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Abstract
Measuring and anticipating systematic risk in credit markets appropriately
are currently the core challenges for many researchers, investors and regula-
tory authorities around the world, especially with regard to structured finance
products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO). The development of a
comprehensive framework for evaluating the risk characteristics of CDOs due
to systematic risk may also allow to identify and to measure pricing impacts of
systematic risk on both structured securities and credit default swaps (CDS).
In credit markets, CDS contracts represent the most common credit derivatives
and they also constitute the collateral in synthetic asset securitizations.
This cumulative thesis confirms the relevance of structured finance products
such as asset securitizations in financial markets and provides an analytical
framework for obtaining detailed insights into their complex risk characteris-
tics due to systematic risk. With regard to systematic influences, this ana-
lytical framework allows a closed-form comparison of comparably rated bonds
and securitized tranches in terms of their default risk and related losses. The
analytical results are backed by several Monte Carlo simulations. Due to the
higher exposure to systematic risk, securitized tranches react much more sensi-
tive to changes in the macroeconomic climate – as source for systematic risk –
than corporate bonds, particularly in economic downturns. Based on the core
characteristics of asset securitizations namely pooling and tranching, effects
of both risk diversification and risk concentration are examined indicating the
product-specific risk profiles. While idiosyncratic risk and sectoral risk may
be diversified in securitizations, pooling and tranching also lead to the con-
centration of systematic risk. The corresponding effect sizes strongly depend
on tranche seniorities. The results also indicate that classical credit ratings
are insufficient metrics for measuring the entire risk of structured securities,
particularly with respect to high-rated, e.g., AAA-rated, tranches.
Correlations, which usually describe the dependency structures within credit-
risky portfolios, are identified as the main drivers for credit portfolio risk
and constitute a major element in pricing portfolio credit derivatives such as
synthetic single-tranche CDO swaps (STCDO). In the standard single-factor
Gaussian copula model for pricing STCDOs, benefits of historical asset cor-
relations gained from stock market returns are strongly limited for pricing
securitized tranches of the 5-year iTraxx Europe credit index. Two alternative
spread-dependent correlation skew models are proposed to model and to fore-
cast implied correlations of iTraxx Europe index tranches from 2005 to 2008.
The applied panel regressions show that the proposed dynamic mixed-effects
regression correlation model (MERM) reaches highest forecast accuracy by ac-
counting for i) random time-specific effects and ii) tranche-specific fixed effects
on implied tranche correlations. The model-based forecast accuracy is mea-
sured in terms of root mean squared forecast errors. The empirical findings
also indicate the presence of a systematic risk factor influencing all spreads of
the index tranches simultaneously.
Quoted CDS spreads from 2004 to 2010 of 339 U.S. entities divided across
ten economic sectors are used in order to examine whether common risk fac-
tors are priced in the cross-section of CDS spreads. By using two-pass regres-
sions, the credit market climate, the cross-market correlation and the market
volatility are identified as systematic risk factors simultaneously affecting the
cross-section of CDS spreads, particularly in times of financial distress and
even in the presence of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk factors such as credit
ratings, liquidity and leverage. Since swap contracts not only exhibit differ-
ent sensitivities to systematic risk by rating class, but also within each rating
class, the need for appropriate systematic risk measures is underlined. The
proposed basic set of risk factors explains about 83% of the CDS spreads prior
to the global financial crisis and about 90% during the crisis. The applied ap-
proach allows to identify contract-specific sensitivities to systematic risk and
to calculate related premium payments. It may also facilitate the development
of a risk-adjusted valuation framework for CDOs, particularly with respect to
systematic risk.
The findings of this thesis are addressed to several interest groups, e.g,
other researchers in the field of credit risk or derivatives, investors dealing
with securitized tranches or swap contracts, risk managers in banks or in-
surance companies engaged in the management of credit risk, and regulatory
authorities developing capital rules for risk-adjusted capital requirements of
financial institutions.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Entwicklung geeigneter Verfahren zur Messung und zur vorausschauen-
den Berücksichtigung systematischer Risiken in Kreditmärkten stellt gegenwär-
tig weltweit eine der zentralen Herausforderungen von vielen Wissenschaftlern,
Investoren und regulatorischen Aufsichtsinstanzen dar. Dies gilt insbesonde-
re mit Blick auf strukturierte Produkte wie Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDO). Die Entwicklung eines umfassenden Bewertungsrahmens zur Beurtei-
lung der Risikocharakteristika von CDOs hinsichtlich systematischer Risiken
kann zudem erste Anhaltspunkte dafür liefern, welchen Bepreisungseinfluss
systematische Risiken auf Verbriefungstransaktionen und auf klassische Kre-
ditderivate wie Credit Default Swaps (CDS) ausüben. CDS Kontrakte stellen
die wesentlichen Kreditderivate auf globalen Kreditmärkten dar und fungieren
in synthetischen Verbriefungstransaktionen als Referenzaktiva.
Im Rahmen dieser kumulierten Dissertation wird die Relevanz von Verbrie-
fungstransaktionen auf Finanzmärkten bestätigt. Zudem wird ein analytisches
Modell vorgestellt, das detaillierte Einblicke in die komplexen Risikocharak-
teristika von CDOs liefert, die sich speziell aufgrund systematischer Risiken
ergeben. Dieser analytische Modellrahmen liefert ferner einen ‘geschlossenen’
Lösungsansatz, um den Einfluss systematischer Risiken auf produkt-spezifische
Ausfallrisiken und damit verbundene Verluste zu quantifizieren. Zusätzliche
Monte Carlo Simulationen stützen die erzielten analytischen Ergebnisse. Da
verbriefte Tranchen systematischen Risiken in einem höheren Maße ausgesetzt
sind, reagieren sie sehr viel sensitiver auf makroökonomische Veränderungen
als Unternehmensanleihen mit vergleichbarem Ausgangsrating, insbesondere
in wirtschaftlichen Abschwungsphasen. Anzumerken bleibt, dass makroökono-
mische Entwicklungen im Allgemeinen als Quelle systematischen Risikos an-
gesehen werden. ‘Poolen’ und ‘Tranchieren’ stellen die wesentlichen Prozes-
se in Verbriefungstransaktionen dar, durch die sowohl Risikodiversifikations-
als auch Risikokonzentrationseffekte erreicht werden. Beide Effekte bestim-
men letztlich die Risikoprofile verbriefter Tranchen, wobei die beobachteten
Effektstärken von der jeweiligen Tranchenseniorität abhängen. Die erzielten
Ergebnisse lassen zudem vermuten, dass klassische Kreditratings unzureichen-
de Meßverfahren für das produktbezogene Ausfallrisiko von strukturierten Ver-
briefungen darstellen, insbesondere in Bezug auf Tranchen, die ein besonders
gutes Rating, bspw. ein AAA-Rating, aufweisen.
Korrelationen, die beispielsweise Abhängigkeitsstrukturen in ausfallrisiko-
behafteten Portfolien zum Ausdruck bringen, werden als Haupttreiber für das
Kreditportfoliorisiko identifiziert und stellen daher einen wesentlichen Faktor
zur Bepreisung von Kreditportfolioderivaten wie synthetischen Einzeltranchen-
CDOs (STCDO) dar. Im standard Einfaktormodell mit Gauß-Copula Spezifi-
kation liefern historische Asset-Korrelationen, die aus Aktienkursrenditen ab-
geleitet werden, nur eingeschränkt brauchbare Bepreisungsinformationen für
verbriefte Tranchen des iTraxx Europe Kreditindex mit fünfjähriger Lauf-
zeit. Daher werden zwei alternative Korrelationsmodelle zur Bestimmung und
Prognose impliziter Korrelationen der untersuchten iTraxx Europe Indextran-
chen von 2005 bis 2008 vorgeschlagen, die spread-abhängige Variationen der
tranchen-spezifischen impliziten Korrelationen berücksichtigen. Basierend auf
den durchgeführten Panelregressionen (Paneldatenanalyse), erreicht das vor-
geschlagenen dynamische Regressionsmodell MERM unter Berücksichtigung
von zufälligen Zeiteffekten und tranchen-fixen Effekten die höchste Prognose-
güte. Dabei wird die modelbezogene Prognosegüte durch die Wurzel aus der
mittleren quadratischen Prognoseabweichung ausgedrückt. Die empirischen Er-
gebnisse deuten ebenfalls darauf hin, dass ein tranchen-übergreifender – also
‘systematischer’ – Risikofaktor zeitgleich die Risikoprämien aller Indextran-
chen beeinflusst.
CDS Prämienquotierungen der Jahre 2004 bis 2010 von 339 U.S. amerikani-
schen Unternehmen, die sich über insgesamt zehn Wirtschaftssektoren erstre-
cken, werden genutzt, um zu untersuchen, ob schuldnerübergreifende Risiko-
faktoren im Querschnitt der vorhandenen CDS Spreads bepreist werden. Auf
Basis eines zweistufigen Regressionsverfahrens, werden das allgemeine Kre-
ditmarktumfeld, die Kreuzmarktkorrelation und die Marktvolatilität als sys-
tematische Risikofaktoren identifiziert, die zeitgleich sämtliche Risikoprämien
im Querschnitt der untersuchten Swap Kontrakte beeinflussen, insbesondere in
finanzmarktbezogenen Krisenzeiten. Dieser Bepreisungseinfluss systematischer
Risikofaktoren bleibt auch dann noch bestehen, wenn für idiosynkratische oder
unternehmens-spezifische Risikofaktoren wie Kreditratings, Liquidität und den
Verschuldungsgrad kontrolliert wird. Da die Sensitivität der untersuchten CDS
Kontrakte gegenüber systematischen Risiken nicht nur kontraktspezifisch vari-
iert, sondern auch innerhalb der betrachteten Ratingklassen deutlich schwankt,
wird der Bedarf nach geeigneten Meßverfahren für systematische Risiken be-
sonders deutlich. In der Zeit vor dem Einsetzen der letzten globalen Finanz-
krise erklären die vorgeschlagenen Risikofaktoren des Basismodells ungefähr
83% der CDS Spreads, während sie im Krisenzeitraum ungefähr 90% der ent-
sprechenden Risikoprämien erklären. Insgesamt ermöglicht der implementierte
Regressionsansatz zum einen eine Identifikation kontraktspezifischer Sensiti-
vitäten hinsichtlich systematischer Risiken und zum anderen die Berechnung
entsprechender Risikoprämien. Zudem liefert er erste Erkenntnisse zur Ent-
wicklung eines risikoadjustierten Bewertungsrahmens für CDOs, insbesondere
mit Blick auf die Berücksichtigung systematischer Risiken.
Die Arbeitsinhalte und -ergebnisse dieser Dissertation richten sich an ver-
schiedene Interessengruppen: beispielsweise an andere Wissenschaftler im
Kreditrisiko- oder Derivatebereich, an Investoren, die mit strukturierten Ver-
briefungen oder CDS-Kontrakten handeln, an Risikomanager in Banken oder
Versicherungsgesellschaften, die mit dem Management von Kreditrisken be-
traut sind, aber auch an regulatorische Aufsichtsinstanzen, die risikoadjustierte
Eigenkapitalvorschriften für Banken entwickeln und festsetzen.
Schlagwörter:
Systematisches Risko, Collateralized Debt Obligation, Credit Default Swap
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Credit Risk and Structured Finance Securi-
ties
Many practitioners and researchers consider Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDO) as one of the most important financial innovations of the recent decades
(see Hull & White 2008, Longstaff 2010). However, these structured financial
instruments have often been controversially discussed, since they were also
identified as a major source of credit losses in the recent credit crisis (see
Longstaff 2010). The developments in structured finance markets show both a
sharp rise in the demand for these structured instruments up to the year 2007
and a dramatic fall of their issuance volume in the aftermath, which began
with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Since 2010, the market
developments have shown that asset securitization has been rediscovered as
valuable tool for managing credit risk.1
Dealing with risk is the day-to-day business of financial institutions in glob-
alized financial markets (Bruyère et al. 2006).2 Thereby, risk is commonly
divided into market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk and credit risk (BIS
2006, 2010a). Particularly credit risk gained increasingly in importance during
the last two decades and encouraged not only the emergence of credit deriva-
1 Credit risk can be seen as default risk or the risk of a decrease in the market value of
a liability due to changes in the obligor’s credit quality (Duffie & Singleton 2003). The
management of credit risk may refer to buy-and-hold strategies and to transferring or
hedging credit risk in general.
2 For further information about the set of activities related to the risk management of
financial institutions see Duffie & Singleton (2003) and Hull (2007).
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tives in general, but also the design of more complex securitization structures.3
The growing attention of numerous researchers, market participants, and reg-
ulatory authorities around the world was caused by several waves of corporate
bankruptcies, for example, in Germany during the nineties (e.g., Herstatt-
Bank, Bankhaus Fischer, and SchmidtBank), and during the last financial
crisis.4 In this context, the need for more transparent supervision mechanisms
for credit risk has triggered the introduction of a revised capital adequacy
framework – known as Basel II – that became effective in January 2007 (BIS
2006). Due to the recent financial turmoil, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision tightened these seemingly insufficient regulatory requirements in
another revision called Basel III. The Basel III framework particularly focuses
on the regulatory treatment of asset securitizations and re-securitizations in
order to reestablish and maintain stability in global financial markets (BIS
2009b, 2011).
The GFC has also shown that unexpected high default rates have caused
credit losses on global credit markets, which were far above investors’ expec-
tations, even if those expectations primarily relied on classical credit ratings
(Moody’s 2011b).5 Thereby, default rates and related losses were only one
channel, which has shown the wide impacts of credit risk.6 Normally, an
excellent credit rating, e.g., ‘Aaa’, provided by credit-rating agencies (CRA)
such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch, suggests the highest
creditworthiness of the rated borrower. However, in the last few years particu-
larly high-rated financial instruments were strongly affected by macroeconomic
shocks – or more generally by systematic risk. Thus, market participants who
were invested in these ‘low risk’ products have been surprised by high default
rates.
This effect was even stronger for credit derivatives than for corporate debt
claims such as classical bonds. Especially, structured financial instruments
3 While in 2003 the annual survey of the Center for the Study of Financial Innovation
(CSFI) (‘Banking Banana Skins 2003’) reported that derivatives and credit risk were the
main risks for the banking community, the annual survey of 2012 identified macroeconomic
risk and credit risk as the top risks in banking (CSFI 2003, 2012).
4 A well-known example is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Inc. on September 15th,
2008. This default event was a major reason for distrust in the banking community which
has caused liquidity troubles within the interbank market in the aftermath.
5 Typically, a rating refers to the obligor’s creditworthiness and thus expresses an opinion
about his ability to fulfill contractual interest and liquidation payments (liabilities).
6 Other channels, for example, were governmental, regulatory and bank internal adjust-
ments of credit risk policies.
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like CDOs relying on entire debt portfolios or Credit Default Swap (CDS)
baskets leveraged such systematic risk through pooling and tranching. Thus,
empirical observations from 2007 to 2010 have shown that the physical default
rates of structured securities were multiples of those related to comparably
rated bonds (Moody’s 2011b,a). The risk characteristics of securitizations –
even in terms of financial distress – may be the reason why the market for
structured securities rapidly broke down in these years, although the demand
for asset securitizations was impressive in the decade prior to the GFC.
Simultaneously, credit spreads for corporate bonds and debt-related instru-
ments such as CDS or securitized tranches increased across all rated prod-
ucts, but the effects on high-rated instruments were disproportionally intense.
Risk premiums for ‘Aaa’-rated bonds or tranches increased much more rapidly
than those for lower-rated credit assets. In corporate bond markets, this phe-
nomenon is known as the ‘credit spread puzzle’ dealing with the mismatch
between prices for the product’s physical default risk and the risk neutral val-
uation of the product’s total risk (compare Amato & Remolona 2003, Hui
2010). Therefore, solving this puzzle implies having to look beyond the prod-
uct’s physical default risk indicated by its rating in order to identify further
pricing components compensating for, e.g., related liquidity risk, counter-party
risk and systematic risk. With respect to systematic risk, recent studies come
to the conclusion that ratings do not appropriately reflect this kind of risk,
especially in terms of securitizations (see, e.g., Rösch & Scheule 2009, 2010).
Thus, Coval et al. (2009b) state that particularly market participants investing
in asset securitizations should claim premiums beyond the products’s physical
default probabilities compensating for impacts of systematic risk.
Recent empirical studies address several determinants of credit spreads with
respect to corporate bond markets (among others Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001,
De Jong & Driessen 2006, Hui 2010, Iannotta & Pennacchi 2011, Giesecke,
Longstaff, Schaefer & Strebulaev 2011, Friewald et al. 2012) in order to decom-
pose observed credit spreads into their major pricing elements. These studies
often suspect common risk factors as the main drivers for pricing credit risk
of corporate debt claims. Besides bond spreads, the analysis of systematic
risk factors in pricing CDS contracts seems to be of special interest for several
reasons: firstly, single-name CDS represent a substantial section of the credit
derivatives market (BBA 2006, SIFMA 2012c). Secondly, several types of secu-
ritizations often involve swap contracts. Thirdly, baskets of single-name CDS
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contracts mainly represent the collateral of synthetic CDOs which has been
increased in their market relevance since 2002 (BBA 2006, SIFMA 2012c).7 In
fact, only a few studies examine how systematic risk is affecting swap premi-
ums (Amato 2005, Blanco et al. 2005, Ericsson et al. 2009, Gala et al. 2010,
Gandhi et al. 2012).
Thus far, the recent financial literature and also many public discussions
underline the relevance of that topic and show that measuring and anticipat-
ing systematic risk are currently the core challenges for researchers, investors
and regulatory authorities around the world – not only with regard to struc-
tured products. Indeed, the recent literature shows a lack of a comprehensive
framework for evaluating the risk characteristics of structured products due
to systematic risk, which may also allow to identify and to measure pricing
impacts of systematic risk.
Despite the critical discussion of securitizations, a couple of reasons support
the commitment of structured securities.8 At least these benefits underline the
need for further empirical research investigating the complex risk profiles of
such asset securitizations in terms of default risk and related losses, which
determine their ‘natural’ behavior due to systematic risk. Furthermore, scien-
tific efforts are gaining in importance even if the discussion of such products
is becoming more and more emotional and backed less by empirical evidence,
as reported in FCIC (2011).
This cumulative thesis confirms the relevance of structured products in fi-
nancial markets and provides an analytical framework for obtaining detailed
insights into the risk characteristics of structured products due to systematic
risk. The analytical models as well as Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are ap-
plied to quantify the impacts of systematic risk on default rates and related
losses of securitized tranches. The suggested model setup additionally allows
to spotlight the effects of both risk diversification and concentration in secu-
ritizations. The major limitations of CRA ratings are also indicated in this
framework. Particularly with respect to systematic risk, the empirical stud-
ies presented in this thesis firstly suggest that tranche spreads of the 5-year
iTraxx Europe credit index may jointly be driven by a systematic component
7 Compare Laurent & Gregory (2005) for a detailed analysis of CDS baskets.
8 Compare Chapter 2 and Rajan et al. (2007) for an introductory overview.
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and secondly that systematic risk is also priced in U.S. CDS spreads.9 Related
to the CDS-spread study, some measures for systematic risk are identified and
empirically tested for their cross-sectional pricing impact on CDS spreads in
order to quantify systematic risk premiums, even after controlling for essential
idiosyncratic risk factors such as rating information, firm leverage or market
capitalization. The results also show that the risk premium linked to credit
ratings does not sufficiently compensate for contract-specific systematic risk
exposures. Thus, market participants may claim a separate risk premium for
facing systematic risk.
In conclusion, this thesis targets
• a better understanding of ‘complex’ securitizations, their functionality
and relevance in financial markets,
• the application of dynamic implied correlation concepts for pricing single-
tranche CDO swaps,
• the risk characteristics of structured products due to systematic risk, and
• common determinants of credit default swap spreads to quantify the
pricing impacts of systematic risk on such credit derivatives.
The empirical findings related to the latter objective may facilitate the devel-
opment of a risk-adjusted valuation framework for CDOs, particularly with
respect to systematic risk. Thus, the findings are addressed to several groups,
e.g, other researchers in the field of credit risk or derivatives, investors deal-
ing with securitized tranches or swap contracts, risk managers in banks or
insurance companies engaged in the management of credit risk, and regula-
tory authorities developing capital rules for risk-adjusted capital requirements.
Eventually, this work may help to return more confidence to structured finance
instruments for a ‘healthy’ or rather sustainable handling of these products in
order to increase the transparency and stability in global financial markets.
9 Nowadays, such swap contracts constitute not only the most issued and liquid credit
derivatives, but also the major elements of synthetic asset securitizations, such as syn-
thetic CDOs. For a good description of the 5-year iTraxx Europe as one of the most
popular credit indices and an example for such synthetic CDOs see www.iTraxx.com.
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1.2 Outline and Contributions
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines why es-
pecially CDOs – one major class of Asset-backed Securities (ABS) – have been
widely seen as a popular tool for managing credit risk prior to the GFC.10 For
the time period from 2000 to 2011 developments of the global CDO market are
examined by year in terms of their issuance, global outstanding, collateral and
purpose. The developments in structured financial markets show the sharp
rise of this security class until the year 2007 and their dramatic fall triggered
by the beginning of the GFC. The recent market developments also indicate
that their popularity has again increased since 2010. Furthermore, the analysis
shows that rating-based default rates reported by Moody’s indicate limitations
of current rating metrics, especially in macroeconomic downturns. Eventually,
the market developments may reflect the influences of systematic risk on struc-
tured securities, particularly caused by changes in the global macroeconomic
climate as a source for systematic risk.
Chapter 3 reviews the existing paradigms for modeling default risk of a
single borrower: structural models and intensity models. Factor models for
credit risk are introduced as special case of intensity models and a unifying
synthesis of the models is provided. Based on these preliminaries, the models
are extended to portfolio credit risk, which is essential for valuation purposes
of asset securitizations. In this context, the single-factor Gaussian copula
model is specified, which represents the market standard model for pricing
CDOs and single-tranche CDO swaps (STCDO), see Hull & White (2008)
and Finger (2009). Additionally, the copula approach is briefly presented as
flexible framework for modeling joint default times of borrowers in a credit
portfolio. Common correlation concepts such as asset and default correlation
are introduced in order to reflect dependency structures between borrowers.
Correlations are identified as major determinants of credit portfolio risk and
thus also constitute important parameters for pricing structured securities.
The empirical study in Chapter 4 contrasts several correlation approaches
and confirms the limitations of historical asset correlations in the standard
10 The database of the empirical analysis ‘Developments in Structured Finance Markets’
was provided by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
and refers to U.S. ABS, global CDOs and European securitizations from January 1996
to December 2011. The respective impairment and rating database was provided by
Moody’s.
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single-factor Gaussian copula model for pricing STCDOs.11 Compound and
base correlations, as two popular concepts of implied correlations, are intro-
duced in order to overcome the pricing limitations of a single-correlation ap-
proach. Within a dynamic panel regression framework, two alternative spread-
dependent correlation skew models are proposed to model and forecast implied
correlations of tranches referring to ‘on the run’ series of the 5-year iTraxx Eu-
rope credit index. Thereby, random effects are incorporated in order to account
for unobservable time-specific effects on implied tranche correlations. The pro-
posed dynamic mixed-effects regression correlation model (MERM) is checked
for its forecast accuracy in comparison to a dynamic asset correlation model
and a fixed-effects regression correlation model (FERM). The empirical find-
ings suggest that historical asset correlations gained from stock market returns
– as proposed in the financial literature several times – are insufficiently re-
flecting the dependency structure across single-name CDS in the credit index.
This leads to a mismatch between tranche-specific model spreads and market
spreads. Indeed, the highest forecast accuracy measured in terms of root mean
squared forecast errors (RMSFE) is reached by applying the proposed MERM.
Since each regression model refers to three different sample periods, the predic-
tion power of all three models is also checked under varying economic climates:
in times of financial distress (during the GFC), in moderate market conditions
(pre-crisis) and for the entire period from August 2005 to September 2008.
Eventually, the empirical findings also hold for different macroeconomic condi-
tions and indicate the presence of a common risk factor influencing all tranche
spreads simultaneously.
In Chapter 5, effects of systematic risk on asset securitizations are explicitly
addressed.12 The provided analytical framework refers to a basic model exten-
sion of the standard single-factor Gaussian copula model (see Gordy 2003) and
allows a closed-form comparison of comparably rated bonds and tranches. The
comparison provides insights into product-specific default risks, related losses
11 The empirical study ‘Dynamic Implied Correlation Modeling and Forecasting in Struc-
tured Finance’ refers to daily index and tranche spreads of the 5-year iTraxx Europe
credit index and its securitized tranches from August 2005 to September 2008. The index
tranches refer to a basket of the 125 most liquid and equally weighted single-name CDS on
European entities. The spread database was provided by Markit, contains 4,494 spread
notations in total, and covers six ‘on the run’ series of the credit index.
12 In the analytical study ‘Systematic Risk Sensitivity of Structured Financial Products’ the
natural behavior of asset securitization due to systematic risk is demonstrated. In several
case studies based on Monte Carlo simulations, the basic assumptions of the analytical
model are stepwise relaxed to account for a more ‘realistic’ model setup.
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and sensitivities to systematic risk. Even if both products share the same (un-
conditional) probability of default in the model setup, they exhibit greatly dif-
ferent risk profiles with respect to systematic risk. Furthermore, these findings
show that tranches are much more sensitive to systematic risk than corporate
bonds due to their increased exposure to systematic risk. The risk charac-
teristics of securitized tranches are strongly dependent on the subordination
level. A MC approach also demonstrates the effects of pooling and tranching
and additionally facilitates the investigation of both risk diversification and
concentration effects. While bonds are typically exposed to idiosyncratic, sec-
toral and macroeconomic risk, securitizations allow the diversification of both
idiosyncratic and sectoral risk, but also lead to the concentration of system-
atic risk exposures. The effects may be even more severe for tranches of high
seniority. Eventually, the higher concentration of systematic risk exposures in
structured products may be responsible for the dramatic increase of impair-
ments in economic downturns as it was observable during the GFC (compare
Chapter 2). However, the analytical as well as the MC approach indicate that
classical ratings are insufficient metrics for measuring risks of structured securi-
ties, particularly with respect to high-rated tranches. Overall, the model-based
outcome corresponds to the empirical findings in Chapter 2, where historical
impairments of securitizations are reported by rating.
In Chapter 6, determinants of CDS spread changes are investigated based
on a comprehensive spread data set.13 Several macroeconomic and financial
variables are proposed to explain the cross-section of CDS spreads. The proxies
for these common risk variables are applied in a two-pass regression approach
in order to examine factor-specific pricing contributions (compare Fama &
MacBeth 1973).
In the first pass, the contract-specific sensitivities to systematic risk are eval-
uated based on proxies for the Cross-market Correlation, the Market Volatility,
the Credit Market Climate, the Slope of the Term Structure and the Spot Rate.
Since swap contracts not only show different sensitivities to systematic risk by
rating class, but also within each rating class, the need for systematic risk mea-
sures is underlined. In the second pass, these systematic risk sensitivities are
tested for their explanatory power in pricing swap contracts cross-sectionally,
13 The empirical study ‘Valuation of Systematic Risk in the Cross-section of Credit Default
Swap Spreads’ relies on a CDS spread database of 339 U.S. firms divided across ten
economic sectors from January 2004 to December 2010. The spread database was provided
by Markit and contains 124,413 weekly spread observations in total.
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even after controlling for several idiosyncratic risk factors such as the firm’s
Rating, Leverage Ratio, Market Capitalization and the contract-specific Swap
Liquidity. Even though credit ratings may determine the general CDS spread
level, these spread levels seem to depend on the macroeconomic climate and,
therefore, vary over time. Hence, two-pass regressions are conducted for two
different time intervals (subsampling): while the first sample refers to moder-
ate economic conditions prior to the GFC, the second sample covers the period
of financial distress during the GFC. The empirical findings demonstrate that
the premium for the firm’s physical default risk is not sufficiently compen-
sating for systematic risk. In addition to the firm’s physical default risk and
other idiosyncratic risk premiums, particularly the Credit Market Climate, the
Cross-market Correlation and Market Volatility are cross-sectionally rewarded
in CDS spreads. In contrast to equity markets, the Fama-French factors exhibit
rather limited explanatory power for the pricing of swap contracts. Further-
more, the main findings are quite robust for different proxies of the interest
term structure. Thus, the empirical results hold, even if swap rates are incor-
porated instead of Treasury bills. A principal component analysis suggests the
presence of an additional common risk factor, which is not explicitly addressed,
but significantly priced in the cross-section of swap contracts during the GFC.
Overall, this study contributes a framework for identifying contract-specific
sensitivities to systematic risk and allows to quantify the factor-specific pric-
ing contributions in the cross-section of CDS spreads. Chapter 7 concludes
and provides a brief outlook for suggested research.
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Chapter 2
Developments in Structured
Finance Markets
The content of this chapter will be published as Löhr S. (2013) ‘Developments
in Structured Financial Markets’ in Rösch, D., and Scheule, H. (eds.): ‘Credit
Securities and Derivatives: Challenges for the Global Markets’, Wiley.
2.1 Impairments of Asset-backed Securities and
Outstanding Ratings
In 2010 the number of impaired Asset-backed Securities (ABS) fell for the first
time in five years to 8,071 from 14,242 in 2009 (Moody’s 2011b). By contrast,
there were only 106 ABS impairments reported for 2006 which was several
months before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began in June 2007.14
Before analyzing the impairments by year, as well as further market devel-
opments, the major ABS structures and its functionality are briefly discussed:
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 2004) defines ABS as
financial securities “that are backed by a discrete pool of self-liquidating fi-
nancial assets.” The SEC (2004) further defines asset-backed securitization in
its regulation rules as “a financing technique in which financial assets [...] are
pooled and converted into instruments that may be offered and sold in the
capital markets. In a basic securitization structure, an entity, often a finan-
cial institution and commonly known as a ‘sponsor’ originates or otherwise
acquires a pool of financial assets, such as mortgage loans [...]. It then sells
14 For a chronology of the GFC see BIS (2009a).
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the financial assets [...] to a specially created investment vehicle that issues
[...] asset-backed securities. Payment on the asset-backed securities depends
primarily on the cash flows generated by the assets in the underlying pool
and other rights designed to assure timely payment, such as liquidity facilities,
guarantees or other features generally known as credit enhancements."15
Based on this definition Figure 2.1 summarizes the functionality of a simple
asset securitization focusing on the loss flow in such a structure. Corresponding
to the SEC’s definition of ABS, the underlying asset pool, which is also called
the collateral, typically consists of debt assets that are unable to be traded
individually. These debt assets are represented by single-name Loan 1 to 10
on the left hand side of Figure 2.1. Furthermore, Loan 1 to Loan 8 (in any
order) constitute the specified pool of loans (collateral), which is tranched
afterwards.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Loss-flow in a Simple Asset Securitization
Pooling & Tranching Asset Securitization
Loan 2
Loan 3
Loan 4
Loan 5
Loan 6
Loan 7
Loan 8
Loan 1
Loan 8
Loan 7
Loan 2
Loan 1
Loan 5
Loan 3
Loan 6
Loan 4
Equity Tranche
Mezzanine Tranche
Senior Tranche
Loss
Loan 9
Loan 10
Notes: This figure shows the loss flow in a simple asset securitization. Other elements such as premium
flows, issuance and rating structures and involved participants are omitted for simplicity.
Through pooling and tranching – as main characteristics of securitizations
– the original debt claims are converted to tradeable financial instruments
(tranches) that may be sold to external investors in accordance to their in-
15 In § 364 of the Standard Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 securitizations are
similarly defined as “the process by which financial assets are transformed into securities."
(FASB 2000).
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dividual risk-return profile.16 The investor’s risk-return profile is determined
by his internal willingness to face risk related to the respective security. De-
pending on the instrument’s inherent risk, an investor may expect a premium
that compensates him for bearing this risk.17 The Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), for example, is the most popular factor model for pricing the risk
of assets (compare Sharpe 1964). How to calculate credit risk premiums of
tranches is discribed in Chapter 3, where the standard single-factor Gaussian
copula model is introduced for pricing single-tranche CDO swaps.
The asset securitization in Figure 2.1 consists of three tranches representing
generic tranche types: the equity, mezzanine and senior tranche. Often, the
originator (sponsor) partly retains the issued securitization to signal the credit
quality of underlying debt claims.18 The retained part of the securitization is
mostly the equity tranche, which is also called first loss piece, since it covers
first losses in the collateral (see Renault 2007).
If losses in the collateral exceed the size of the equity tranche, measured in
its nominal or in percentage of the total portfolio loss, then the next tranche
of higher seniority suffers from defaults in the collateral and so on. Referring
to Figure 2.1, the cumulated losses of Loan 2 and Loan 5 exceed the thickness
of the equity tranche and thus also hit the mezzanine tranche. Eventually,
both tranches are impaired, the equity tranche completely and the mezzanine
tranche in parts. Thus, investors of both tranches suffer from losses in the
collateral: while the nominal of the equity-tranche investor has been entirely
eliminated, the exceeding losses are covered by the investor who holds the mez-
zanine tranche. Consequently, the nominal of senior tranche holders remains
unaffected. Hence, according to this subordination principle, subordinated
tranches provide loss buffers for more senior tranches. Thereby, tranche losses
are generally restricted to the nominal or principal of the respective tranche
(thickness). Thus, the risk profiles of securitized tranches may clearly differ
from each other in terms of default risk and related losses strongly depend-
16 Note that risk is defined here as uncertainty measured in terms of the standard deviation
of expectations, e.g., referring to expected returns or expected losses (compare Modigliani
& Pogue 1974). Indeed, other definitions of risk are available.
17 Under the assumption that risk averse investors attempt to maximize their expected
returns according to their individually acceptable levels of risk – which is one of the most
important capital market theories – there should exist a relationship between expected
return and risk (compare Modigliani & Pogue 1974).
18 Examples for such originators are banks, monoline insurers, reinsurers, and pensions funds
(compare Rajan et al. 2007).
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ing on i) the risk characteristics of the collateral and ii) the seniority of the
tranche.
Finally, each security funds a fraction of the underlying pool and transfers
the related risk to the investors, such as banks, insurance companies, hedge
funds, investment banks. In turn, tranche investors receive a premium pay-
ment which is periodically paid out, e.g., quarterly, and which is a compensa-
tion for the default risk. Thus, related cash flows can be distinguished by their
payment directions into the premium leg (pass-through structure) and the pro-
tection leg.19 The premium leg contains the investors’ risk premium paid by
the issuer. The risk premium is mostly raised from cash flows generated by the
collateral through interest and/or liquidation payments. Premium payments
also follow the subordination principle: hence, the premium claims of senior
tranche investors are firstly served stepwise followed by claims of investors
who purchased subordinated tranches (waterfall principle). Since premium
payments strongly depend on the risk-profile of securitized tranches, the pre-
miums for the equity tranches are generally much higher than the respective
ones of more senior tranches. The protection leg (contingent payments) has to
be paid from investors to its counterparts in terms of a default event within
the collateral to compensate for occurred losses. In general, the definition of
a default event may vary. However, in standard securitizations such default
events are triggered by delayed or failed interest payments and liquidation.20
In order to achieve an appropriate risk profile of the entire credit expo-
sure, both the originator as well as the contract counterparties may engage in
asset securitizations. Required customization as well as optimization of the
counterparts’ credit portfolio risk can easily be executed with credit deriva-
tives involving so-called bespoke, or customized, CDO tranches (Rajan et al.
2007). Bespoke securitizations are often generated in cooperation with rat-
ing agencies such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. For example, a single investor
announces his individual risk-return preference, e.g., expressed by a desired
tranche rating in line with a risk-adjusted premium claim, to the issuer and
the cooperating rating agency. In the following, the issuer defines both the
collateral and the tranche sizes as well as the subordination in order to meet
19 Both payment legs play a crucial role for further valuation purposes referring to structured
securities, compare Chapters 3 and 6.
20 Moody’s, one of the leading rating agencies worldwide, for example, defines an interest
impairment, that is also an default event, as an interest shortfall continuing for 12 months
or more (see Moody’s 2011b).
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the rating agency’s requirements to achieve the target rating.21 Afterwards,
the individually securitized tranche is purchased by the investor who adds di-
versity to his portfolio. Besides bespoke asset securitization, the ABS market
offers a variety of business opportunities for global rating agencies, which is
also indicated by a rapidly increasing number of tranche ratings, as shown
later on.
To alleviate the following market analysis of structured securities, Figure
2.2 provides an overview of the major ABS structures.
Figure 2.2: Major Asset-backed Security Classes
Asset-backed Securities (wide sense) 
• Home Equity Loans (HEL) 
• Auto Loans 
• Credit Card Receivables 
• Student Loans etc. 
 
Asset-backed Securities 
(more specifically) 
Mortgage-backed 
Securities (MBS) 
Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDO) 
• Commercial MBS (CMBS) 
• Residential MBS (RMBS) 
• Collateralzized Loan 
Obligations (CLO) 
• Collateralized Bond  
Obligations (CBO) 
Other Cash-flow Generating Backed Securities 
Notes: This figure summarizes the three major classes of Asset-backed Securities and its sub-classes.
In general, ABS may be seen as hypernym for all asset backed securities
(wide sense), but more specifically ABS are for themselves seen as financial
securities backed by, e.g., home equity loans (HEL), auto loans, leases, credit
card receivables, student loans, aircraft leases etc. Other sub-classes of ABS
are Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDO). MBS can further be separated into Commercial MBS and Residential
MBS.22 Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO) as well as Collateralized Bond
Obligations (CBO) represent sub-categories of CDOs. Hence, depending on
the underlying collateral and its characteristics ABS structures may be further
sub-classified.
Figure 2.3 underlines the development of annual impairments of structured
finance securities (x-axis) from 2000 to 2010 (y-axis) for major Asset-backed
21 The Moody’s long-term ordinal rating scale for bonds and structured finance, for example,
reaches from ‘Aaa’ (highest creditworthiness) to ‘C’ (lowest creditworthiness) embedding
21 categories (grades) (see Moody’s 2009b).
22 Agency MBS are securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac representing a major category of MBS in the U.S.
(see SEC 2011).
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Security (ABS) structures (Moody’s 2011b).23
Figure 2.3: Total Impairments of Structured Securities
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Notes: This figure shows the amount of impairments for major U.S. Asset-backed Security classes from 2000
to 2010. Other SF contains structured finance securities that are not categorized in the four major sectors
(ABS, CDO, CMBS, and RMBS). Data Source: Moody’s (2011b).
In contrast to the period from 2000 to 2006, where 1,064 cumulated im-
pairments occurred, the number of impairments dramatically increased in the
years 2007 to 2009 triggered by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).24 The
events of the GFC come along with strongly increasing credit spreads25 par-
ticularly on the credit derivative markets around the world, e.g., the markets
for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) (see Chapter 6). Simultaneously, the credit
risk premiums of portfolio credit derivatives related to popular credit indices
such as the iTraxx Europe index families and the U.S. CDX index families also
increased rapidly, as shown in Chapter 4 with respect to tranches of the 5Y
iTraxx Europe credit index.26
The sharp rise of ABS impairments in 2007 can be attributed to the U.S.
housing crisis, which was spawned by nationwide U.S. housing price declines
23 Note that Moody’s definition of material impairments includes a downgrade to ‘Ca’ or
‘C’, which often occurs far in advance of any interest shortfall or principal write-down.
24 For more detailed information on the chronology of the GFC compare BIS (2009a).
25 A credit spread may simply be seen as premium compensating, e.g., investors, for the
related default risk, see also Footnote 50 for a literature remark.
26 These credit indices are baskets containing the 125 most liquid CDS contracts (equally
weighted) either from U.S. entities having investment grade (IG) ratings (CDX) or from
European entities having IG ratings (iTraxx). For further information to CDOs and credit
indices see Chapter 4 and Longstaff & Rajan (2008).
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combined with a sudden tightening of credit standards and rising interest rates
(Moody’s 2011b). Although, the tranche impairments in 2007 (2,153) were al-
ready as twice as high as the cumulated impairments observed over the previous
six years, the total amount was rapidly increasing to 12,719 in 2008 which was
almost six times higher than in 2007. With 14,242 the peak of impairments
was reached in 2009 due to 13,618 principal write-downs (95.61%) and 624
interest shortfalls (4.39%).27
Based on total impairments by year shown in Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4 shows
the fraction of impairments in percent for U.S. ABS excluding (ex) HEL, U.S.
RMBS/HEL, U.S. CMBS, global CDO and other structured finance (SF) se-
curities.
Figure 2.4: Impairments of Structured Securities by Sector
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Notes: This figure shows the percentages of material impairments from 2006 to 2010 related to the four major
asset-backed security classes (or sectors): U.S. ABS ex Home Equity Loans (HEL), U.S. RMBS/HEL, U.S.
CMBS, Global CDO, and Other SF. Other SF contains structured finance securities that are not categorized
in the four major sectors. Data Source: Moody’s (2011b).
While the U.S. ABS ex HEL market exhibited the highest default frequency
until 2007 with on average 36.6% over the years 2000 up to 2006, impairments
are clearly dominated by U.S. RMBS/HEL since 2007. In contrast to 2006,
where we observed almost balanced impairments across all major ABS classes
(except other SF), especially the market for U.S. Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities (RMBS), Home Equity Loans (HEL) and global Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDO) suffered from default events related to its borrowers in later
years.
27 In the previous 5 years, the proportion of principal write-downs on the total impairments
was above 99% throughout. The number of interest shortfalls is generally small because
most either can be cured (repaid) or become principal impairments.
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In 2007, 1,505 tranche defaults in the U.S. RMBS/HEL market account for
more than 69.9% of the total, followed by impairments of global CDO tranches
with a proportion of 27.7%. Thus, both securitization classes accounted for
more than 97.6% of reported tranche defaults in the first year of the GFC.
In the following years, there was again a slight shift in the proportion of sec-
toral impairments: up to the impairment peak in 2009 the U.S. RMBS/HEL
proportion of tranche defaults increased to 75.6% (10,774), while the respec-
tive proportion of global CDOs clearly decreased to 17.5%. But despite this
decrease the absolute number of 2,496 impairments was relatively high and
still higher than the overall impairments in 2007.
In 2010, U.S. RMBS/HEL accounted for 78.7%, U.S. Commercial MBS
for 16.6% and global CDOs for 3.8% of the 8,071 reported tranche defaults.
Thereby, the new impairments of U.S. CMBS increased by 59% from 839 to
1,337. However, we observe a decrease of almost 47% in new impairments in
comparison to the previous year in total across the reported ABS classes. The
decrease of impairments from absolute 2,496 to 304 (about 88%) is even higher
in the global CDO market.
Figure 2.5 shows the proportion of outstanding ratings across the reported
ABS classes for January 2007 and 2010 (compare Moody’s 2008, 2011b).
Figure 2.5: Comparison of Outstanding Ratings
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2010 (total: 94,326). The ratings refer to the entire reported Asset-backed security market, particularly to
U.S. ABS ex HEL, U.S. RMBS/HEL, U.S. CMBS, Global CDO and Other SF. Other SF contains structured
finance securities that are not categorized in the four major sectors. Data Source: Moody’s (2008, 2011b).
Moody’s (2011b) reports that the number of new ratings by closing year
exponentially increased from 1993 to 2006 and reached its peak in 2006 with
over 27,000 ratings. During the turmoils of the global financial markets, the
number of new ratings decreased strongly and fell below 2,500 in 2010 which
is the second lowest level since 1993 (compare Moody’s 2011b). Consequently,
the number of outstanding ratings moderately declines for the second year in
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a row across all ABS classes.
In 2010 – analogous to 2007 (reported in parentheses) – the amount of
ratings for structured securities backed by U.S. RMBS/HEL approximately
accounted for 61.4% (60.1%) of the outstanding ratings and was thus leading,
followed by U.S. CMBS ratings approximately accounting for 9.3% (9.8%) and
by global CDO ratings approximately accounting for 13.4% (13.4%).
While the distribution of outstanding ratings was heavily skewed in the
beginning of 2007 towards Investment Grade (IG) ratings, the respective dis-
tribution for 2010 was not: with over 50% ‘Aaa’-rated tranches the IG ratings
making up 91.8% of all asset-backed security ratings in 2007. In contrast, ap-
proximately 55.3% of all structured ratings were below the IG rating in the
beginning of 2010. The proportion of tranches in the ‘Aaa’ category experi-
enced a decline of over 36%, while the amount of non-IG rated tranches was
about 6.7 times higher than in 2007, despite the numerous impairments in the
previous years.
Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of material impairments by original rating
of structured securities in 2010.
Figure 2.6: Impairments of Asset-backed Securities by Original Rating (in %)
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of material impairments, defined as interest shortfalls or principal
write-downs, by the original rating of Asset-backed Securities for the year 2010 in percent. Data Source:
Moody’s (2011b).
As already indicated, in 2010 most tranche impairments occurred in rating
category ‘Aaa’ which is expected to contain the most secure tranches in terms
of default risk. Interestingly, tranches of category ‘Caa’ to ‘C’ exhibiting the
lowest creditworthiness represent the smallest group of defaulted securities.
Overall, 90.4% of impaired tranches were labeled with an IG rating, which
underlines the shortcomings of current rating metrics.
These rating-based descriptives lead to two major results: firstly, the dis-
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tress on the global financial markets arrived with strongly increasing material
impairments across all securitized asset classes. From an economic perspective
a dramatic increase of physical defaults was observed across various financial
instruments, e.g., bonds, loans, leases, structured products, even during the
economic downturn, either caused by principal write-downs or continuing in-
terest shortfalls. However, structured financial instruments seem to have been
particularly affected by the financial turmoil, since its investors were faced
with unexpected high default frequencies/rates, even though they invested in
‘Aaa’-rated securities.
Under the assumption that global economic movements are caused by unob-
servable systematic risk which affects all economic sectors simultaneously, one
may conclude that particularly structured finance instruments are exposed to
systematic risk due to pooling and tranching (compare also Chapter 5). The
impacts of systematic risk are especially observable in economic downturns
since this economic distress becomes manifest in an increase of impairments
(downside risk). On the other hand, the systematic upside risk is rather neg-
ligible since default events are rarely triggered by economic upturns.
Eventually, these market developments indicate not only that structured
finance products exhibit a higher sensitivity to systematic risk than other fi-
nancial instruments such as classical bonds, but also that the systematic risk
sensitivity is monotonically increasing with the tranche seniority.28
Despite the absence of an exact knowledge about the established rating
methodologies, one may secondly conclude that ratings are not appropriately
measuring default risk of structured securities at all. Rather, they seem to
underestimate risk characteristics of structured financial products, especially
in times of market crisis, as could be deduced by market participants from
the recent GFC. Since particularly investors in structured products bore un-
expected high default rates and also suffered from related severe losses due to
the numerous tranche impairments, one may suspect that agency ratings do
not reflect appropriately the risk characteristics of structured financial prod-
ucts – neither in terms of default risk nor in terms of losses caused by such
impairments.
In conclusion, it is suggested that current rating metrics do not account
appropriately for systematic risks inherent in Asset-backed Securities since
28 Chapter 5 demonstrates that pooling and tranching in asset securitizations lead to concen-
tration effects of systematic risk exposures, which are higher in tranches of high seniority.
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they obviously underestimate cyclical influences which affect impairments.
2.2 Issuance of Asset-backed Securities and Out-
standing Volume
One way to examine the economic relevance and popularity of asset securitiza-
tions in global financial markets is to analyze recorded issuance activities and
outstanding volumes of these securities.
Starting with a description of the developments on current structured fi-
nance markets, Figure 2.7 compares the market issuance from 1996 to 2010
concerning asset- and mortgage-backed securities, which represent two major
ABS classes (see Figure 2.2). The upper chart refers to ABS and compares
the issuance volume related to the U.S. and Europe.29 In the lower chart,
the security issuance is analogously compared with respect to MBS. The is-
suance volume is denoted in USD billions (bn) on the y-axes from 1996 to 2010
(x-axes).
Similarly to the developments of tranche impairments shown in Figure 2.3,
the U.S. ABS issuance increased more than 19 years in row and reached its all-
time high in 2006 with over 753 USD bn (upper chart).30 In the following years
it fell dramatically, reaching a low of 107 USD bn in 2010. From 2010 to 2011,
the issuance increased about 16% to more than 124 USD bn. This was the first
reported increase after four weak years. The increase in volume comes along
with the decrease in new material impairments which was described earlier.
Even though first European securitizations were already recorded in 1987,
the total market for ABS was comparably less developed in Europe until 1997.
While the U.S. ABS issuance was at 202 USD bn, its European pendant solely
denoted at 1.08 USD bn. However, from 1997 to 2011 the developments in
terms of absolute growth were still dominated by the U.S. markets, but the
relative growth rates indicate the increasing importance of the European mar-
29 According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association “European se-
curities are defined as securitizations with collateral predominantly from the European
continent, including Turkey, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Iceland." (SIFMA
2012a).
30 The collateral assets of U.S. ABS refer to auto loans and leases, credit card receivables,
equipment, home equity loans, manufactured housing, student loans and other asset cat-
egories that do not fit any other categories. The European ABS refer to auto loans,
consumer loans, credit card receivables, leases and others in the sense of above. For more
details compare SIFMA (2012d,a).
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of ABS and MBS Issuance
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ket segment: despite a moderate break-down in 2007 due to the turmoil in
global financial markets, the European security issuance increased to more
than 98 USD bn, which is more than 90 times as high as the volume in 1997.
Due to the increasing demand for European ABS structures both ABS mar-
kets (U.S. and Europe) exhibit a comparable level in terms of issuance volume.
This also underlines the emergence of Europe as one of the major markets for
structured securities.
Similar developments may be observed with regard to MBS markets (lower
chart). Until 2010 the U.S. MBS issuance was dominating the respective Eu-
ropean one in absolute pattern. Interestingly, after the U.S. issuance peak in
2003 (over 3,179 USD bn) the volume declined to 1,924 USD bn in 2004, but
varies around 2,000 USD bn with the exception of 2008. In 2008, the issuance
fell to 1,403 USD bn, which was about 37% less volume than in the previous
year. Thus, in contrast to the ABS markets one may conclude that the U.S.
MBS markets experienced a relatively strong issuance of structured securities
despite the turmoil on the global financial markets.
Similar to European ABS, European MBS have increased since 1987. From
1987 to 1996 the issuance increased moderately from 1.0 USD bn to about
9.76 USD bn. In the following years, the demand for European MBS has
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also increased and the issuance denoted an all-time high in 2009 with over
1,961 USD bn, which is more than 200 times higher than the issuance in 1996.
Nevertheless, the absolute volume was slightly lower than the respective one
in U.S. markets. This has changed in the years 2009 to 2011: while the U.S.
Market issuance has decreased about 18.7% the European issuance has declined
only about 11.5%. Thus, in 2011, the absolute U.S. issuance volume was 1,660
USD bn while the European was 1,736 U.S. bn, which was historically the first
time that the U.S. MBS issuance was below the European one.
2.3 Global CDO Issuance and Outstanding Vol-
ume
Since many practitioners and researchers widely view CDOs as one of the
most important financial innovations of the past decade and identify CDOs as
a major source for credit losses in the recent credit crisis (see, e.g., Longstaff
2010), the remainder of this chapter focuses on CDOs as heavily and most
critical discussed ABS class. In order to underline their special role on global
financial markets, both the global CDO issuance and CDO outstandings are
addressed from several perspectives.
Initially, North America and Europe were the main markets for credit
derivatives such as credit default swaps and CDOs as well. Recently trad-
ing activities have begun in Asia, Japan and a number of emerging markets
(Rajan et al. 2007). Although, the list of participants has grown, banks are
major market participants next to others such as hedge funds, monoline in-
surers, reinsurers, pensions funds, mutual funds and corporations. Nowadays,
most market participants are buyers as well as sellers of default protection
(Rajan et al. 2007).
Figure 2.8 compares the global CDO issuance (black line) with the U.S. bond
issuance (dashed line). The primary y-axis denotes the U.S. bond issuance and
the secondary y-axis shows the global CDO issuance in USD billions (bn) from
2000 to 2011 (x-axis).
After four years of moderate CDO issuance growth from 67.99 USD bn in
2000 to 86.63 USD bn in 2003, the issuance growth rate was strongly increasing
over the next three years. This led to a peak in 2006 that is marked by an
issuance of more than 520 USD bn. During these three years, the market
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Figure 2.8: The Global CDO and Bond Issuance from 2000 to 2011
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demand for global CDOs rapidly increased and was six times higher than in
2003. In line with the distress on financial markets, the global issuance fell for
three years in a row and reached its recorded all-time low at 4.3 USD bn in
2009. Since 2010 the volume is again raising and denoted at almost 13 USD
bn in 2011.31
While varying around approximately 800 USD bn between 2000 and 2005,
the issuance on U.S. bond markets clearly increased in 2006 to 1,058 USD bn
from 752 USD bn in 2005. In contrast to the CDO markets, the bond issuance
grew also in 2007 up to 1,127 USD bn (almost 6.5%). Further, the volume
was just declining in 2008 to 707 USD bn due to the crisis. Thus, the issuance
only fell approximately back to the level established between 2000 and 2005.
Additionally, the U.S. bond issuance rebounded fast to over 1,000 USD bn in
2010, which is close to the former peak in 2007.
By contrast, the global CDO issuance broke down heavily during the GFC
and only started recovering in 2011, while the U.S. bond market was seemingly
much less affected by the recent turmoil. Additionally, the default rates were
much lower in this period on corporate bond markets than for comparably
rated asset securitizations (compare Moody’s 2010a,c).
These market developments suggest that corporate bonds and structured
finance securities vary in their risk characteristics, and they also indicate dif-
ferences in the instruments’ sensitivities to systematic risk, which are explicitly
31 Note that unfunded synthetic CDO tranches are not included in this data set (compare
SIFMA 2012a).
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addressed in Chapter 5.
Before current market developments for the global CDO issuance are ana-
lyzed in detail, the most common types of CDOs are briefly contrasted. As
sub-class of Asset-backed Securities in general, CDOs may further be cate-
gorized, among others, by its type, purpose, collateral, and domination. Re-
garding the type of CDOs, one may distinguish between Cash Flow, Synthetic,
Hybrid and Market Value CDOs. Generally, Cash Flow, Synthetic, Hybrid and
Market Value CDOs refer to the source of funds related to the securitization.
In a Cash Flow CDO, a portfolio of individual debt asset such as loans, bonds
(high yield or IG bonds), other ABS or MBS etc. is physically acquired at
launch of the deal and securitized afterwards. Although there is only little
change on the asset side during the securitization’s term, the focus lies on the
management of the collateral in order to maintain a pre-specified credit quality
of the underlying assets, particularly when credit impairments occur so that
single-name asset must be replaced (compare Batchvarov 2007).32
Typically, a special purpose entity (SPE) is involved – in Europe often called
a special purpose vehicle – that is especially designed to acquire the collateral
of the securitization and issues bonds to investors for cash used to purchase the
underlying Cash Pool (compare SEC 2005).33 In this way, the originator legally
conveys the ownership of the debt assets to the SPE (true sale transaction) and
is thus isolated from the financial risks of the entire securitization, e.g., credit
risk and market risk. Thus, an SPE can be characterized by its narrow as well
as temporary objectives. This mechanism of course may create a number of
moral hazard risks since the originator is aware that he may not suffer any
credit losses on the loans he makes because they will be sold as repackaged
CDOs (compare Longstaff 2010).
Eventually, the issuer engaged in such off-balance sheet transactions looks
less leveraged and may be permitted to borrow money on capital markets
at cheaper interest rates. Further, the originator raises liquidity increasing his
financial flexibility through the sale of receivables (off-balance sheet financing).
By isolating inherent credit risks and transferring it to external investors,
32 This is often handled by an employed CDO manager, who also selects the initial asset
pool (collateral).
33 SPE are often located in countries with lax taxation, e.g., cayman islands. However,
issues concerning the taxation or accounting standards of SPEs are, among others, no
central topic of this exercise and are therefore omitted. For further information see, for
example, SEC (2005).
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the financial institution may also optimize its credit portfolio risk. For exam-
ple, through the sale of sectoral concentrated debt assets such as ship financing
and auto loans, concentration risk may be reduced (diversification effects). In
consequence, the issuing bank may achieve a release of required regulatory
capital. The reduction of regulatory capital requirements is among others, a
frequent reason for issuing Balance Sheet CDOs. By contrast, if the sale of
receivables is recognized on the (consolidated) balance sheet of the originator
then this securitization is called an on-balance sheet transaction (on-balance
sheet financing).
Thus, additional to enhancing liquidity, facilitating lower-cost funding there
are further reasons for the originator to engage in these securitized transactions
such as managing risk, e.g., by diversifying credit portfolio risk, trading various
components of credit risk and separating legal from beneficial ownership.34
On the other hand, investors are also able to customize the exposures they
want to hold in their portfolios (compare FCIC 2011).35 Once credit risk or
specified elements of credit risk have been separated – such as default risk and
related losses, spread volatility, counterparty risk and correlation risk – market
participants can choose which ones they want to hold or to hedge. Thereby,
derivative contracts are naturally two-sided and thus allow long and short
positions to be taken on each element of credit risk (Rajan et al. 2007). For
example, investors can use structured securities to get access to products whose
spread would otherwise be either too high or too low for their needs (Rajan
et al. 2007). An investor looking for ‘A’-rated risk can either purchase a junior
tranche (note) backed by ‘AAA’-collateral or, instead, invest in a senior tranche
that is backed by ‘B’-rated assets in the structured credit market. Eventually,
structured finance securities may fulfill numerous useful functions, as briefly
described in this chapter.
In contrast to Cash Flow CDOs, Synthetic CDOs do not involve cash assets,
but take on credit exposures through embedding credit default swaps (CDS) or
baskets of CDS (compare Longstaff & Rajan 2008). A CDS is a credit deriva-
tive that is linked to a specified credit risky asset or basket of assets (reference
asset or underlying). In a CDS contract, the protection seller, e.g., an exter-
34 For example, investors may use default swaps to add names to their portfolios in order to
diversify their exposures away from large and concentrated holdings in, e.g., plain-vanilla
credit, interest-rate product classes etc. (Rajan et al. 2007).
35 An useful illustration of the practical importance of structured products can be found in
Rajan et al. (2007).
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nal investor, offers protection against the default risk of the underlying, and
compensates the protection buyer for losses related to the reference asset in
terms of an default event such as an interest shortfall or principal impairment
(similar to an insurance contract). In turn, the protection buyer, e.g., a bank,
owning the underlying, periodically pays a risk premium (spread) to the in-
vestor – usually on the outstanding nominal – for taking the default risk.36
Most popular examples for standardized Synthetic CDOs are credit indices
such as the iTraxx Europe and the CDX index families.37 In such Synthetic
CDOs, CDS contracts are used to synthetically replicate a Cash Flow CDO.
Since many CDOs actually take on credit risk through both cash assets and
CDS, the boundary between Cash Flow CDOs and Synthetic CDOs is often
blurred. To avoid mis-specifications, these structures can be summarized below
Hybrid CDOs (intermediate securities).38 Apart from other involved parties,
e.g., an underwriter, a special purpose entity, a credit rating agency (CRA) and
a trustee, Figure 2.9 points out that Hybrid CDOs involving CDS contracts
may lead to complex securitization structures.
The invested capital is typically provided by Bond Holders acquiring secu-
ritized tranches of the CDO. Due to the credit quality of tranches which is
indicated through its CRA rating, e.g., ‘BB’, ‘BBB’, ‘A’, Bond Holders obtain
interest payments throughout the tranches’ maturity – periodically on the re-
maining nominal – and the residual principal at maturity. Eventually, the size
of principal re-payment depends on the losses of the respective tranche until
maturity. If the principal covering for tranche losses expires, the investor of
this tranche neither receive any principal payback nor any interest payments.
In contrast to funded investors, here the Bond Holders, unfunded investors
typically buy the most senior tranche and are effectively engaged in a CDS with
the ‘CDO’. Thus, such investors offer credit protection to losses occurring in
the super senior tranche and receive in turn premiums (also periodically) for
facing the default risk of that tranche.
Additional funds are generated by Short Investors, who also enter into CDS
contracts with the ‘CDO’. They demand credit protection related to own Ref-
erence Securities such as other ABS, which are independent on the major CDO
(compare Figure 2.9). Offering credit protection for losses in these Reference
36 For more information, also for CDS markets compare Gandhi et al. (2012).
37 See Footnote 26, and compare www.markit.com for detailed information.
38 Other illustrated examples for Hybrid CDOs and more detailed information are either
given in Rajan et al. (2007) or in Jobst (2007).
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Figure 2.9: Complexity of Hybrid CDOs: An Example
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Notes: This figure shows an example for a complex hybrid CDO structure, similar to FCIC (2011).
Securities the ‘CDO’ receives CDS premiums (funds). But, if losses occur
within the external collateral (Reference Securities), the ‘CDO’ has to provide
protection payments to the Short Investors.39 By embedding CDS contracts
in securitizations, a possibility for market participants was created to bet for
or against the performance of these securities. Generally, through offering syn-
thetic CDOs the demand for this kind of betting heavily increased and added
liquidity to the market, which is sometimes referred to as social utility (FCIC
2011).
Funds generated through premiums by the Short Investors can be retained
on cash reserve accounts and used to cover losses within the most senior
tranches.40 If funds are not enough to cover losses, e.g., in the super senior
tranche, then Unfunded Investors in this tranche have to cover the remaining
39 Other instruments that are used to protect investors against losses are, among others,
credit enhancements such as over-collateralization of the assets sold, cash reserve accounts
and guarantees (compare SEC 2005).
40 Generally, a cash reserve account is a form of credit protection funded from a portion of
proceeds from the securitization transaction. Principal losses and/or interest shortfalls
are first covered by that reserve up to the amount funded in such account. Thus, a
cash reserve provides a form of credit enhancement to the third-party investors of the
securitization, e.g., Unfunded Investors.
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losses according to signed swap contracts.
Underwriters of securitizations such as investment banks raise investment
capital from investors on behalf of the securitization’s issuer, e.g., the origi-
nating bank. In collaboration with a hired asset manager of the CDO – or
asset management firm – that selects the collateral, the underwriter structures
the securitization related to the tranche’s thickness, subordination and credit
quality in order to meet desired requirements of involved parties such as the
originator himself, investors or credit rating agencies.41 Thus, the underwriter
acts as intermediary between the issuer and potential investors on the financial
markets.
For i) bearing the market risk while holding issued securities on its own
books until all securitized tranches are completely sold to market participants,
ii) shorting many of these deals and iii) providing sale channels facilitating
transactions between buyer and seller of credit default swap protection the un-
derwriter is rewarded with a compensating fee. This fee may range from 0.5%
to 1.50% of the total deals (see FCIC 2011). Further proceeds often result from
an exclusive sale agreement on the securities. Indeed, the originator is insu-
lated from the market risk related to the entire issuance of the securitization
on capital markets at a sufficient price.
Generally, CDO tranches may find their way into several asset securitiza-
tions which boosts the complexity of the overall mosaic capturing all cross-links
and other dependencies related to structured finance products (compare FCIC
2011). Often single mortgage-backed securities are referenced multiple times
in Synthetic CDOs. As long as the reference securities perform well, investors
betting that the tranche would fail (short investors) would make regular pay-
ments to the protection sellers. If the reference securities default, then the long
investors would make large payments to the protection buyer (short investor).
For example: if the reference securities, e.g., bonds, are worth 10 USD million
and there are bets placed through CDS contracts on that securities worth 50
USD million, then on the basis of the performance of 10 USD million in bonds,
more than 60 USD million could potentially change hands.
Due to the structure of such synthetic CDOs, losses from the bursting of
the housing bubble were multiplied exponentially during the GFC through
Synthetic CDOs by magnifying the overall risk (compare FCIC 2011).
41 Note that an experienced CDO manager is crucial for both the construction and mainte-
nance of the collateral.
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However, investors often relied on the rating agencies’ opinions rather than
conduct their own credit analysis. Thus, it was a great business for rating
agencies such as Moodys, S&P and Fitch since they were paid according to
the size of each deal.42 In providing credit ratings, the agencies were faced to
two key challenges: firstly, estimating the probability of default for the MBS
purchased by the CDO or its synthetic equivalent and, second, gauging the cor-
relation between defaults measuring the dependency between security defaults
at the same time. To estimate the default probability, Moody’s relied almost
exclusively on its own ratings of the mortgage-backed securities purchased by
the CDO (FCIC 2011). The rating agencies did rarely ‘look through’ the se-
curities to the underlying, e.g., subprime mortgages, which led to problems
for Moody’s and investors (FCIC 2011). Necessary assessments may be even
more difficult in complex CDO structures. On the other hand, the increased
complexity of structured products also allowed rating agencies to increase their
proceeds since it was even harder for investors to provide their own due dili-
gence. This led to situations in which investors relied more heavily on ratings
than for other types of rated financial instruments such as corporate bonds
(FCIC 2011).
Market Value CDOs represent another typ of CDOs. Market Value CDOs
can be characterized by frequent trading activities in order to maintain a spec-
ified ratio of the collateral’s market value to the structure’s obligations.43 Typ-
ically, the collateral must be liquidated, either in part or in whole, if the speci-
fied ratio falls below a specified threshold (compare Moody’s 1998). Revenues
from liquidated collateral are used to reduce the liabilities to tranche investors
until the specified ratio is again fulfilled (re-balancing). Overall, Market Value
CDOs tend to offer a variety of useful applications, even in structures of un-
predictable cash flows, such as distressed debt (compare Moody’s 1998).
Referring to the purpose of a CDO, another couple of sub-categories is rep-
resented by Arbitrage CDOs and Balance Sheet CDOs. In an Arbitrage CDO,
whether cash, synthetic or hybrid, the respective arranger undertakes trans-
actions that are mainly targeted at the spread differences between relatively
high yielding pool assets (spreads on loans or CDS) and lower yielding CDO
liabilities (spreads on CDO notes), compare Renault (2007). Thus, assets of
42 Moody’s set for a ‘standard’ CDO 500,000 USD and as much as 850,000 USD for a
‘complex’ CDO in 2006 and 2007, see FCIC (2011).
43 The obligation of a CDO is the sum of amortized principal and accrued interest, that has
to be paid to investors of tranches until maturity.
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an Arbitrage CDO are particularly purchased for arbitrage transactions rather
than holding these assets on the originator’s book. Note that all sub-categories
do not obviate each other. Thus, Arbitrage CDOs may refer to Cash Flow,
Synthetic, Hybrid, and Market Value CDOs.
Based on the global CDO issuance by year shown in Figure 2.8, Figure
2.10 shows the distribution of the global CDO issuance (y-axes) by type and
purpose for the period 2005 to 2011 (x-axes) denoted in USD billions (bn).
Thereby, the left chart refers to several securitization types and the right chart
to its purposes.44
Figure 2.10: Comparison of Global CDO Issuance by Type and Purpose
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Notes: This figure shows the global CDO issuance from 2005 to 2011 by type divided into Cash Flow/Hybrid
CDOs, Synthetic and Market Value CDOs (left chart), and also by purpose (right chart) distinguished
between Arbitrage and Balance Sheet CDOs. Data Source: SIFMA (2012b).
The percentage of Cash Flow/Hybrid CDOs dominated the issuance volume
in each year from 2005 to 2011 (left chart). Despite a decline from 82% in 2005
to 59% in 2009, in 2010 almost each issuance was of this type (99.5%). Further,
its proportion remained relatively stable at 70% in 2007 and 2008.
While in 2005 and 2006 Synthetic CDOs represented the second major is-
suance type with 17.7% and 12.8%, respectively, the proportion shifted in
2007 as Market Value CDOs accounted for 19.3% and Synthetic CDOs only
for 10.1%. Until 2009, this gap widened to 35.1% (Market Value) versus 5.9%
(Synthetic), so that the global issuance of Market Value CDOs accounted for
more than one third of the total volume. However, in 2010 only 11% was
attributed to Market Value CDOs.
44 With respect to the data source, in this analysis only funded Synthetic CDOs are consid-
ered. Funded tranches require the deposit of cash to an SPV account at the inception of
the deal to collateralize the SPE’s potential swap obligations in the transaction (compare
SIFMA 2012a).
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Until 2009, the global CDO issuance by purpose was clearly dominated by
Arbitrage CDOs. From 2005 to 2009 this kind of CDO issuance accounted for
at least 77%. In 2010 and 2011, the demand for Balance Sheet CDOs strongly
increased from 20.6% in 2009 to 57.9% and 58.8%, respectively. Thus, in these
years the issuance market was slightly dominated by Balance Sheet CDOs,
which underlines the rising attractiveness of these securitizations.
Next, Figure 2.11 shows the global CDO issuance with respect to the col-
lateral (upper chart), and the denomination (lower chart) for 2005 to 2011
(x-axes) in USD billions (bn). The respective issuance volume is denoted on
the y-axes. The total issuance by year corresponds to the plotted ones in the
previous Figures 2.8 and 2.10. The issuance by collateral shown in the upper
chart is distinguished in High Yield and Investment Grade Bonds, High Yield
Loans, Mixed Collateral, Structured Finance and Other.
Investment Grade Bonds are defined as bonds that are rated by authorized
credit rating agencies with an investment grade rating being equal or above
‘Baa3’ (‘BBB’) in terms of the Moody’s (S&P) rating scale. On the other
hand, bonds that are rated below the investment grade are defined as High
Yield Bonds. With respect to the data, High Yield Loans are defined as debt
assets of borrowers with senior unsecured debt ratings that are at financial
close below Moody’s ‘Baa3’ or S&P’s ‘BBB’ (SIFMA 2012b).
Structured Finance collateral includes underlying assets such as RMBS,
CMBS, ABS, CMO, CDO, CDS, and other securitized or structured products
(SIFMA 2012b). In category Other SIFMA (2012a) summarizes collateral such
as funds, insurance receivables, cash, and assets that are not captured by the
other categories noted above. Further, a CDO that has 51% or more of a single
collateral type, is included in this bucket, otherwise in Mixed Collateral.
With an absolute issuance of 746.94 USD bn from 2005 to 2011 (relative
55.72%) structured finance (SF) securities represent the major collateral re-
lated to the total global CDO issuance of 1,340 USD bn. This collateral type
was followed by high yield loans with 420.85 USD bn (relative 31.4%) and IG
bonds with 131.08 USD bn (relative 9.8%).
In 2006, the percentage of SF was 59.1% with absolute 307 USD bn, which
was more than 12.3 times higher than the IG collateral and 1.79 times as high
as the high-yield loan issuance (24.86 USD bn, and 171.9 USD bn compared to
520.64 USD bn in total). Up to 2009 the SF as well as the HYL issuance was
rapidly decreasing: while the SF accounted for 7.64% (absolute 0.33 USD bn),
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Figure 2.11: Comparison of Global CDO Issuance by Collateral and Denomi-
nation
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Notes: This figure shows the global CDO issuance from 2005 to 2011 by its collateral in the upper chart and
by its denomination in the lower one. The collateral is distinguished in High Yield and Investment Grade
Bonds, High Yield Loans, Mixed Collateral, Structured Finance and Other. The category Other refers to
collateral assets such as funds, insurance receivables, cash, and assets that are not captured by the other
categories noted above. With respect to the lower chart, Other refers to currencies other than USD, EUR,
GBP, JPY and AUD. Data Source: SIFMA (2012a).
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HYL accounted for 46.9% (absolute 2 USD bn) of the annual issuance of 4.33
USD bn. Interestingly, that was less than 1% of the total issuance in 2006.
After four years in a row, the issuance slightly increased in 2010 for the first
time in both collateral groups. Finally, the demand for HYL recovered faster
since the percentage was 76.9% with 10.01 USD bn in 2011, and thus 8.74
times higher than in 2010. By contrast, the SF issuance increased by 14.1%
compared to 2010 to 1.98 USD bn in 2011.
In fact, the percentage of IG bonds (IGB) strongly increased from 2005 to
2010 from 1.5% to 62.6%. Additionally, the demand for IGB was with 78.51
USD bn more than 3 times higher than in the year before (24.86 USD bn).
In 2010, the IGB collateral was more than 4 times higher than the HYL and
2.8 times higher than the SF collateral. These market developments indicate
that the confidence in structured markets massively declined, but they also
show that the investors’ confidence has slightly returned since 2010. Thus,
the market demand for more secured products like IG bonds seems to increase
again and HYL are preferred over the structured collateral.
Additionally, most of the global CDO securities are either denoted in U.S.
dollars or in Euros and accounted together for at least 96% of the global
issuance in 2005 to 2007. Thereby, the USD issuance was throughout around
75%. With 29.2 USD bn (relative 47.12 %) the EUR issuance was in 2008 the
first time above the USD notations since 2000. In 2011, around two thirds
(65.1%) of the issuance was denoted in USD and about one third in EUR
(30.1%).
Intuitively, another important indicator for current market developments
is the outstanding of global CDOs. For this reason, Figure 2.12 reports the
global CDO outstanding in USD bn (y-axis) by type and purpose from 2005
to 2011 (x-axis).
From 1995 to 2007, the outstandings of global CDOs rapidly grew from 1.39
USD bn to more than 1,363 USD bn. After its peak in 2007, these outstandings
declined for four years in a row to approximately 951 USD bn.45
From 2005 to 2007, Cash Flow and Hybrid CDOs dominated the global
outstandings. All CDO outstandings that could not be captured by other
categories are summarized below Unknown (see SIFMA 2012b). From 2008 to
45 Note that source data for outstanding global CDOs are not the same for global CDO
issuance. Due to differences in underlying data, contents are not directly comparable.
Fore more details compare SIFMA (2012b).
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of Global CDO Outstanding by Type and Purpose
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Notes: This figure shows the outstanding of global CDOs from 2005 to 2011 by type (Cash Flow/Hybrid,
Synthetic andMarket Value CDOs) in the upper chart and by purpose (Arbitrage and Balance Sheet CDOs)
in the lower chart. All CDO structures that may not be allocated in any of the other categories are included
in category Unknown. Data Source: SIFMA (2012b).
2011, around 50% of the entire outstandings were attributed to that category.
In 2011, Cash Flow and Hybrid CDOs accounted with 434.8 USD bn for ap-
proximately 45.7%, while solely 2.3% could be attributed to Synthetic Funded
CDOs (absolute 21.9 USD bn). In contrast to 2006, where the attributed vol-
ume was with 56.2 USD bn at an all-time high accounting for 5.2% of the total
outstanding, the Synthetic Funded CDO outstandings denoted at an all-time
low in 2011 due to a decline for 7 years in a row.
In 2005, the outstanding volume ofMarket Value CDOs accounted for solely
0.8% of the global outstanding with 6 USD bn. Since 2005, the absolute as
well as the relative outstandings of Market Value CDOs decreased and reached
in 2011 an all-time low of 1.1 USD bn and 0.1%, respectively.
Overall, neither Synthetic Funded CDOs nor Market Value CDOs seem to
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play a major role on global CDO markets. Instead, at least Cash Flow and
Hybrid CDOs are identified as one of the most important securities on current
markets accounting for almost 50% of the securitized market volume.46
Related to the purpose of global CDOs, Arbitrage CDOs were dominating
Balance Sheet CDOs in terms of global outstandings from 1999 to 2005. In
2006, Arbitrage CDOs reached its all-time high with over 574 USD bn or
53.4% of total outstandings. In line with the turmoil on financial markets,
the volume declined to 320 USD bn in 2011, which denoted 33.7% of the
annual outstandings. Simultaneously, the proportion of Balance Sheet CDOs
also continuously declined from 5.63% in 2005 (absolute about 40 USD bn) to
1.64% in 2011 with an absolute volume of about 15.61 USD bn.
However, Unknown CDOs which are not attributable to one of both stan-
dard categories play a major role and account for 28.45% of the outstandings
(201.8 USD bn) in 2005. Their proportion continuously increased to 64.66%
of the total outstandings with an absolute volume of 615 USD bn in 2011.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
I Structured finance securities such as Collateralized Debt Obligations fa-
cilitate the isolation of credit risk and its transfer to external investors.
I Numerous useful applications of structured products made these financial
instruments the most popular tools in the last decade.
I During the GFC the default rates of structured securities increased dra-
matically, even those of ‘Aaa’-rated tranches.
I More than 90% of the reported impairments referred to IG-rated securi-
ties indicating the shortcomings of the current rating metrics.
I Seemingly, securitizations exhibit specific risk characteristics not suffi-
ciently reflected by credit ratings due to their high sensitivity to system-
atic risk.
I Within the financial turbulences, impairments were concentrated in the
market for RMBS, HEL and CDOs.
46 Note that results of this exercise strongly depend on the quality of the data.
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I Dramatically affected was the demand for U.S. ABS, global CDOs, but
less strongly the demand on U.S. MBS markets.
I Indeed, the European ABS issuance tended to move sideways on a rel-
atively low level, while the MBS issuance clearly increased, even in the
GFC.
I In 2011, the European ABS issuance reached the U.S. level with almost
98 USD bn, while the MBS issuance was above the U.S. one for the first
time.
I Related to the global CDO issuance an all-time low was reached in 2009
with less than 1% of the volume in 2006.
I After four years in a row the global CDO issuance increased for the first
time in 2010 with changed major collateral types.
I In fact, since 2010 more secured collateral such as IG bonds, and High-
yield loans are preferred over structured collateral.
I Due to the numerous tranche impairments as well as the decreased is-
suance, the global CDO outstanding was also slightly decreasing from
2008 to 2011.
I Since 2010 when the number of tranche impairments fell for the first time
in five years, the confidence in structured securities has begun to return
slightly.
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Chapter 3
Approaches to Credit Risk for
Valuing Structured Finance
Securities
3.1 Introduction
Longstaff (2010), among others, states that structured finance securities are
the most important financial innovations of the last decade. Particularly, the
demand for Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) increased rapidly from
2001 to 2007 due to several reasons outlined in Chapter 2. In the aftermath,
especially the U.S. market for structured securities was heavily shocked by
the turmoil in the global financial markets. Due to decreasing numbers of
impairments, confidence in structured products has returned slightly since 2010
and thus the issuance volume of Asset-backed Securities is again increasing.47
In consequence, practitioners and researchers are again focusing on appropriate
valuation concepts for these products.
Although the limitations of the Black & Scholes (1973) approach have been
broadly discussed by market participants and researchers as well, it has become
the market standard pricing model on equity and option markets (De Servigny
2007). Comparably developments are observable on credit markets, where the
basic single-factor Gaussian copula model has become the most established
setup for the valuation of CDOs (see Hull & White 2006, Finger 2009, Rosen
& Saunders 2009). Even though related valuation techniques are not entirely
47 Compare Chapter 2 for more detailed analyses of structured finance markets.
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satisfying, they certainly facilitate the fast expansion of the market for such
credit-linked instruments (De Servigny 2007).
In general, a CDO refers to a reference pool of credit risky assets that is also
called collateral or underlying. Thus, the risk profiles of securitized tranches
are determined by the risk characteristics of its collateral.48 In turn, the credit
risk profile of the reference pool is determined by i) the risk characteristics
of its single debt assets and by ii) pool-specific dependency structures across
embedded debt assets. For this reason, approaches to credit risk of single
borrowers are presented before portfolio credit risk is addressed.49 Note that
financial institutions may be faced with the measurement of default risk related
to non-traded financial instruments. In this case, they can apply the credit
risk approaches to model the ‘physical’ default risk of these instruments using
natural probability measures in order to quantify, e.g., the required economic
capital or risk charges (compare Bluhm et al. 2003). By contrast, if mar-
ket prices, e.g., credit spreads50 on corporate bonds or Credit Default Swaps
(CDS), are used to derive the (implied) default risk then risk-neutral probability
measures – or rather equivalent martingale probability measures – are applied
due to the pricing theory of financial assets (see Jarrow & Turnbull 2000).51
In context of portfolio credit risk, common correlation concepts are described
for modeling dependency structures within credit portfolios. Although ‘true’
correlations are not observable, they are crucial determinants for the risk pro-
file of a credit portfolio (see Schönbucher 2001). Eventually, the risk profile
of a credit portfolio – summarizing the portfolio’s risk characteristics – causes
the portfolio’s loss distribution. Since the valuation process of securitizations
is strongly dependent on the portfolio’s loss distribution (Longstaff & Rajan
2008), also correlation concepts become central for valuing securitizations.52
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: after a brief intro-
duction to the risk-neutral valuation of debt assets, structural, intensity and
48 Recall that the risk profile of a financial instrument reflects its risk characteristics in terms
of default risk and related losses from default.
49 Current bottom-up and top-down approaches for modeling portfolio credit risk are dif-
ferentiated later on.
50 According to Bluhm et al. (2003), a credit spread is the difference between the yield on
a particular debt security and the risk-free yield. Yields on government bonds are often
assumed as benchmark proxy for the risk-free interest rates.
51 In the next section, the risk-neutral valuation of credit-linked securities and the differences
between ‘physical’ and risk-neutral default probabilities are briefly described.
52 Recall that securitized tranches are sold to investors who offer credit protection for losses
within the credit portfolio affecting these tranches.
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factor models are introduced in Section 3.2, as the main approaches to credit
risk of single borrowers. Based on these approaches, a general framework for
modeling portfolio credit risk is presented in Section 3.3. In this context, the
basic single-factor Gaussian copula model is classified. Relying on the Gaus-
sian model specification, a simple valuation framework for single-tranche CDO
swaps (STCDO) is also introduced. Moreover, the most common correlation
concepts represented by default correlations and asset correlations are briefly
described. These correlation concepts are not only crucial elements for mea-
suring and modeling the risk of credit portfolios, but also for the valuation
of CDOs (see Hull & White 2008). Thus, this chapter particularly provides
theoretical preliminaries for the Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 Approaches for Modeling andMeasuring Credit
Risk
3.2.1 An Introduction to Physical Default Risk and Risk-
neutral Valuation
The main approaches to credit risk, which will be presented in the following sec-
tions, primarily address the physical default risk of obligors.53 In this context,
the 3-tuple (Ω,F ,P) denotes the underlying probability space for modeling the
physical default risk. This probability space consists of a sample space Ω, a
σ-Algebra F ⊂ P(Ω) representing a nonempty collection of countable subsets
of the power set P(Ω), and the probability measure function P.54 Thereby,
Ω contains the set of all possible outcomes, the elements of F describe the
measurable events of the respective model, e.g., the obligor’s default time,
commonly identified with all information available, and P assigns the physi-
cal or real-world probabilities to the measurable random events (Bluhm et al.
2003). The risk measure P can be related to actual default rates, which are
derived from historical default information reported by rating agencies such as
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (see Hull 2007). Then, the assigned default
probabilities can be used to estimate the economic capital and risk charges of
53 The terms ‘obligor’, ‘firm’ and ‘borrower’ are used interchangeably.
54 For more technical details describing, for example, the element properties of the 3-tuple
compare Harrison & Pliska (1981) and Martin et al. (2006).
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a single borrower or a credit portfolio (compare Bluhm et al. 2003).55
When estimating the default risk and valuing credit-related financial in-
struments based on financial market information such as observable credit
spreads (pricing perspective), the probability measure function refers to the
risk-neutral valuation framework (compare Bluhm et al. 2003). Then, the
probability space is denoted by (Ω,F ,Q), where Q describes the probability
measure function assigning risk-neutral probabilities to the measurable events
in F . The probability measure Q is called equivalent martingale measure on
the probability space (Ω,F ,P) due to the equivalence of P and Q.56
Mostly, the valuation of financial instruments such as derivatives is based
on the fundamental assumption that there are no arbitrage opportunities on
financial markets (Hull 2009). No arbitrage implies that the cost of synthetic
instruments (financial replication) must equal the value of the traded (repli-
cated) instrument. In the absence of arbitrage, there exist unique martingale
probabilities – termed risk-neutral probabilities or rather equivalent martingale
probabilities – that can be used to price financial instruments such as options,
futures and credit derivatives (compare Jarrow & Turnbull 2000).57 It can be
shown that the resulting prices are valid not only in the risk-neutral world,
but in the real-world as well (compare Bluhm et al. 2003, Hull 2009).
The risk-neutral valuation is a general principle, e.g., in the option pric-
ing theory (Jarrow & Turnbull 2000), which “states that it is valid to assume
the world is risk-neutral when pricing options” (Bluhm et al. 2003). In a
risk-neutral world all individuals i) are indifferent to risk, ii) require no com-
pensation for risk and iii) the expected return on all securities is the risk-free
interest rate, see Bluhm et al. (2003) and Hull (2009). Hence, the risk-neutral
individuals make their investment decisions only on the basis of expected val-
ues and they do not consider the dispersion of distributions (Jarrow & Turnbull
2000).
Equation (3.1) exemplarily shows the core of risk-neutral pricing under risk-
55 General limitations of ratings for extracting the products’ credit curve representing the
time-dependent default risk are discussed, e.g., in Li (2000). Shortcomings of ratings
quantifying the inherent credit risk of structured financial instruments in terms of default
risk and related losses are explicitly addressed in Chapter 5.
56 For a good introduction to probability spaces and definitions, martingales and equivalent
martingale probabilities see, e.g., Harrison & Pliska (1981) and Martin et al. (2006).
For more detailed information on martingales and stochastic integrals see also Rogers &
Williams (2000).
57 For a general proof see Harrison & Kreps (1979).
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neutral probabilities. Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, the price
of a financial instrument A(t) relative to the value of the money market ac-
count58 W (t) at time t follows a martingale
A(t)
W (t)
= EQ
[
A(t+ 1)
W (t+ 1)
]
(3.1)
with t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T}, W (0) = 1 (by definition) and corresponding expec-
tations EQ(·), compare Jarrow & Turnbull (2000).59 Then, the present value
of a financial instrument A(0) is determined by the expected value of the in-
strument’s future cash flows discounted at the time-specific risk-free rates of
interest (Jarrow & Turnbull 2000).
“In the credit risk context, risk-neutrality is achieved by calibrating the de-
fault probabilities of individual credits [or credit portfolios] with the market-
implied probabilities drawn from bonds or credit default swap spreads” (Bluhm
et al. 2003). Under risk-neutrality investors should exactly be compensated for
expected losses due to a possible default. But in a real world scenario, investors
should intuitively be concerned about default risk. Due to the investors’ aver-
sion to bear more risk, they may demand an additional risk premium and the
pricing of financial instruments should somehow account for this risk aver-
sion (Bluhm et al. 2003). This means that financial instruments are priced as
though they were a break-even trade for investors who are not risk adverse but
assume a higher probability of default than the physical one. The assumed
probability is called risk-neutral probability of default.60 The difference be-
tween the risk-neutral and the physical probability reflects the risk premium
required by market participants for taking risk (Bluhm et al. 2003).
58 On the money market account M , money can be invested in the risk-less asset. At the
start, the account’s value equals one, W (0) = 1. Assume that Rf0 is the time-dependent
one-period-ahead return from investing one unit in the risk-less asset at date 0, then
W (1) =W (0) ·Rf0 and the corresponding risk-less discount factor Q equals 1/Rf0 . Thus,
the value of the investment at date t + 1 is W (t + 1) = W (t) · Rft , compare Jarrow &
Turnbull (2000). Depending on the model framework, the return on the money market
account can be easily defined in both a continuous-time or a discrete-time setting (see,
e.g., Martin et al. 2006).
59 According to Harrison & Pliska (1981), an adapted positive process K = {kt; 0 ≤ t ≤ T},
which is right continuous with left limits such that Kt is integrable, is a martingale and
E(Kt) = k0. Thus, martingales can be associated with “fair” gambles.
60 Since market participants cannot really be assumed as risk-neutral, this terminology is
somehow misleading, see Jarrow & Turnbull (2000).
41
3.2. APPROACHES FOR MODELING AND MEASURING CREDIT RISK
3.2.2 Structural Models
The single-factor Gaussian copula model, firstly applied to credit risky portfo-
lios by Vasicek (1987), has become the industry standard model for the pricing
of securitized tranches (Hull & White 2008). Vasicek’s approach is based on a
structural model framework introduced by Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1974, 1977). Within this economically grounded framework, the firm’s liabil-
ities are assumed to be contingent claims on the firm’s assets. Merton (1974)
describes that the physical asset value Gi,t of firm i ∈ {1, ..., I} at any point in
time t follows a continuous-time random walk (geometric Brownian motion)
dGi,t
Gi,t
= µi dt+ σi dWi,t, Gi,0 > 0 (3.2)
with exogenously specified expected rate of return µi ∈ R and volatility σi > 0,
whereWi,t is a standard Brownian motion (standard Gauss-Wiener process).61
According to Merton (1974), the default of firm i occurs if the asset value
given from Itô’s Lemma by
Gi,t = Gi,0 · exp
((
µi − 0.5 · σ2i
) · t+ σi Wi,t) (3.3)
undergoes the principal value Pi of the zero bond at maturity t so that pre-
specified claims on these assets can not be served at maturity (principal short-
fall).62
Let Ti denote a random variable for the discrete default time of firm i
Ti =
t if Gi,t < Pi,∞ else (3.4)
then the physical probability of default pii,t is
pii,t = P (Ti = t) = P (Gi,t < Pi) . (3.5)
According to Equation (3.2), the natural logarithm of the asset value growth
61 In Merton’s original model the liabilities are represented by a single zero-coupon bond
with a 1-year maturity. Thus, the default threshold is exogenously set to the bond’s
principal and the default event can only occur at the bond’s maturity (Merton 1974).
62 Itô’s lemma is a crucial tool for dealing with stochastic differential equations, compare
Franke et al. (2011) and Hull (2009).
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Ui,t is normally distributed (Hull 2009)
Ui,t = ln
(
Gi,t
Gi,0
)
= lnGi,t − ln Gi,0 ∼ N
((
µi − 0.5 · σ2i
) · t, σ2i · t) (3.6)
and thus the normalized asset return Zi,t of firm i is given by
Zi,t =
Ui,t − (µi − 0.5 · σ2i ) · t
σi ·
√
t
. (3.7)
Under consideration of the initial leverage ratio Pi
Gi,0
, the normalized default
threshold ci,t is
ci,t =
ln
(
Pi
Gi,0
)
− (µi − 0.5 · σ2i ) · t
σi ·
√
t
. (3.8)
Based on Equations (3.5), (3.7) and (3.8), the physical probability of default
pii,t is given by
pii,t = P (Gi,t < Pi) = P
[
ln
(
Gi,t
Gi,0
)
< ln
(
Pi
Gi,0
)]
= P (Zi,t < ci,t)
= Φ (ci,t) (3.9)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution (compare Leland 2004).
At maturity t, the bondholders receive their principal in full if Gi,t > Pi and
hence no default occurred. In case of Gi,t < Pi, the bondholders liquidate the
firm’s assets and receive solely the recovery rate. Thus, they suffer from losses
on the zero-bond, that are in value Pi −Gi,t.
From the pricing perspective, this structural model setup provides an at-
tractive approach for the valuation of credit risk, since the credit risky debt
claim (zero-bond) can be replicated by a long position in a risk-free zero-bond
with maturity t plus a short position in a put option sold to equity holders.
The put option allows the equity holders at maturity t to put the firm at the
strike price. Several authors extended this standard approach in the following
years. For example, Black & Cox (1976) and Longstaff & Schwartz (1995)
developed the so-called first-passage model by incorporating stochastic default
times before maturity. Another extension refers to stochastic risk-free interest
rates as proposed by Kim et al. (1993), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) or Barnhill
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& Maxwell (2002).63 However, in most structural models the credit spreads
for short maturities tend to zero which is often not compatible with empirical
observations (compare Uhrig-Homburg 2002).64 While structural models have
the advantage of sound economic underpinning, the disadvantage is that they
are difficult to calibrate to market data, e.g., credit spreads, and usually have
to be implemented via Monte Carlo simulations (Hull & White 2008).
3.2.3 Intensity Models
Another approach to model default times is represented by so-called intensity
models. Firstly introduced by Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) and Artzner & Del-
baen (1995), a stochastic process is applied to model the default time of an
obligor, which consequently comes randomly (Uhrig-Homburg 2002, Giesecke
2004).65 Since intensity models allow to model default times for any time
horizons, this model type enables short-term defaults (Li 2000). Thus, inten-
sity models can be applied to provide short-term credit spreads, which are
empirically observable, and eases model fits on empirical data. In contrast
to structural models, the causality of the default event is not explicitly mod-
eled along economic theory. Due to this reduction of complexity, intensity
based models are often called reduced form models, which is instantly plausi-
ble (compare Duffie & Singleton 1999). Generally, default events are triggered
by surprising jump processes which are rather formally described.
In this context, Ti denotes a nonnegative, continuous random variable de-
scribing the random default time of obligor i ∈ {i = 1, ..., I}. The random
63 Note that the expected rate of return µi,t in Equation (3.2) depends on the risk preferences
of investors. The higher the investor’s level of risk aversion the higher µi,t of firm i will
be (Hull 2009). Because µi,t drops out in the derivation of the Black-Scholes-Merton
differential equation, the differential equation is independent of risk preferences and any
set of risk preferences can be used in this framework (compare Hull 2009). In particular,
the assumption that all investors are risk-neutral. In a risk-neutral world, the expected
return on firm i equals the risk-free interest rate rt (µi,t = rt) and rt can be modeled
stochastically (Hull 2009).
64 In continuous-time structural models that are based on a diffusion process for the asset
value, credit spreads decline to zero as the maturity goes to zero (Uhrig-Homburg 2002).
Since basic Merton-type (or structural) models ignore the possibility of short-term or
early defaults (before the product’s maturity), they are mainly used by the financial
industry to estimate 1-year default probabilities. First-passage-time models can be used
to estimate default probabilities over any time horizons (Zhou 2001). By extending the
structural approach, for example, Zhou (2001) develops such a first-passage-time model
for credit portfolios.
65 While the default time becomes predictable in structural models, it purely is a random
event (prescribed exogenously) in intensity models (Uhrig-Homburg 2002).
44
3.2. APPROACHES FOR MODELING AND MEASURING CREDIT RISK
default time is modeled via the stochastic default indicator Di,t, where
Di,t = 1{Ti≤t} =
1 if Ti ≤ t,0 else (3.10)
is a point process with one jump of size one at default (see Giesecke 2004).
If fi(t) denotes the density and Fi(t) the distribution function of random
default time Ti, then
Fi(t) = P(Ti ≤ t) = P(Di,t = 1) =
t∫
0
fi(u)du, (3.11)
and from Equation (3.11) follows the corresponding survivor function with
Si(t) = P(Ti > t) = 1− Fi(t), (3.12)
see Meeker & Escobar (1998). The hazard rate hi(t) is defined as the
marginal conditional probability of default in the time interval (t, t+∆t] given
the obligor’s survival to time t with
hi(t) = lim
∆t→0,∆t>0
1
∆t
P(t < Ti ≤ t+ ∆t | Ti > t)
=
fi(t)
Si(t)
=
fi(t)
1− Fi(t) , (3.13)
and thus it describes the immediate default risk of obligor i being ‘alive’, i.e.,
not defaulted, at time t (compare Meeker & Escobar 1998, Li 2000).
The hazard rate hi(t) or instantaneous failure rate may also be interpreted
as default intensity and thus hazard models are often called intensity models
as well. The cumulative hazard rate follows from
Hi(t) =
t∫
0
hi(u)du =
t∫
0
fi(u)
1− Fi(u)du
= − ln [1− Fi(t)] = − lnSi(t) (3.14)
45
3.2. APPROACHES FOR MODELING AND MEASURING CREDIT RISK
and therefore
Fi(t) = 1− exp
− t∫
0
hi(u)du
 (3.15)
and
fi(t) = hi(t) · exp
− t∫
0
hi(u)du
 , (3.16)
compare Meeker & Escobar (1998) and Li (2000). In practice, default in-
tensities are often extracted from the credit spread curves of traded financial
instruments such as CDS or corporate bonds (Martin et al. 2006). In these
cases, the default intensities refer to the risk-neutral probability measure Q
(compare Section 3.2.1).66 Eventually, the setup of an intensity model may re-
fer to several sources such as ratings (compare Das & Tufano 1996, Jarrow et al.
1997), stock prices (see Madan & Unal 1998) and other state variables (com-
pare Lando 1998, Duffie & Singleton 1999) to account for, e.g., time-variant
default intensities reflected by market data.67
In contrast, Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) assume a constant intensity un-
der the real-world probability measure. Under a constant default intensity
hi(t) = hi, t ≥ 0, hi > 0, the default time Ti is exponentially distributed with
distribution function
Fi(t) = 1− exp(−hi · t) (3.17)
and density
fi(t) = hi · exp(−hi · t), (3.18)
66 If calibrated on market data referring to the risk-neutral valuation (no arbitrage) the
default indicator Di,t (submartingale) has to be transformed since the default process
has an upward trend (compare Uhrig-Homburg 2002, Giesecke 2004). The transforma-
tion of Di,t into a martingale follows the Doob-Meyer decomposition. For a throughout
description of this decomposition compare Dellacherie & Meyer (1978).
67 Compare Uhrig-Homburg (2002) for an insightful overview referring to the applications
of reduced-form models and structural models as well.
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see Li (2000).68
In practice, the parameter specifications of structural models are often not
practicable. In such cases, it may be more convenient for practitioners to es-
timate the parameters of an intensity model (Uhrig-Homburg 2002). With
respect to empirical applications, it is convenient to model discrete-time de-
faults and to divide the time line (0,∞) into k + 1 time intervals
(p0, p1], (p1, p2], ..., (pk−1, pk], (pk, pk+1), (3.19)
where p0 usually equals 0 and pk+1 =∞ (compare Meeker & Escobar 1998).69
Note that the time intervals need not be of equal length. The last interval
is of infinite length. Thereby, the time interval t ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} is denoted by
(pt−1, pt] and describes, for example, a day or a year. Thus, Ti becomes an
integer random variable and Ti = t indicates that the obligor’s default has
occurred during the interval (pt−1, pt].
The unconditional discrete-time probability of default pidi,t states that obligor
i defaults in interval t without any conditions on its survival and is defined by
pidi,t = P(Ti = t) = P(pt−1 < Ti ≤ pt) = Fi(pt)− Fi(pt−1) (3.20)
with pidi,t ≥ 0,
∑k+1
j=1 pi
d
i,j = 1, and
Sdi,t = P(Ti > t) = Sdi (pt) = P(Ti > pt) = 1− Fi(pt) (3.21)
denotes the discrete-time survivor function evaluated at time interval t with
Sdi (p0) = 1 (compare Meeker & Escobar 1998).
Analogous to Equation (3.13), the discrete-time hazard rate hdi,t ∈ [0, 1] can
then be defined by
hdi,t = h
d
i (pt) = P(pt−1 < Ti ≤ pt|Ti > pt−1)
=
Fi(pt)− Fi(pt−1)
1− Fi(pt−1) =
pidi,t
Sdi (pt−1)
(3.22)
indicating that the default of obligor i occurs in period t conditional on the
68 The assumption of a constant default intensity implies that the credit quality of a bond
does not change up to the default event. Changing credit qualities can be considered
by intensity models that incorporate time-variant default intensities (see Uhrig-Homburg
2002).
69 Note that failure-time data are always discrete (Meeker & Escobar 1998).
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obligor’s survival until the beginning of period t (see Meeker & Escobar 1998).
The physical probability of default pii,t denoted in Equation (3.5) is also
conditional on the fact that obligor i has not defaulted before. Thus, the
discrete-time hazard rate hdi,t for time period t equals pii,t. Due to this discrete-
time setting, pii,t is rather called probability of default than default intensity
(see Rösch 2004).
The survivor function is denoted by
Sdi,t =
t∏
j=1
(1− hdi,j) (3.23)
and the cumulative distribution function of Ti, evaluated at t, can be expressed
as
F di,t = 1−
t∏
j=1
(1− hdi,j)
=
t∑
j=1
pidi,j (3.24)
with F di,t = Fi(pt), compare Meeker & Escobar (1998).
Although default times are not endogenously modeled in the classical model
setup, intensity models do not generally obviate economic intuitions. Among
others, Duffie & Gârleanu (2001), Rösch (2004), Longstaff & Rajan (2008), and
Hull & White (2008) show that several sources of default risk approximated
by, e.g., firm-specific fundamentals or macroeconomic variables, can be easily
embedded into such intensity approaches through the application of a factor
model setup which is described in the following section.
3.2.4 Factor Models
The introduction of the first well-known factor models dates back to the early
beginnings of the capital market theory. Two of the most popular factor models
are the Capital Asset Pricing Model introduced by Sharpe (1964) and the
Arbitrage Pricing Theory introduced by Ross (1976).
Factor models for credit risk can be regarded as a special case of intensity
models and may be established in either a continuous-time or a discrete-time
framework (Rösch 2004). Generally, the description of factor models arises
48
3.2. APPROACHES FOR MODELING AND MEASURING CREDIT RISK
from the separation of embedded risk factors and the incorporation of system-
atic risk. Hence, factor models are typically characterized by the distinction
between firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk and systematic risk, where the lat-
ter is typically assumed to affect all firms in the model setup (see Bluhm
et al. 2003).70 The dependence between individual default events of firms is
driven by systematic risk which is approximated by one or more unobservable
systematic risk factors (Schönbucher 2001). Thus, factor models are a well es-
tablished technique for identifying common drivers of correlated defaults and
for reducing the computational effort related to the calculation of correlated
defaults and losses (compare Bluhm et al. 2003). They provide a practicable
framework to interpret default correlations in terms of economic variables and
also allow to explain higher default rates in economic downturns in a sound
manner (Schönbucher 2001, Bluhm et al. 2003).
In a one-factor or single-factor model, the default events of firms are in-
dependent from each other conditional on a realization of the systematic risk
factor Yt.71 In this framework, the default indicator Di,t conditional on a
realization of Yt = yt is a Bernoulli random variable with
Di,t|Yt = yt ∼ Ber
[
EP(Di,t|Yt = yt)
]
(3.25)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., I} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}, compare Bluhm et al. (2003).72 Thereby,
the conditional expectations of Di,t|Yt = yt are given by
EP(Di,t|Yt = yt) = pii,t(yt) (3.26)
and the variance by
VarP(Di,t|Yt = yt) = pii,t(yt) · [1− pii,t(yt)], (3.27)
compare Martin et al. (2006). Thus, the default indicator Di,t|Yt = yt equals
one with probability pii,t(yt), and zero with probability 1− pii,t(yt).
70 Note that the included risk factors can also represent other non-firm-specific risks such
as sectoral or industry risk and country-specific risk (see Bluhm et al. 2003).
71 In Chapter 5, an analytical study is presented in which the systematic risk factor of the
simple one-factor approach is decomposed into a linear combination of two risk factors,
similar to Gordy (2003). Analogously, the single-risk factor can linearly be composed of
multiple risk factors, see Koyluoglu & Hickman (1998).
72 For a good description of Bernoulli-type random variables compare also Giesecke (2004),
Martin et al. (2006) or Franke et al. (2011).
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While the density of the systematic risk factor Yt is denoted by f(yt), expec-
tations of the conditional default probability lead to the unconditional proba-
bility of default pii,t with
pii,t = EP(Di,t) = EP
[
EP(Di,t|yt)
]
= EP [pii,t(Y )]
=
+∞∫
−∞
pii,t(yt) · f(yt) dyt, (3.28)
compare Martin et al. (2006). Note that the default probability pii,t is uncon-
ditional on Yt, but conditional on the fact that obligor i has not defaulted
before t (compare Section 3.2.3.). In the following, the terms conditional and
unconditional are only related to the systematic risk factor Yt.
According to Bluhm et al. (2003), the unconditional variance is given by
VarP(Di,t) = VarP
[
EP (Di,t|yt)
]
+ E
[
VarP (Di,t|yt)
]
= VarP [pii,t(Yt)] + EP [pii,t(Yt) · (1− pii,t(Yt))]
= VarP [pii,t(Yt)] + EP [pii,t(Yt)]− EP
[
pii,t(Yt)
2
]
= VarP [pii,t(Yt)] + EP [pii,t(Yt)]−
[
VarP [pii,t(Yt)] + EP [pii,t(Yt)]2
]
= pii,t · (1− pii,t). (3.29)
As an alternative to the intensity-based view, the representation of a factor
model can be based on the structural approach. Recall that in a structural
setup, the default of obligor i occurs at time t when the latent asset return Zi,t
falls below some critical threshold ci,t, see Equation (3.9). In a factor-model
specification, the default threshold ci,t may also vary across borrowers i and
over time t. The latent asset return Zi,t is then specified as a function of a
common systematic risk factor Yt and a borrower-specific (idiosyncratic) risk
factor Ei,t
Zi,t = Z(Yt, Ei,t) (3.30)
with i ∈ {1, ..., I} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Even though factor models are jointly
characterized by common systematic risk factors, they may differ in terms of
their default specification, the amount of incorporated risk factors and the
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factors’ distributional assumptions.73
The presented three approaches to credit risk may primarily be applied to
model the default risk of a single borrower. These approaches may also repre-
sent the basic elements for evaluating portfolio credit risk, which is generally
related to a portfolio of debt assets (loans, bonds etc.) referring to numerous
borrowers. Measuring credit portfolio risk appropriately is also essential for
the valuation of asset securitizations since structured securities are basically
related to portfolios or baskets of debt claims (see, e.g., Schönbucher 2001).
As already indicated in Section 3.2.3, intensity-based models are often
preferred due to their convenient calibration process on empirical data. In
this context, both presented approaches to credit risk – intensity-based and
structural-based – can be easily translated to each other (see, e.g., Li 2000),
then
P(Ti ≤ t)⇔ P(Zi,t < ci,t). (3.31)
Referring to Equivalence (3.31) and Equations (3.15) and (3.17), it follows
under the Gaussian specification of Zi,t ∼ N (0, 1) in terms of a time-variant
default intensity
Φ(ci,t) = 1− exp
− t∫
0
hi(u)du
 (3.32)
or correspondingly
ci,t = Φ
−1
1− exp
− t∫
0
hi(u)du
 , (3.33)
and in terms of a time-constant default intensity
ci,t = Φ
−1 (1− exp(−hi · t)) , (3.34)
73 Relying on a single-factor structure, Hamerle & Rösch (2006) compare three popular
model specifications for portfolio credit risk in terms of ‘model risk’. Based on this
earlier work, Hamerle et al. (2011) use a multi-factor credit risk model with observable
macroeconomic and latent variables to explain individual default risk. Thus, observable
variables are incorporated to economically ‘explain’ unobservable risk factors.
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compare Martin et al. (2006).74 Φ−1 denotes the inverse of the standard normal
distribution function Φ.
Particularly, the relation in Equivalence (3.31) is used in many empirical
studies which examine the pricing of classic CDOs or STCDOs (see Laurent &
Gregory 2005, Hull & White 2004, Finger 2009), as it will be further described
in the following sections. Especially for valuing structured securities, default
thresholds are often extracted from market data under the assumption that
default intensities are constant over the products’ maturity (compare Hull &
White 2004, 2006).75
In the next section, the most established valuation framework for structured
securities is presented in the context of credit portfolio risk. Thereby, basic
concepts accounting for dependency structures within credit portfolios are de-
scribed since these dependency structures represent one of the most crucial
risk parameters determining the portfolio’s loss distribution (compare Schön-
bucher 2001, Bluhm et al. 2003). Recall that the loss distribution reflects the
credit risk inherent in such a credit portfolio and is therefore determining the
risk characteristics of securitized tranches.
3.3 Portfolio Credit Risk and the Valuation of
STCDOs
3.3.1 The Single-factor Gaussian Copula Model
Real-world scenarios such as global economic downturns show that sometimes
the number of borrower defaults is jointly increasing in and across several
economic sectors (see, e.g., Bluhm et al. 2003). Since a credit portfolio typ-
ically consists of debt assets from numerous borrowers, correlated borrower
defaults are an important aspect for measuring portfolio credit risk (Schön-
bucher 2001). Apart from global economic downturns, joint borrower defaults
may generally indicate the existence of dependency structures across obligors
in a credit portfolio which may be caused by i) direct links between obligors
referring to, e.g., credit guarantees, or other contractual relationships, and ii)
74 Note that the time horizon t, t > 0, has to be fixed for the model calibration, since classic
Merton-type models refer to a specified point in time, e.g., one year or the products
maturity (compare Section 3.2.2).
75 An empirical application for valuing STCDOs based on these preliminaries is presented
in Chapter 4.
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indirect links such as sectoral influences (demand or price shocks), or general
states of an industry (compare Schönbucher 2001). Particularly, for the con-
sideration of dependency structures between borrowers in a credit portfolio
common risk factors become central (compare Section 3.2.4). In this context,
the Gaussian single-factor model is the most popular approach for measur-
ing credit portfolio risk and it also represents the market standard model for
pricing portfolio credit derivatives such as STCDOs (see Hull & White 2006,
Finger 2009).
Firstly applied by Vasicek (1987) to aggregate credit risk of credit portfolios
and further analyzed by Gordy (2000, 2003), Laurent & Gregory (2005), Rösch
&Winterfeldt (2008), Bade et al. (2011), Rösch & Scheule (2012), the Gaussian
single-factor model constitutes the major element of the regulatory capital
formula under the Basel II Capital Accord to calculate risk-weighted capital
requirements (BIS 2005).76
Based on Merton’s (1974) structural approach (see Section 3.2.2), obligor
i defaults on his bond if the return on his assets Zi,t undergoes a critical
threshold ci,t at time t, then
Di,t = 1⇔ Zi,t < ci,t. (3.35)
In a factor-model setup, the asset return Zi,t is driven by a common risk factor
Yt ∼ N (0, 1) which represents, e.g., macroeconomic influences jointly affecting
all obligors i ∈ {1, ..., I} in an economy, and an individual risk component
Ei,t ∼ N (0, 1) only affecting borrower i (idiosyncratic risk). Yt and Ei,t are in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d). ρ ∈ [0, 1] determines the exposure
to systematic risk, which is equal for each obligor in this simple specification.77
Then, the latent asset return Zi,t at time t ∈ {1, ..., T} is modeled by
Zi,t =
√
ρ · Yt +
√
1− ρ · Ei,t, (3.36)
and also standard normal distributed with Zi,t ∼ N (0, 1). Conditional on a
realization of the common risk factor Yt, the asset returns of borrowers are
i.i.d. random variables due to the independence of idiosyncratic risk factors.
76 In the Basel II framework for regulatory capital requirements, this model is also called
the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model (BIS 2005).
77 For ease of exposition only, the weighting factor ρ is assumed to be time-constant until
maturity with ρt = ρ. Thus, index t is not carried.
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The conditional probability of default follows from Equation (3.36) with
pii,t(yt) = P(Zi,t < ci,t|yt) = P
(
Ei,t <
ci,t −√ρ · yt√
1− ρ
)
= Φ
(
ci,t −√ρ · yt√
1− ρ
)
, (3.37)
see, e.g., Bluhm et al. (2003). Based on the following identity
+∞∫
−∞
Φ(αy + β) · ϕ(y)dy = Φ
(
β√
1 + α2
)
(3.38)
with
α = −
√
ρ√
1− ρ and β =
ci,t√
1− ρ,
and related to Equations (3.37) and (3.28) the unconditional probability of
default is given as expectations over all realizations of the common factor Yt
pii,t = EP
[
EP(Di,t|yt)
]
= EP [pii,t(Yt)]
=
∞∫
−∞
Φ
(
ci,t −√ρ · yt√
1− ρ
)
· ϕ(yt) dyt
= Φ(ci,t), (3.39)
where ϕ(·) denotes the Gaussian density function (compare Martin et al. 2006).
Due to i) the independence of systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors and
ii) the standard normal distributed asset returns Zi,t ∼ N (0, 1), the asset
correlation ρi,j is identical across all pairs of borrowers in this model setup,
which is given by
ρi,j = CorrP(Zi,t, Zj,t) =
EP(Zi,t · Zj,t)− EP(Zi,t) · EP(Zj,t)√
VarP(Zi,t) ·
√
VarP(Zj,t)
= ρ · EP (Y 2t )
= ρ · [EP (Yt) · EP (Yt) + CovP (Yt, Yt)]
= ρ (3.40)
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for all i 6= j.78
In Vasicek’s basic model specification, the credit portfolio consists of homo-
geneous loans, i.e. each loan exhibits the same risk characteristics in terms of
default risk and related losses, and the credit portfolio is additionally assumed
to be infinitely granular. Furthermore, the borrowers’ asset returns are corre-
lated with coefficient ρ for any two borrowers, as shown in Equation (3.40).79
This leads to a large homogeneous credit portfolio (LHP) which is solely ex-
posed to systematic risk since idiosyncratic risks are fully diversified, see Gordy
(2003).80 Then, the density of the percentage loss Lt on the portfolio at time
t is given by
v(lt) =
√
1− ρ
ρ
· exp
(
−
(√
1− ρ · Φ−1(lt)− Φ−1(pit)
)2
2 · ρ +
(Φ−1(lt))
2
2
)
.
(3.41)
pit describes the default probability of the LHP, which equals the homogeneous
default probability pii,t of a single loan in the credit portfolio (pi1,t = ... = piI,t =
pit with I →∞), and due to the law of large numbers also the expected default
rate of the LHP (Vasicek 1987, Bluhm et al. 2003). According to Vasicek (1987,
1991), the cumulative probability that the percentage loss of the LHP does not
exceed Lt ∈ [0, 1] follows from the cumulative distribution function
V (lt) = Φ
(√
1− ρ · Φ−1(lt)− Φ−1(pit)√
ρ
)
. (3.42)
According to BIS (2005) and Franke et al. (2011), the expected loss EP(Li,t)
of a single borrower i at time t is a random variable, which is determined by
78 Note that asset correlations may generally vary among borrowers in factor models, but
in this model specification, the asset correlation ρ is homogeneous and ranges between
0 and 1 due to the factor-model assumptions (see also Bluhm et al. 2003). For a good
description of a generalized framework to calculate asset correlations in factor models
compare Bluhm et al. (2003). Furthermore, homogeneous asset correlations can easily
be relaxed in an expanded factor-model approach, as shown in Chapter 5, where several
cross-correlation concepts, e.g., inter-sectoral asset correlations, are applied to account
for different asset correlations among borrowers.
79 Limitations of such a model setup are discussed in the context of the empirical applications
in Chapters 4 and 5.
80 If the number of credit risky assets in a portfolio is large and if the credit exposures
of these assets are relatively small (granularity), then idiosyncratic risks – which are
generally associated with individual exposures – tend to cancel out one another (BIS
2005). Eventually, only systematic risks have a material effect on portfolio losses and
thus may be compensated through a respective risk premium.
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the exposure at default EADi,t, the loss given default LGDi,t = 1− Ri,t with
recovery rate Ri,t, and the probability of default pii,t = EP(Di,t) representing
the expectations of the default indicator Di,t:81
E(Li,t) = EADi,t · LGDi,t · pii,t (3.43)
where Li,t describes the loss of obligor i at time t
Li,t = EADi,t · LGDi,t ·Di,t. (3.44)
Based on the additivity of expectations (Bluhm et al. 2003), the expected
loss EP(LP,t) of a credit portfolio P is given by
EP(LP,t) =
I∑
i=1
EADi,t · LGDi,t · pii,t, (3.45)
where the credit portfolio P contains debt claims of borrowers i, i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
Let the weight ωi,t of each credit exposure EADi,t in the entire credit port-
folio be defined by
ωi,t =
EADi,t
I∑
j=1
EADj,t
. (3.46)
Then, the loss rate of the portfolio Lt is a random variable given by
Lt =
I∑
i=1
ωi,t · LGDi,t ·Di,t, (3.47)
and the expected loss rate follows from
EP(Lt) =
I∑
i=1
ωi,t · LGDi,t · pii,t. (3.48)
According to Martin et al. (2006), the conditional expected loss rate of a
81 Although EADi,t and Ri,t may generally be stochastic, both measures are regarded as
known parameters (deterministic) for ease of expositions.
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credit portfolio is obtained by
EP(Lt|yt) =
I∑
i=1
ωi,t · LGDi,t · pii,t(yt). (3.49)
Let pi1,t = ... = piI,t = pit, LGD1,t = ... = LGDI,t = 1 and EAD1,t = ... =
EADI,t > 0 with I →∞, reflecting the assumptions of the LHP, then
EP(Lt|yt) = pit(yt), (3.50)
and the unconditional expected loss rate of the portfolio is
EP(Lt) = EP
[
EP(Lt|yt)
]
= pit (3.51)
where pit equals the unconditional default probability of a single debt asset
within the homogeneous credit portfolio (Vasicek 1987). Under these assump-
tions and based on Equation (3.36), the expected loss rate of the portfolio Lt
conditional on a realization of Yt = yt is given by
EP(Lt|Yt = yt) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pit)−√ρ · yt√
1− ρ
)
. (3.52)
The variance of the conditional loss rate in a homogeneous portfolio is
VarP(Lt|Yt = yt) =
I∑
i=1
(ωi,t)
2 · VarP (Di,t = 1|Yt = yt)
=
I∑
i=1
(ωi,t)
2 · pit(Yt) · [1− pit(Yt)], (3.53)
where VarP(Lt|Yt = yt) → 0 if I → ∞, compare Martin et al. (2006).82 Fur-
thermore, Martin et al. (2006) show that the variance of portfolio losses is
82 For the additivity of variances it is sufficient that the involved random variables are
pairwise uncorrelated and integrable (Bluhm et al. 2003). In this thesis, the independence
of involved random variables is assumed only for ease of this exercise. For example,
Pykhtin (2003) provides a model approach considering dependency structures between
recovery rates and default probabilities. This model is extended and empirically tested
by Bade et al. (2011).
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given by
VarP(LP,t) =
I∑
i,j=1
CovP(Li,t, Lj,t)
=
I∑
i,j=1
EADi,t · LGDi,t · CovP(Di,t, Dj,t)
=
I∑
i=1
EADi,t · LGDi,t · VarP(Di,t) +
I∑
i,j;i 6=j
%i,j,t · σi,t · σj,t (3.54)
with %i,j,t denoting the default correlation between obligor i and j at time t
%i,j,t = CorrP(Di,t, Dj,t) =
CovP(Di,t, Dj,t)√
VarP(Di,t) · VarP(Dj,t)
=
EP(Di,t ·Dj,t)− pii,t · pij,t√
pii,t · (1− pii,t) · pij,t · (1− pij,t)
, (3.55)
and
σx,t = EADx,t · LGDx,t ·
√
VarP(Dx,t), (3.56)
where VarP(Dx,t) = pix,t · (1 − pix,t), x ∈ {i, j}. The standard deviation√
VarP(LP,t) measures the magnitude of the deviation of portfolio losses from
the expected portfolio loss. As deviation from expectations, the standard devi-
ation may be seen as measure for the inherent credit risk of a credit portfolio.
Thus, it is commonly used to quantify unexpected losses ULP,t of a credit
portfolio P at time t
ULP,t =
√
V arP(LP,t), (3.57)
see Bluhm et al. (2003) and Martin et al. (2006). As Equation (3.54) shows,
default dependencies play a fundamental role for quantifying portfolio credit
risk and they represent main drivers for credit risk (Bluhm et al. 2003). For this
reason, the next section briefly introduces the copula approach for modeling
joint default times of borrowers in a credit portfolio, which is also widely used
for quantifying default correlations.
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3.3.2 Modeling Dependency Structures: The Copula Ap-
proach
Default probabilities and dependency structures such as default and asset cor-
relations play a crucial role in commercial credit risk models, even in the Basel
II Capital Accord (see Hamerle et al. 2003, Duellmann et al. 2010). Conse-
quently, correlations – in particular default correlations – are also critical for
the valuation of credit derivatives such as CDS or CDOs, which are regarded
as the most popular portfolio credit derivatives (see Hull & White 2008).
Valuing asset securitizations usually refers to the valuation of cash flows
linked to a basket of reference assets such as loans, bonds or CDS. These cash
flows strongly depend on the ensemble of asset-specific default times Ti with
i ∈ {1, ..., I} that can be denoted in the random vector T = (T1, ..., TI). In
order to determine the multivariate distribution function F of random default
times Ti in such a random vector
F (t1, ..., tI) = P(T1 ≤ t1, ..., TI ≤ tI) (3.58)
Li (2000), Frey et al. (2001), Bluhm et al. (2003) and Hamerle & Rösch (2005)
among others transferred a copula framework to credit risk. Particularly for the
valuation of CDOs, Li (2000) firstly proposed some common copula functions,
e.g., the Gaussian Copula and Archimedian Copulae, to compute the default
time of defaultable instruments and the pairwise correlation of default times.
The copula approach offers a practicable and flexible framework to examine
the behavior of multivariate distributions, particularly with respect to portfo-
lio credit risk (Li 2000). Generally, a copula function is a function that links
univariate marginal distributions of random variates to a joint multivariate
distribution function (see Sklar 1959, 1973). Sklar (1973) shows that a copula
function K can be specified for each joint multivariate distribution function.
Let U1, ..., UI be I uniform distributed random variables then the joint distri-
bution function K
K(u1, ..., uI) = P(U1 ≤ u1, ..., UI ≤ uI) (3.59)
is called a copula function (see Li 2000). Next, let X1, ..., XI be I contin-
uous random variates with one-dimensional marginal distribution functions
F1(x1), ..., FI(xI), where F denotes the joint distribution function of xi, ..., xI .
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Then, the copula function K (I-dimensional) with marginals F1(x1), ..., FI(xI)
can be defined by
K(F1(x1), ..., FI(xI)) = P(U1 ≤ F1(x1), ..., UI ≤ FI(xI))
= P(F−11 (U1) ≤ x1, ..., F−1I (UI) ≤ xI)
= P(X1 ≤ x1, ..., XI ≤ xI)
= F (x1, ..., xI), (3.60)
compare Sklar (1973) and Li (2000).83 Furthermore, Sklar (1973) shows that
a copula function K is unique if each of its marginal distribution functions
is continuous. According to Sklar (1973), an I-dimensional copula function
K(u1, ..., uI) satisfies, for example, the conditions that for each i ≤ I and all
ui ∈ [0, 1]
K(1, ..., 1, ui, 1, ..., 1) = ui. (3.61)
and if ui = 0 then
K(u1, ..., uI) = 0 (3.62)
for any i ≤ I.84
The most popular copula specification is the Gaussian copula KG related to
Gaussian marginals. This specification is used in credit risk models such as JP
Morgan‘s CreditMetrics (see Gupton et al. 1997), KMV‘s Portfolio Manager
(see Crosbie & Bohn 2002) and the Basel II capital weight function (compare
Hamerle & Rösch 2005, Rösch 2010, Franke et al. 2011), and also represents
the standard copula for pricing STCDOs referring to synthetic CDOs (Hull &
White 2008, Finger 2009).85
Based on the Gaussian specification and referring to Equation (3.58), it is
assumed that i) each credit asset i in the portfolio exhibits a hazard function
for its default time Ti, and ii) the distribution of Ti is Fi(t), then the joint
83 For more technical details see Sklar (1973).
84 The conditions satisfied by an I-dimensional copula function K(u1, ..., uI) are described
in detail in Sklar (1973).
85 For a good distinction between the industry credit risk models compare Bluhm et al.
(2003).
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distribution of the default times is given by
F (t1, ..., tI) = KG(F1(t1), ..., FI(tI))
= ΦI
(
Φ−1(F1(t1)), ...,Φ−1(Fn(tn)); Σ
)
, (3.63)
(compare Li 2000), where ΦI is the I-dimensional standard normal cumulative
distribution function with correlation matrix Σ ∈ RI×I
Σ =

1 γ1,2 . . . γ1,I
γ2,1 1
...
... . . . γI−1,I
γI,1 . . . γI,I−1 1
 (3.64)
containing the correlation coefficients γi,j with i, j ∈ {1, ..., I} and γi,j ∈ [−1, 1]
for i 6= j. Thus, the correlation matrix Σ describes the dependency structure
between the asset-specific default times.
Referring to the single-factor setup, the probability for a joint default of two
borrowers – borrower i and borrower j – at time t conditional on a realization
of Yt = yt is given by
P(Di,t = 1, Dj,t = 1|yt) = EP(Di,t ·Dj,t|yt) = pii,t(yt) · pij,t(yt). (3.65)
Equation (3.65) shows that the joint probability of default conditional on a
realization of the systematic risk factor Yt = yt is the product of the marginal
conditional default probabilities due to the independence of borrower-specific
risk factors leading to independent asset returns.
Analogous to Equation (3.28), the unconditional joint probability of default
is given as expectations over all realizations of Yt
P(Di,t = 1, Dj,t = 1) = EP(Di,t ·Dj,t) = EP
[
EP(Di,t ·Dj,t|yt)
]
=
+∞∫
−∞
pii,t(yt) · pij,t(yt) · ϕ(yt) dyt. (3.66)
In order to calculate the unconditional joint probability of default in the Gaus-
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sian specification, the bivariate Gaussian copula KG given by
KG(u1,t, u2,t) =
Φ−1(u1,t)∫
−∞
Φ−1(u2,t)∫
−∞
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2 exp
(−(v21 − 2ρv1v2 + v22)
2(1− ρ2)
)
dv1 dv2
= Φ2
(
Φ−1(u1,t),Φ−1(u2,t); Σ
)
(3.67)
is used, see Martin et al. (2006). Φ2 denotes the bivariate Gaussian cumulative
distribution function and Σ ∈ R2×2 describes the correlation matrix reflecting
the dependency structure between the random variates.86 Analogous to Equa-
tion (3.39), the unconditional joint probability is then
P(Di,t = 1, Dj,t = 1) = EP(Di,t ·Dj,t)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
ci,t −√ρ · yt√
1− ρ
)
· Φ
(
cj,t −√ρ · yt√
1− ρ
)
· ϕ(yt) dyt
= Φ2 (ci,t, cj,t; Σ) (3.68)
with correlation matrix Σ
Σ =
(
1 ρ1,2
ρ2,1 1
)
(3.69)
containing the asset correlations ρi,j with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, ρi,j ∈ [0, 1] for i 6= j,
compare Martin et al. (2006).
Through the inclusion of a common risk factor that simultaneously affects
all borrowers in a sector or an economy, the borrower defaults are correlated in
such a factor-model setup (compare Section 3.2.4). In the Gaussian specifica-
tion and referring to Equation (3.55), the joint correlation of borrower defaults
86 For more details on the bivariate standard normal (Gaussian) cumulative distribution
function see Li (2000) and Giesecke (2004).
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can be obtained by
CorrP(Di,t, Dj,t) =
EP(Di,t ·Dj,t)− EP(Di,t) · EP(Dj,t)√
VarP(Di,t) · VarP(Dj,t)
=
+∞∫
−∞
pii,t(yt) · pij,t(yt) · ϕ(yt) dyt − pii,t · pij,t√
pii,t · (1− pii,t) · pij,t · (1− pij,t)
=
Φ2(Φ
−1(pii,t),Φ−1(pij,t); Σ)− pii,t · pij,t√
pii,t · (1− pii,t) · pij,t · (1− pij,t)
. (3.70)
Equation (3.70) also shows that the joint default probability generally increases
with an increasing default correlation. However, in factor models the corre-
lation of defaults arises from correlations in the latent asset returns. If the
latent asset returns are independent, i.e., uncorrelated with ρi,j = 0 ∀ i 6= j
and i, j ∈ {1, ..., I}, the joint default probability is reduced to the product
of the obligors’ marginal default probabilities. Economically, this may be the
case if one borrower – either borrower i or j – is solely exposed to idiosyncratic
risk.
Based on Equation (3.40), the asset correlation ρi,j is identical across all
pairs of obligors in the simple LHP specification. Modeling these dependency
structures more realistically (or rather less restrictively), allows to examine
effects of diversification in multi-sectoral credit portfolios and asset securiti-
zations.87 Eventually, limitations of the LHP can be cured by considering
heterogenous (or even individual) obligor structures, e.g., sector-specific cross-
correlations and individual default probabilities.
As it is pointed out, asset correlations represent a substantial driver of port-
folio credit risk. Unfortunately, neither asset returns nor the respective asset
correlations are explicitly observable. Therefore, some recent works examine
several approaches to parameterize these important correlation parameters.
For example, Duellmann et al. (2010) suggest to estimate correlation parame-
ters on corresponding stock returns rather than on default rates.88 Such cross-
correlation estimates may then be incorporated into the correlation-coefficient
87 Chapter 5 addresses effects of sectoral diversification and systematic risk concentration
in asset securitizations by a Monte Carlo simulation approach.
88 Recall that asset correlations may generally vary across obligors and over time, which is
in contrast to the simplifying assumption of time-constant and identical asset correlations
across obligors.
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matrix in Equation (3.64) in order to calculate obligor defaults and corre-
sponding default correlations. Other authors, e.g., Hamerle & Rösch (2005),
examine the sensitivity of several copula approaches to misspecifications via a
maximum likelihood framework. For estimating default probabilities and cor-
relations on empirical default data they suggest the Gaussian copula approach
rather than other examined copula approaches.89
3.3.3 Valuing Single-tranche CDO Swaps
For valuing single-tranche CDO swaps (STCDO), a precise knowledge of ex-
pected tranche losses is essential. These expected tranche losses are triggered
by the portfolio’s credit risk and determined by the cumulative loss distribution
of the underlying credit risky portfolio.
In order to determine portfolio loss distributions, there are generally two
alternative approaches to setting up intensity-based models for portfolio credit
risk: the so-called bottom-up and top-down approaches. In a bottom-up ap-
proach, the default times of individual obligors are modeled and afterwards
aggregated to obtain the loss distribution of the entire credit portfolio. Corre-
sponding approaches to estimate portfolio loss distributions (bottom-up) are
provided by Li (2000) and Duffie & Gârleanu (2001).90 Beyond the single-
factor Gaussian copula specification (see Li 2000), Duffie & Gârleanu (2001)
develop a multi-factor affine jump-diffusion model to address portfolio credit
risk.91 As long as the number of debt asset is small, e.g., with regard to CDS
portfolios (or baskets) of 10 assets, Li’s (2000) approach is commonly used for
pricing the related credit risk based on comprehensive Monte Carlo simula-
tions, which are applied in order to specify the joint distribution of default
times (Martin et al. 2006).92 With an increasing number of individual credit
89 In this context, parameter (estimation) risk and model risk in measuring portfolio credit
risk is addressed by Löﬄer (2003), Hamerle & Rösch (2006), Heitfield (2009) and Tarashev
(2010).
90 Other reduced-form approaches to credit derivatives can be found in Graziano & Rogers
(2009), where defaults of different names are driven by a common continuous-time Markov
process, in Joshi & Stacey (2006) who provide an intensity-gamma model to value portfolio
credit derivatives, and in Chapovsky et al. (2007) who apply a stochastic intensity model
for pricing exotic structured credit derivatives.
91 Within this approach the default time of an obligor is due to three risk factors: one
issuer-specific, one common to all issuers in a specific sector and at least one common to
all issuers across all sectors (global).
92 Default events can be generated by bootstrapping the multivariate distribution of default
times from empirical data such as CDS notations.
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assets, bottom-up approaches may become less applicable since the computa-
tional resources for the simulation of a sufficient frequency of default times are
limited.
In contrast to bottom-up approaches, the evolution of the losses on a credit
risky portfolio is sometimes modeled top-down, where only the aggregated loss
process of the entire credit portfolio is modeled, but not explicitly the behav-
ior of single obligors. Within such a top-down approach, Longstaff & Rajan
(2008) provide a multi-factor portfolio credit model for pricing CDOs which is
motivated by the idea of Duffie & Gârleanu (2001): similar to Duffie & Gâr-
leanu (2001), defaults which cause losses in the credit portfolio follow a jump
process which is due to an idiosyncratic (firm-specific) component, a common
sector-specific risk factor and a common systematic risk factor affecting all
firms economywide.93 Top-down models exhibit advantages when individual
obligors in the portfolio are not dominating the others – or in other words – if
the credit exposure of each individual obligor is small compared to the refer-
ence credit portfolio.94 The gain in flexibility and tractability in such top-down
approaches outweigh the limitations, which are due to assumed simplifications
related to the borrower structure. This may be a reason for the increasing
attractiveness of top-down models, even with regard to the strong growth of
the markets for STCDOs (Ehlers & Schönbucher 2009).
In the following, the single-factor Gaussian Copula specification is applied
for valuing STCDOs, as also proposed by, e.g., Hull & White (2008) and Finger
(2009).95 Recall that Lt denotes the percentage loss of a credit portfolio, as
defined in Equation (3.47). Then, the market participants invested in tranche
T[A,D) suffer from losses on the portfolio’s debt assets if the loss rate Lt exceeds
the lower attachment point A ∈ [0, 1) of the tranche. The upper attachment
pointD ∈ (A, 1] of tranche T[A,D) is also called detachment point and represents
the tranche’s upper bound. The default event of a tranche occurs if the loss
rate of the underlying credit portfolio exceeds the lower bound (attachment
93 Other top-down approaches may be found in Ehlers & Schönbucher (2009), where the
evolution of the loss distribution is modeled as a Markov chain, and in Giesecke, Goldberg
& Ding (2011), who propose a ‘random thinning’ approach in order to decompose the
portfolio-level default intensity into the sum of the constituent intensities.
94 This is the case, for example, in retail portfolios or with respect to standard credit indices
such as the CDX or iTraxx index families.
95 Note that many other copula approaches exist such as the t-copula, the Clayton copula,
the Archimedian copulae and the Marshall Olkin copula which can be applied to the
valuation of CDOs. In some cases, these models may provide a much better fit to market
data than the Gaussian copula model (Hull & White 2008).
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point A) for the first time. The tranche and thus investors suffer from losses as
long as the loss rate is below the upper bound D. Therefore, tranche-specific
losses are restricted to the tranche size, which is the difference of detachment
point D and attachment point A. Consequently, the tranche loss at time t is
given by
L
T[A,D)
t = min (max (0, Lt − A) , D − A) . (3.71)
The boundaries of a tranche (A and D) determine the tranche seniority within
an asset securitization. Depending on the risk characteristics of the under-
lying credit portfolio, which determine the portfolio’s loss distribution, the
risk profile of a securitized tranche varies by seniority. In practice, a specific
risk profile of a tranche is sometimes proposed (or claimed) by investors or
credit-rating agencies in order to meet the investor’s risk appetite or the CRA
rating requirements, respectively (compare Section 2.3). To fulfill the specified
risk profile, the tranche boundaries can be calibrated on a given portfolio loss
distribution individually.96
According to Martin et al. (2006), the loss rate of a specified tranche LT[A,D)t
with attachment point A and detachment point D follows from
L
T[A,D)
t =
1
D − A
[
(Lt − A)+ − (Lt −D)+
]
(3.72)
with (·)+ = max(·, 0) and expectations
EP
(
L
T[A,D)
t
)
=
1
D − A
[
EP
(
(Lt − A)+
)− EP ((Lt −D)+)] . (3.73)
In this context, tranche losses can be seen as a call spread option on the loss
rate Lt (Longstaff & Rajan 2008). Thus, the calculation of expected tranche
losses may follow the classic valuation procedure of plain vanilla call options
on the firm’s equity, as presented in Martin et al. (2006): although the pool
recovery rate Rt may generally vary between [0, 1), the proof can be reduced
to the special case of Rt = 0 since
EP
(
(Lt − A)+
)
= (1−Rt) · EP0
((
Lt − A
1−Rt
)+)
(3.74)
96 An illustrative analytical application is provided in Chapter 5, where the systematic risk
sensitivity of structured products is examined.
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is valid with EP0(·) describing expectations under a recovery rate Rt = 0. Due
to the linearity of E(·), only expectations of EP0 ((Lt − A)+) are calculated.
Using integration by parts, it follows that
EP0
(
(Lt − A)+
)
=
1∫
0
(lt − A) · 1{lt≥A} · gt(lt)dlt
=
1∫
A
(lt − A) · gt(lt)dlt
=
1∫
A
lt · gt(lt)dlt − A ·
1∫
A
gt(lt)dlt
=
[
lt ·Gt(lt)
]1
A
−
1∫
A
1 ·Gt(lt)dlt −
[
A ·Gt(lt)
]1
A
= 1− A−
1∫
A
P(Lt ≤ lt)dlt, (3.75)
where gt(lt) denotes the density function of the portfolio’s loss rate with lt ∈
[0, 1] and Gt(lt) = P(Lt ≤ lt) describes the respective cumulative distribution
function. Equation (3.75) shows that the calculation method for the expected
loss rate of a tranche is independent from specific distributional assumptions
and holds for every cumulative distribution function Gt(lt).
Next, the expected loss rate of tranche T[A,D) is calculated with respect to
the presented single-factor Gaussian copula specification referring to a LHP.
Related to Vasicek’s cumulative distribution function, see Equation (3.42), it
follows that
P(Lt ≤ lt) = Φ
(√
1− ρ · Φ−1(lt)− Φ−1(pit)√
ρ
)
= 1− Φ
(
Φ−1(pit)−
√
1− ρ · Φ−1(lt)√
ρ
)
(3.76)
with pit denoting the default probability of the LHP, compare Section 3.3.1.
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Furthermore, the identity provided by Andersen & Sidenius (2005a) is used
γ∫
−∞
Φ(α · x+ β) · ϕ(x)dx = Φ2
(
β√
1 + α2
, γ; Σ
)
, (3.77)
where the correlation matrix Σ denotes the underlying dependency structure
Σ =
(
1 −α√
1+α2
−α√
1+α2
1
)
. (3.78)
Then, EP0 ((Lt − A)+) is obtained by inserting the results of Equation (3.76)
into Equation (3.75) and applying the identity of Equation (3.77). Firstly, this
leads to
EP0
(
(Lt − A)+
)
=
1∫
A
Φ
(
Φ−1(pit)−
√
1− ρ · Φ−1(lt)√
ρ
)
.
By substituting x = −Φ−1(lt) and defining
α =
√
1− ρ√
ρ
, β =
Φ−1(pit)√
ρ
and γ = Φ−1(A),
it follows secondly that
EP0
(
(Lt − A)+
)
=
−Φ−1(A)∫
−∞
Φ
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
· y + Φ
−1(pit)√
ρ
)
ϕ(y) dy
= Φ2
 Φ
−1(pit)√
ρ√
1 +
(√
1−ρ√
ρ
)2 ,−Φ−1(A);−
√
1−ρ√
ρ√
1 +
(√
1−ρ√
ρ
)2

= Φ2
(−Φ−1(A),Φ−1(pit); Σ) (3.79)
with Φ2(x, y; Σ) = Φ2(y, x; Σ) due to the properties of Gaussian functions and
with correlation matrix Σ
Σ =
(
1 −√1− ρ
−√1− ρ 1
)
. (3.80)
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Eventually, it follows from the linearity of expectations that the expected
loss of a tranche is given by
EP
(
L
T[A,D)
t
)
=
1−Rt
D − A
[
Φ2 (κ(A), ct; Σ)− Φ2 (κ(D), ct; Σ)
]
(3.81)
with
ct = Φ
−1(pit), and κ(χ) = −Φ−1
(
χ
1−Rt
)
for χ < 1−Rt and χ ∈ {A,D}.97
This basic single-factor framework is extended in Chapter 5 by a decompo-
sition of the systematic risk factor Yt into a sectoral and a super-systematic
risk component. Analogous to the basic model, an analytical framework for
quantifying default probabilities and expected losses is provided in order to
evaluate the systematic risk sensitivity of structured products in comparison
to the risk sensitivity of corporate bonds exhibiting comparable risk profiles.
An appropriate evaluation of expected tranche losses is particularly impor-
tant for the calculation of STCDO spreads. Similar to credit derivatives such
as classic CDS, the pricing of a STCDO implies evaluating the instrument’s
cash flows over its maturityM in order to calculate the fair spread of a tranche
which is is defined by
ST[A,D) (0,M) = sT[A,D) . (3.82)
The cash flows of a STCDO generally refer to the instrument’s premium leg
and protection leg. In single-tranche CDO swaps, a tranche investor generally
acts as a protection seller, who covers losses within the collateral that affect
the respective securitized tranche (protection leg). Until maturity, related
protection payments are limited to the size of the tranche (thickness). For this
provided credit protection the investor periodically receives a risk premium
compensating for the related default risk. These premium payments constitute
the premium leg.
In capital markets, the fair spread of a tranche refers to the present values of
both legs and is paid to the investor on discrete payment dates tj, j ∈ {1, ..., κ},
e.g., quarterly, with respect to the remaining face value. Under the risk-neutral
97 From Equation (3.74) it follows that the expected loss equals 0 for χ ≥ 1−R.
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probability measure Q, the present value of the premium leg V T[A,D)Q is given
by
V
T[A,D)
Q = s
T[A,D) · η · EQ
[
κ∑
j=1
∆j ·Qtj ·
(
1− LT[A,D)tj
)]
(3.83)
where η describes the face value (notional) of the tranche, ∆j denotes the con-
stant distance between the fixed payment dates tj, Qtj denotes the time-specific
discount factor depending on the term-structure of risk-less interest rates and
L
T[A,D)
tj denotes the tranche-specific loss rate at payment date tj, compare Mar-
tin et al. (2006). EQ(·) describes corresponding expectations under Q.98
Furthermore, the present value of the protection leg CT[A,D)Q (contingent
payment) of tranche T[A,D) is defined by
C
T[A,D)
Q = η ·
κ∑
j=1
Qtj ·
[
EQ
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)
− EQ
(
L
T[A,D)
tj−1
)]
(3.84)
with regard to discrete payment dates tj, j ∈ {1, ..., κ}. As already described,
the evaluation of the tranche’s expected loss rate EQ
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)
at date tj re-
quires knowledge about the default intensity of the underlying credit portfolio.
The most popular single-tranche CDO swaps refer to credit indices such as the
iTraxx Europe families or its U.S. American counterparts the CDX families
(compare Chapters 2 and 4). Each credit index represents a specified basket
of the 125 most liquid CDS contracts (equally weighted), which are related to
either European (iTraxx) or North American entities (CDX). Referring to such
credit indices, the default intensity of the entire CDS basket can be obtained
by bootstrapping the time-specific default intensities of its constitutes from
the respective credit spread curves and generating the multivariate distribu-
tion of default times based on the individual default intensities (compare, e.g.,
Martin et al. 2006). Alternatively, the default intensity of a credit index may
directly be extracted from index spread notations by using the so-called credit
triangle, as presented in O’Kane (2008).99
Based on the risk-neutral probability measure Q, the fair tranche spread of
98 Only for ease of this exercise, a discrete-time model framework is presented for the valua-
tion of STCDOs. In fact, it is quite possible to model fair tranche spreads in a continuous-
time framework, as presented in Martin et al. (2006).
99 In Chapter 4, the credit triangle is applied to daily index spread notations of the 5Y
iTraxx Europe to approximate the default intensity of this credit index.
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a tranche equals the mark-to-market value of a STCDO to zero. Thus, the
fair tranche spread is obtained by equalizing Equations (3.83) and (3.84) and
solving for sT[A,D) . This leads to
sT[A,D) =
κ∑
j=1
Qtj
[
EQ
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)
− EQ
(
L
T[A,D)
tj−1
)]
κ∑
j=1
∆j ·Qtj ·
[
1− EQ
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)] (3.85)
under the assumption of fixed payment dates tj with constant ∆j and related to
a given term-structure of risk-less interest rates determining the time-specific
discount factors Qtj . The standard Gaussian copula valuation framework of-
fers also scope for further model extension, as described above. With respect
to STCDOs, Andersen & Sidenius (2005b), for example, suggest the incorpo-
ration of stochastic recovery rates and the consideration of random systematic
factor loadings to allow for different correlation regimes when evaluating such
synthetic CDOs. Two alternative correlation skew models providing a dy-
namic spread-dependent correlation specification for the standard Gaussian
copula model are presented in Chapter 4. There, a dynamic panel regression
approach is suggested to model and forecast implied correlations for pricing
STCDOs on the 5Y iTraxx Europe credit index. Thereby, random effects are
introduced to account for unobservable time-specific effects on implied tranche
correlations. The spread forecasts based on the dynamic implied correlation
models are compared to forecasts using historical correlations from asset re-
turns. The empirical findings support the proposed dynamic mixed-effects
regression correlation model (MERM) even during the Global Financial Crisis
and indicate several implications for pricing and hedging credit derivatives.
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Implied Correlation
Modeling and Forecasting in
Structured Finance
The content of this chapter refers to the working paper ‘Dynamic Implied Cor-
relation Modeling and Forecasting in Structured Finance’ by Löhr, S., Mur-
sajew, O., Rösch, D., and Scheule, H., 2012.
4.1 Introduction
The market volume of credit derivatives increased rapidly from $180 billion in
1996 to over $57 trillion in 2008 (BBA 2006, BIS 2010b). This growth rate
highlights the importance of these new instruments in financial markets. Con-
sequences of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), e.g., the Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy in 2008, underline the challenge to aggregate individual risk con-
tributions in the presence of correlations, which is essential for pricing credit
derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The GFC has es-
pecially shown that pooling and tranching within CDO structures amplify
mistakes in the assessment of underlying asset default risks and correlations
(compare Coval et al. 2009b).
The Gaussian copula model is market standard for pricing synthetic single-
tranche CDO swaps (STCDO) in the finance industry (Hull & White 2006),
either in a structural single-factor framework (compare Merton 1974, Vasicek
1987) or in respective default intensity models which were initially introduced
72
4.1. INTRODUCTION
by Li (2000). Increasing liquidity in synthetic CDO markets, particularly in
that for standardized index tranches, reveals shortcomings of standard Gaus-
sian copula models for pricing STCDOs. Consequences of these shortcomings
appear mainly in observable differences between model spreads and quoted
market spreads. Earlier literature on STCDOs shows that several extensions
to the Gaussian copula approach are presented to overcome existing model lim-
itations. Within these studies improvements in pricing STCDOs are reached
by implementing different copula structures or relaxing standard correlation
restrictions (compare Hull & White 2004, Laurent & Gregory 2005, Andersen
& Sidenius 2005a, Longstaff & Rajan 2008).
In general, credit risks and their correlations determine the loss distribu-
tions of credit portfolios related to credit derivatives (Longstaff & Rajan 2008).
However, ‘true’ correlations are not observable and thus they are unknown
parameters. This underlines the need for appropriate correlation models in or-
der to estimate expected tranche losses, which in turn determine fair tranche
spreads. Accordingly, appropriate correlation forecasts are important param-
eters in pricing models of structured financial instruments.
In practice, several standard approaches are used to estimate implied corre-
lations matching observable market spreads of credit derivatives (Hull & White
2006). Analogous to the Black-Scholes methodology to extract implied volatil-
ities from option market prices, implied correlations can be extracted from
CDO tranche prices (compare Ncube 1996, Finger 2009). Similar to implied
volatilities, the spread-dependent implied correlations may also differ widely
in asset securitizations (compare Hull & White 2006). Two popular standard
approaches for modeling implied correlations are represented by compound
correlations and base correlations. The concept of base correlations was intro-
duced in 2004 by McGinty et al. (2004) in order to overcome the ambiguity of
compound correlations.
This paper provides an econometric framework which extends existing lit-
erature on pricing credit derivatives. Three correlation estimation approaches
are examined within this empirical spread analysis and evaluated with regard
to their forecast performance. Firstly, we derive both compound correlations
and base correlations as different types of implied correlations from quoted
iTraxx Europe index tranche spreads. The 5-year (5Y) iTraxx Europe is one
of the most popular credit default swap (CDS) indices representing a port-
folio of 125 most liquid as well as equally weighted single-name CDS con-
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tracts.100 Secondly, base correlations are modeled with two different dynamic
regression correlation models: i) a dynamic fixed-effects regression correlation
model (FERM) and ii) a dynamic mixed-effects regression correlation model
(MERM). The dynamic FERM solely considers fixed-tranche effects. By imple-
menting dummy variables and error components, we account for fixed tranche
effects as well as random time effects in the dynamic MERM. In the following,
our models are used to forecast daily tranche spreads. Thirdly, daily spreads
are forecasted using a dynamic asset correlation approach. Within this ap-
proach dynamic historical asset correlations are derived from corresponding
asset returns.101
Eventually, we compare the forecast performances of the provided mod-
els. We show that the implied correlation models are superior to the dynamic
historical asset correlation approach in terms of the prediction error metrics.
Thus, the results correspond to findings related to option markets, where im-
plied volatility regression models outperform forecasts based on standard de-
viations of log-returns (compare Ncube 1996). We find that the accuracy of
daily spread forecasts strongly depends on both correlation types in use and its
underlying estimation approach. Overall, the forecast quality of our dynamic
panel regression correlation models outperforms forecasts based on estimations
referring to standard correlation approaches. Especially, the dynamic MERM
accounting for random time effects as well as fixed tranche effects, seems to be
highly relevant for pricing STCDOs. Last but not least, our empirical study
provides useful implications for both hedging credit risk and pricing several
kinds of credit derivatives, e.g., non-standardized CDO tranches and bespoke
portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we
develop the theoretical pricing framework, introduce three different correla-
tion approaches and demonstrate how to calculate the correlation types. We
then provide both of our dynamic panel regression correlation models MERM
and FERM considering the aforementioned effects in correlation modeling. In
Section 4.3, our empirical results are presented. Section 6.4 concludes.
100Offered STCDOs are standardized with attachment points A ∈ {0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12%}
and detachment points D ∈ {3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22%}, respectively. The composition of
the basket is fixed until maturity. For a detailed description of the iTraxx Europe family
refer to www.iTraxx.com.
101Within our empirical analysis we consider log-returns of entities incorporated in the 5Y
iTraxx Europe index and listed on stock exchanges as well.
74
4.2. CORRELATION APPROACHES AND DYNAMIC PANEL
REGRESSION MODELS
4.2 Correlation Approaches and Dynamic Panel
Regression Models
4.2.1 Valuation of Single-tranche CDO Swaps
A collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a structured financial instrument
that securitizes a specific portfolio of credit risky assets (collateral). Inherent
credit risks of debt assets are transferred to external investors by repacking the
original risk profile and offering risk-adjusted tranches to investors. Tranches
are backed by the collateral. Eventually, the initial debt portfolio is bundled in
tranches of different seniority. Subsequently, the seniority of tranches reflects
the order in which losses within the collateral affect different tranches and
thus tranche investors. Each tranche is defined by the percentage of losses
in the collateral that it carries (for more detailed information compare Bluhm
2003). According to their individual risk-return preferences, investors purchase
corresponding tranches.
In contrast to CDOs, synthetic CDOs refer to a basket of different single-
name CDS contracts.102 A well known standardized credit index of single-name
CDS contracts is the 5Y iTraxx Europe credit index. Analogous to CDOs,
external investors purchase risk-adjusted tranches from this CDS basket in
accordance to their individual risk-return preferences. In its role as protec-
tion seller, each investor receives a periodic premium payment depending on
the tranche-specific risk profile.103 It is generally paid out quarterly. The
premium leg contains all premium payments over the product’s maturity. In
turn, an investor suffers losses within the underlying CDS basket respective to
specific tranche characteristics mentioned above. The resulting protection or
fee payments are called protection leg and refer to cash flows that cover losses
affecting the related tranche. Thus, the protection leg refers to cash flows paid
out to the protection buyer in cases of default events causing losses within the
underlying CDS basket.
The valuation of STCDOs implies calculating the fair spreads of each tranche.
By definition a fair tranche spread equals the mark-to-market value of a STCDO
102See Chapter 2 for more detailed information on synthetic CDOs and their functionality.
103The premium payment depends on i) the tranche-specific spread varying by seniority and
ii) the respective outstanding national amount. Tranche spreads reflect the compensated
credit risk and are thus determined by the tranche-specific risk profile in terms of default
risk and related losses.
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to zero using risk-neutral valuation. Risk-neutral valuation is based on a risk-
neutral martingale measure Q which is taken into consideration for all expec-
tations in the following.
As we will see below, the determination of fair tranche spreads decisively
relies on the cumulative loss distribution of the underlying credit portfolio.
The industry-standard model for the valuation of STCDOs is the single-factor
Gaussian copula model (Hull & White 2008, Finger 2009), which was firstly
applied to portfolio credit risk by Vasicek (1987) and combined with default
intensity models by Li (2000), Schönbucher (2003), Laurent & Gregory (2005)
and Longstaff & Rajan (2008).
Tranche investors suffer losses at time t if the total portfolio loss LPt in
percent of its notional exceeds the lower attachment point A ∈ [0, 1) of the
respective tranche T[A,D). Occurring tranche losses L
T[A,D)
t at time t are re-
stricted to the difference of the upper attachment point D ∈ (0, 1], and the
lower attachment point A of tranche T[A,D). In terms of the total portfolio loss
LPt , it follows for the tranche-specific losses:
L
T[A,D)
t = min
(
max
(
0, LPt − A
)
, D − A) (4.1)
In order to calculate the present value PV of both the premium leg and
the protection leg of a STCDO referring to tranche T[A,D) with maturity of five
years (M = 5), we proceed as follows:104
Firstly, we define the fair STCDO premium
ST[A,D) (0,M) = sT[A,D) . (4.2)
This premium is paid to investors at discrete payment dates tj, j ∈ {1, ..., κ},
with respect to the remaining face value of tranche T[A,D).
Therefore, the present value of the premium leg PV T[A,D)prem is defined by
PV
T[A,D)
prem = s
T[A,D) · η · E
[
κ∑
j=1
∆j ·Qtj
(
1− LT[A,D)tj
)]
(4.3)
where η denotes the face value (notional), Qtj describes the time-specific dis-
count factor, and E(·) corresponding expectations. ∆j describes the constant
104This valuation exercise primarily refers to Martin et al. (2006) and is described in detail
Section 3.3.3.
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distance between fixed payment dates. Tranche-specific losses at time tj are
denoted by LT[A,D)tj .
Secondly, we calculate the present value of the protection leg PV T[A,D)prot with
regard to discrete payment dates tj, j ∈ {1, ..., κ}
PV
T[A,D)
prot = η
κ∑
j=1
Qtj
[
E
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)
− E
(
L
T[A,D)
tj−1
)]
. (4.4)
Finally, we infer fair tranche spreads sT[A,D) by equalizing Equations (4.3)
and (4.4):
sT[A,D) =
κ∑
j=1
Qtj
[
E
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)
− E
(
L
T[A,D)
tj−1
)]
κ∑
j=1
∆j ·Qtj ·
[
1− E
(
L
T[A,D)
tj
)] . (4.5)
The valuation process shows that in cases of spread calculation a precise
knowledge of expected tranche losses is essential. These expected tranche
losses are determined by the cumulative loss distribution of the underlying
credit risky portfolio. Approaches to estimate portfolio loss distributions are
provided, for example, by Li (2000) and Duffie & Gârleanu (2001).
Within the framework of the single-factor Gaussian copula model, we can
use asymptotic analytical approximation procedures to calculate expected tranche
losses (compare Vasicek 1987):
The expected loss of tranche T[A,D) with D ∈ (0, 1] is analytically given by
E
(
LT[A,D)
)
=
1−R
D − A
[
Φ2
(
ω (A) , c;−
√
1− ρ
)
− Φ2
(
ω (D) , c;−
√
1− ρ
)]
(4.6)
with ω (χ) = −Φ−1 ( χ
1−R
)
for χ ∈ {A,D} and R ∈ [0, 1) describing the recov-
ery rate of the underlying credit portfolio (compare Kalemanova et al. 2007).105
Φ2 (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the bivariate nor-
mal distribution and ρ ∈ [0, 1] its correlation parameter. Additionally, we
105A recovery rate of R = 40%, for example, indicates that 40% of the contract’s face value
will be recovered in case of a default event. For a general analysis of basket default swaps,
we refer to Laurent & Gregory (2005).
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define the time-dependent default threshold c by
c = c(tj) = Φ
−1
(
1− exp
(
−λ · tj
4
))
. (4.7)
In accordance to the so-called credit triangle (O’Kane 2008), we approxi-
mate λ by
λ =
sTrax
1−RTrax (4.8)
with λ as time-constant default intensity of the 5Y iTraxx Europe (Trax) de-
rived from the daily index spread sTrax and the related index recovery rate
RTrax = R.106
From Equation (4.6) follows that the correlation parameter ρ affects deci-
sively the expected tranche loss LT[A,D) and thus the tranche spread sT[A,D) ,
compare Equation (4.5). We conclude that fair tranche spreads sT[A,D) are
highly sensitive to variations of the correlation ρ. Thus, ρ is a decisive factor
in pricing STCDOs.
4.2.2 Correlation Approaches: Compound, Base and As-
set Correlations
Increasing standardization of credit derivatives is a main driver for an enlarge-
ment of trading activities in the STCDO market (compare Finger 2009). In
consequence, relatively high liquidity is achieved in these markets by sufficient
supply and demand for structured finance products. This is in tandem with the
rising popularity of credit indices such as the iTraxx Europe credit index family.
Thus, observable market quotes for STCDOs reflect a market-specific view of
correlations (compare Longstaff & Rajan 2008). In the following subsection,
we introduce the main approaches for extracting three different correlation
types from given market information:
106Note that on each day the default intensity of the 5Y iTraxx Europe is derived from its
daily index spread notation. Thus, the implied default intensity may vary by day, but
nevertheless it is assumed to be constant over the 5-year maturity of the index.
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Compound Correlations
Within the concept of compound correlations, implied correlations are de-
rived from quoted market spreads. This practice was inspired by the implied
volatility approach from Black-Scholes in which implied volatilities are derived
from option market prices.107 The compound correlation approach can there-
fore be termed as a direct adaption of Black-Scholes implied volatilities to
the STCDO market (compare Hull & White 2004). Basically, we obtain the
respective compound correlation by inverting the introduced Gaussian copula
model and matching model generated prices to market quoted spreads. In
detail, we use a numeric inversion procedure referring to Equation (4.5) to
infer the correlation parameter which produces a model spread equal to the
market quoted spread. Usually, the time-varying compound correlation differs
across tranches T[A,D). Additionally, there is obviously another similarity to
implied volatilities called correlation smile. In the same way that a volatility
smile is a function of the option’s strike, the correlation smile is a function of
the tranche-specific subordination level. Figure 4.1 shows a typical correlation
Figure 4.1: Compound Correlation Smile, 16th of September 2005
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Notes: This figure shows the compound correlation smile for tranche spreads of the 5Y iTraxx Europe on
16th of September 2005. The x-axis denotes the subordination levels of tranches while the y-axis denotes
the compound correlations. As we can see the correlation of tranche T[0%,3%) is higher than the correlation
of tranche T[3%,6%). The remaining compound correlations increase with increasing tranche seniorities.
smile. While the compound correlations are denoted on the y-axis, the x-axis
denotes the various subordination levels. The correlation of tranche T[0%,3%)
is higher than the correlation of tranche T[3%,6%). The remaining compound
correlations monotonically increase with increasing tranche seniorities. Thus,
107Implied volatilities provide a common benchmark for a comparison of options across
maturities and strikes as well (Ncube 1996).
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the plotted function implies that different tranches on the same underlying
credit portfolio trade at various correlations, whereas the model to estimate
the underlying portfolio loss distribution uses only a single parameter ρ to
summarize the overall dependency structure of borrowers. This also means
that for valuing STCDOs a flat correlation is not sufficient to model market
spreads (Andersen & Sidenius 2005b).
One of the main shortcomings with compound correlations is related to the
applied quadratic optimizing techniques whose solutions are not unique.108
The observable ambiguity of compound correlations is often mentioned crit-
ically in the recent literature: according to the spread function in Equation
(4.5) two different - but still plausible - compound correlations may lead to
the same observable tranche spread. Such a lack of uniqueness makes interpre-
tations of compound correlations much more difficult, even more so in CDO
hedging (see Finger 2009). Non-monotonic correlations especially in tranches
of middle seniority have a weakening effect on the applicability of this concept.
For more details compare McGinty et al. (2004).
Base Correlations
In 2004, the base correlation approach was proposed by McGinty et al.
(2004) to overcome limitations of compound correlations. Basically, base cor-
relations are implied correlations as well. Analogous to compound correla-
tions, they are derived from market spreads. In contrast to compound corre-
lations, they are defined as implied correlations of virtual equity tranches.109
These virtual equity tranches T[0%,Di) have the same lower attachment point
as standard equity tranches, but differ in their detachment level Di with level
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The detachment points of these virtual equity tranches corre-
spond to the upper attachment points of all other standard tranches, and thus
Di ∈ {3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22%}. In general, the correlations of fictive tranches
T[0%,Di) are received in line with the procedure introduced in Section 4.2.1 for
the compound correlations. A methodical modification within the base corre-
lation approach is a bootstrap process presented by JP Morgan. Simplified, it
means to derive base correlation for higher levels i from the first equity tranche
108Solving for the correlation ρ means to minimize the sum of square errors of quoted market
and model spreads which leads to the stated quadratic optimization problem.
109The equity tranche T[0%,3%) is also called first loss tranche.
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T[0%,3%). The expected tranche loss E
(
LT[0%,D1)
)
is equal to the expected loss
from the first observable equity tranche. Consequently, the base correlation for
the first equity tranche T[0%,D1) equals its compound correlation. Remaining
base correlations for higher detachment levels i are obtained by calculating the
expected tranche losses E
(
LT[0%,Di)
)
E
(
LT[0%,Di)
)
= E
(
LT[0%,Di−1)
)
+ E
(
LT[Di−1,Di)
)
(4.9)
with i ≥ 1 and D0 = 0%. E
(
LT[Di−1,Di)
)
is calculated using the market spread
sT[Di−1,Di) .
Once expected losses for the sequence of first loss tranches T[0%,Di) are pro-
vided, we can solve for single base correlations for each tranche T[0%,Di) (com-
pare Parcell & Wood 2007).110
Figure 4.2 reveals the monotonic function of both correlation and spread
leading to a typical base correlation skew. In contrast to Figure 4.1, base
Figure 4.2: Base Correlation Skew, 16th of September 2005
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Notes: This figure shows the base correlation skew for tranche spreads of the 5Y iTraxx Europe on 16th of
September 2005. The x-axis denotes synthetic equity tranches T[0%,Di). The y-axis denotes base correlations.
The base correlations increase monotonically with increasing detachment levelDi ∈ {3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22%}.
correlations (y-axis) increase monotonically with increasing detachment points
of the virtual equity tranches (x-axis). We also conclude that the concept of
base correlation exploits the monotonicity of equity tranches to overcome the
problem of non-uniqueness of compound correlations, which leads to a more
meaningful skew.
The main benefit of this approach is that base correlations can be calcu-
lated for any virtual equity tranche T[0%,Di) with Di ∈ (0, 1]. In this manner,
110For example: T[0%,D2) = T[0%,6%).
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base correlations can be used to value non-standardized CDOs with specific
interpolation methods as provided by Parcell & Wood (2007).
The presented base correlation approach provides market participants with
a simple measure of implied correlation inherent in quoted tranches. This
measure leads to unique solutions and offers a reasonable valuation framework
for non-standardized CDOs (Andersen & Sidenius 2005a, Hull & White 2006,
Finger 2009).
Historical Asset Correlations
In the basic single-factor Gaussian copula framework, only a single corre-
lation parameter ρ is needed to describe the overall dependency structure of
borrowers in the underlying credit portfolio. After estimating the correlation
parameter ρ and based on a specified default threshold c, the bivariate Gaus-
sian copula model can be applied to calculate fair tranche spreads sT[A,D) as
denoted in Equations (4.5) and (4.6).111
One standard approach to directly approximate the dependency parameter
ρ is inspired by fundamental assumptions in the Merton model. Within this
framework the default event of a firm is endogenously modeled by assessing
the firm’s capital structure (compare Merton 1974). This idea can be extended
to a credit portfolio. In order to derive joint default correlations of firms in
the credit portfolio, the firms‘ asset returns and their dependency structures
are taken into consideration. Hence, current market information is included in
modeling dependency structures across borrowers. Other authors who address
this kind of direct modeling are, for example, Lucas (1995), Gupton et al.
(1997) and Zhou (2001).
For our empirical analysis, we modify this standard approach as follows:
Firstly, we define several sample periods of our empirical study to account for
different states of the global economy, as described in Section 4.3. Secondly,
we investigate the log-asset returns of the firms which are included in ‘on the
run’ series of the 5Y iTraxx Europe in order to calculate average asset corre-
lations.112 The daily average asset correlations – also called historical asset
111In the market standard model for pricing STCDOs, a single correlation parameter is
sufficient for pricing securitized tranches. However, such a single correlation parameter
implies a flat correlation structure, which is in contrast to observable implied correlation
smiles and skews.
112Using DataStream provided by Thomson Reuters.
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correlations – are dynamically calculated for every trading day t in the speci-
fied sample period, with t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Each historical asset correlation refers
to a 250-day time window. Thus, the calculation of a historical asset corre-
lation is based on the assets’ last 250 trading days, which are approximately
representing an one-year time horizon. The first window ends one day before
the first spread forecast. In the following, the 250-day time window dynami-
cally rolls through the specified forecast periods day by day. On each day, an
average historical asset correlation is calculated which is then used for fore-
casting tranche spreads (one day ahead).113 Eventually, we daily approximate
the asset correlation ρ applied in Equation (4.6) by the average historical asset
correlations among the index entities of ‘on the run’ series.
In contrast to forecasts based on implied correlations, forecasts with various
types of historical asset correlations assume an identical correlation for each
tranche T[A,D). Consequently, daily spread forecasts based on implied corre-
lations consider tranche-specific correlation values, while the dynamic asset
correlation model (ACM) does not. Despite these general limitations of single-
correlation models, the dynamic ACM is used as a benchmark model due to
its pricing popularity in the past.
4.2.3 Dynamic Panel Regression Approach for Base Cor-
relations
Implied correlations are not constant, but change over time and between
tranches. By inverting the spread formula in Equation (4.5) numerically, we
get daily implied correlation parameters for each tranche T[A,D).114 With re-
spect to the benefits of base correlations, we focus in the following on this type
of implied correlation. Thus, our panel data consists of 5 cross-sectional units
(tranches T[A,D)) which are observed over time t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Hence, panel
data models can be estimated for the implied correlation parameter in order
to reflect both cross-sectional and time characteristics. According to our model
assumptions, the correlations range between 0 and 1, ρit ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, a pro-
bit transformation is performed in order to create a variable ranging between
113The specific length of different forecast periods is denoted in Table 4.2 of Section 4.3.2.
114In order to obtain implied correlations, we used the Quasi-Newton Method.
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[−∞,+∞]. Further, i refers to synthetic tranches T[0%,Di)
i = T[0%,Di). (4.10)
Since we regard tranches T[0%,Di) of five different levels i, it follows that i ∈
{1, ..., 5}. Additionally, we involve the lagged correlation parameter ρit−1 of
tranche i as explanatory variable in the model to account for autocorrelation.
β¯i0 = β¯0 + α
i is the intercept for the i-th base correlation, β¯0 represents the
‘mean’ intercept (Ncube 1996). αi is the difference between the individual
intercept and the ‘mean’ intercept and thus accounting for time-constant dif-
ferences among tranches in both of our proposed dynamic panel regression
models. Therefore, fixed effects vary across tranches i depending on their se-
niority. Besides we assume that ρit−1 is a convenient predictor for the base
correlation ρit. For the i-th tranche the model is given by
Φ−1(ρit) = (β¯0 + α
i) + β1 · Φ−1
(
ρit−1
)
+ vt + u
i
t, (4.11)
with t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Φ−1(·) denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribu-
tion function and T describes the amount of days. β1 describes the sensitivity
with respect to the lagged correlation which is identical for all tranches i. To
complete our model, we need to specify whether αi and vt, respectively, are
stochastic or fixed. If a variable (αi, vt) is assumed stochastic, we require some
distributional assumptions on the effects as well.
Firstly, we propose a mixed-effects regression correlation model (MERM)
allowing for fixed and random effects.115 In this manner, we assume that
the parameter vt describes an unobservable random effect accounting for any
time-specific effect that is not included in the regression.
The residual eit consists of two components:
eit = vt + u
i
t, (4.12)
where vt ∼ N (0, σ2v) i.i.d., uit ∼ N (0, σ2u) i.i.d. and σ2e = σ2v + σ2u. While vt de-
scribes an unobservable time effect, uit is the remainder stochastic disturbance
term varying in time and with tranche seniority.
115For a discussion of dummy-variable and error-component models refer to Hsiao (1986)
and Baltagi (1995). Time-series and cross-section studies not controlling for heterogenous
individuals run the risk of obtaining biased results, see, e.g., Baltagi (1995).
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We assume the following residual covariance structure:
cov(eit, e
j
s) =

σ2v if i 6= j, t = s
σ2e if i = j, t = s
0 otherwise.
(4.13)
The correlation structure is given by
ψ = corr(eit, e
j
s) =

σ2v/σ
2
e if i 6= j, t = s
1 if i = j, t = s
0 otherwise,
(4.14)
and shows that the correlation between base correlations ρit is determined by
the variance σ2v of the random time effect vt for a given time period. This
intra-class correlation ψ
ψ =
σ2v
σ2u + σ
2
v
(4.15)
measures the extent of unobserved latent time-invariant variation relative to
the total unobserved variation. Since i) all tranches are affected by the time-
specific effect vt in the same way and ii) the intra-class correlation measures the
ratio of its variance (σ2v) to the total variance, we conclude that the intra-class
correlation provides an indication of systematic risk influences on the corre-
lation parameter ρit. Thus, we suggest that the higher (lower) the systematic
risk influence, the higher (lower) the relation of σ2v to σ2u will be and also the
intra-class correlation.
Secondly, we propose a fixed-effects regression model (FERM) allowing for
fixed effects only. In this manner, we assume that αi is a fixed tranche-specific
effect and the residual eit consists only of one component
eit = u
i
t, (4.16)
where uit ∼ N (0, σ2u) i.i.d. This leads to the following dummy-variable model
for the i-th tranche
Φ−1(ρit) = (β¯0 + α
i) + β1 · Φ−1(ρit−1) + uit (4.17)
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with t ∈ {1, ..., T}. By expanding our FERM, it is easily possible to addition-
ally account for fixed time-specific effects. But even if we are able to estimate
these effects ex post, it is barely possible to forecast these effects ex ante. Thus,
fixed time effects are not considered.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Panel Data
Our database contains daily spreads of both the 5Y iTraxx Europe index and
its standardized tranches from August 2005 to September 2008.116 Within our
empirical study we focus on quoted market spreads referring to ‘on the run’
series of the 5Y iTraxx Europe.117
Figure 4.3 shows historical spreads of the 5Y iTraxx Europe index (red
line) and the time series of several tranche spreads (black lines) from August
24th, 2005 to September 19th, 2008. The quoted spreads refer to several ‘on
the run’ series. The runtime of each series is indicated by the dashed-dotted
vertical lines and marked by iTraxx S 4 to iTraxx S 9. The x-axis denotes the
observation days. While the y-axis on the left hand side denotes the market
upfront payment of the equity tranche T[0%,3%) in percent, the secondary y-axis
on the right hand side denotes spreads in basis points (bps). From August 24th,
2005 to June 18th, 2007 we observe slightly decreasing index spreads from 39
bps to almost 20 bps. In contrast to the remaining time series of the 5Y
iTraxx Europe, the index spread movements are moderate and at a relatively
low level during this period. For this reason, we define our first sample from
August 24th, 2005 to June 18th, 2007 (Sample 1 ). On June 18th, 2007 it is
reported for the first time, that Merrill Lynch seizes collateral from a Bear
Stearns hedge fund invested heavily in subprime loans, which leads to strongly
increasing credit spreads over the following days. Therefore, we define the 19th
of June as the beginning of our GFC sample (Sample 2 ). Several days after
this announcement - at the end of July 2007 - the 5Y iTraxx Europe reaches its
first peak at 68 bps. Despite loan interventions through the Federal Reserve
Bank (New York) in March 2008 attempting to avert a sudden collapse of Bear
116All quoted market spreads are provided by Markit. For daily closing quotes we consider
the mid of quoted bid/ask spreads.
117Every six months a new ‘on the run’ series is issued with a constant maturity of 5 years
and a fixed basket of CDS.
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Figure 4.3: Spreads of the Standardized 5Y iTraxx Europe from 2005 to 2008
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Notes: The figure shows historical 5Y iTraxx Europe index spreads (red line) as well as several
tranche spreads with regard to ‘on the run’ series S 4 to S 9 which are indicated by the dashed-doted
vertical lines. The sample period is August 24th, 2005 to September 19th, 2008. During series 7, all spreads
strongly increase for the first time in line with increasing spread volatility due to the beginning of the GFC.
Stearns, the company can not be saved and is sold to JP Morgan Chase later
on. Within these market turbulences, the 5Y iTraxx Europe registers a new
all time high of 160 bps on March 17th, 2008, when JP Morgan Chase offers
to acquire Bear Stearns. This peak is at least 8 times higher than the last
peak in June 2007. The time series of the iTraxx Europe strongly reflects the
chronology of the GFC.118 In comparison to Sample 1 (before the GFC), the
observed 5Y iTraxx Europe index spreads are much more volatile as well as
higher quoted throughout Sample 2 (during the GFC). Lastly, we define our
third sample as the entire observation period by merging Sample 1 and 2 into
Sample 3, in which we are not accounting explicitly for the GFC.
Corresponding to the index chart in Figure 4.3 all 5Y iTraxx Europe tranche
spreads are slightly decreasing in Sample 1 and strongly increasing after the
18th of June 2007. Throughout Sample 2 we observe i) relatively high spread
volatilities and ii) an absolute increase in the tranche-specific spread levels. For
example: while the standard deviation (STD) in bps of the mezzanine tranche
T[6%,9%) is 18 times higher in Sample 2 than in Sample 1 (STD
T[6%,9%)
1 = 5.78
vs. STDT[6%,9%)2 = 105.59)119, the mean of tranche spreads sT[6%,9%) increases
from 18.81 bps to 164.38 bps. In fact, the most senior tranche (dotted line)
118The chronology of the GFC is reported in more detail in BIS (2009a).
119Index 1 refers to Sample 1 and index 2 to Sample 2.
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seems to be much more affected by economic downturns like the GFC than
other tranches. This may be indicated by the relation between average tranche
spreads
[
s
T[A,D)
2 / s
T[A,D)
1
]
. This relation is increasing with tranche seniority:
regarding the most senior tranche we obtain a value of around 14, which means
that the average tranche spread sT[12%,22%)2 is 14 times higher in Sample 2 than
in Sample 1. For the upfront payment of the equity tranche (dashed line) and
the mezzanine tranche T[6%,9%) (continuous black line) this relation is 1.54 and
8.74, respectively.
Table 4.1 provides additional summary statistics for index and tranche data
referring to Sample 3.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of 5Y Itraxx Europe Index and Tranche Spreads
Tranche Mean STD Min. Max. N
0% - 3% 2,321.84 953.41 636.07 5,219.11 749
3% - 6% 156.47 145.09 39.70 685.93 749
6% - 9% 81.36 100.11 10.25 414.69 749
9% - 12% 51.45 68.20 4.18 323.24 749
12% - 22% 25.93 34.56 1.72 156.79 749
iTraxx Index 48.42 30.42 20.09 160.00 749
Notes: This table provides summary statistics of market spreads in basis points for Sample 3. The results
refer to merged ‘on the run’ time series. The sample period is August 24th, 2005 to September 19th, 2008.
N denotes the amount of observations. STD describes the respective standard deviation of market spreads.
The entire sample contains 749 daily observations for i) the 5Y iTraxx Eu-
rope and ii) each of its securitized tranches. The mean spreads monotonically
decrease with increasing tranche seniority. Thus, the highest (lowest) default
risk is linked to the equity (senior) tranche which is indicated by the highest
(lowest) mean spread of 2,321.84 bps (25.93 bps). In fact, the senior tranche
exhibits the largest spread range: its maximum spread is 91 times higher than
its minimum spread. Additionally, considering the relation between standard
deviation and average spread (STD/Mean) we suggest that the sensitivity
to systematic risk, e.g., in economic downturns, is increasing monotonically
in tranche seniority due to the increasing systematic risk exposures (compare
Chapter 5). Depending on the systematic risk exposures, credit risk premia
of tranches may increase in economic downturns, and we suggest that this
increase is even higher for high-seniority tranches.
Depending on the specified time periods (Sample 1, 2 and 3 ), the sample
sizes of our empirical analysis vary: while Sample 1 contains 431 daily ob-
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servations for the credit index and each of its tranches (total quotes: 2,586),
Sample 2 includes 318 daily spreads for the iTraxx index and 1,509 daily
tranche spreads (total quotes: 1,908). The entire period (Sample 3 ) refers
to 749 trading days with 4,494 quoted spreads in total (index and tranche
spreads).
4.3.2 Analysis of Panel Regressions
In order to obtain tranche-specific base correlations ρit with i ∈ {1, ..., 5} –
using the Quasi-Newton Method – we make commonly applied parameter as-
sumptions referring to
• the recovery rate RTrax of the 5Y iTraxx Europe index,
• the default intensity λ of the 5Y iTraxx Europe index, and
• the risk-less rate r, which is used to calculate the time-dependent dis-
count factors Qtj .120
According to various authors such as Andersen & Sidenius (2005b), Laurent
& Gregory (2005), Hull & White (2006) and Markit, we assume a constant
recovery rate of 40% for investment grade names of the 5Y iTraxx Europe
index which leads to R = RTrax = 40%.121
Similar to Hull & White (2004) and analogous to Equation (4.7), we assume
a time-constant default intensity λ. λ approximates the risk-neutral default
intensity of the 5Y iTraxx Europe which is implicitly given by the daily index
spread notations, compare Equation (4.8). Thus, λ is time-variant by day, but
constant over the index maturity.
Further, we follow other authors in the recent literature by assuming a flat
term structure of risk-less interest rates (compare Hull & White 2004, Heitfield
2009). Based on Sample 3, we set the risk-less interest rate r at 2%, which is
at the lower end of the related historical T-bill term-structure.
Since i) the market spread is given and ii) we implement an identical pricing
model in our entire analysis, we make two observations: firstly, with respect
to our dynamic regression models, parameter changes referring to, e.g., re-
covery or interest rates, lead mainly to shifts in the implied correlation level.
120Compare Equations (4.5), (4.7) and (4.8).
121Recall that the quoted market spreads are provided by Markit.
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Consequently, solving for observable market spreads makes parameter settings
somewhat less important, as shown in Appendix A.
Secondly, parameter settings may be more decisive in terms of our bench-
mark model: in this case the single correlation parameter approximated by
the historical asset correlation directly determines the model spread. Thus,
we may slightly amend the results of our benchmark model (ACM) by im-
plementing a ‘real’ – or rather a more realistic – term structure. We provide
some sensitivity analysis related to historical Treasury bills in Appendix A.
But even if we consider differing assumptions, e.g., a term structure referring
to Treasury bills, we only observe small benefits. Market spreads show that
single-correlation models remain strongly limited in pricing all tranches simul-
taneously. However, often it is impossible to fit a single correlation on the
tranches’ market spreads - independent from specific parameter settings.
Next, we derive base correlations ρit from market quotes of the standardized
5Y iTraxx Europe tranches. Figure 4.4 shows base correlation curves for each
tranche T[0%,Di) from August 24th, 2005 to September 19th, 2008. Throughout
Figure 4.4: Time Series of Base Correlations from 2005 to 2008
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Notes: The figure shows time series of calculated base correlations T[0%,Di) from August 24
th, 2005 to
September 19th, 2008. The Base correlations monotonically increase with increasing detachment level and
are strongly linked to each other. Similar to Figure 4.3, the base correlations are also strongly increasing in
the beginning of the GFC and exhibit a higher volatility in the aftermath.
Sample 3 (x-axis), the skewed curves indicate that base correlations ρit (y-axis)
are increasing monotonically with increasing detachment level i, which is also
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pointed out in Figure 4.2. This effect can be expected as long as spreads of
index tranches are decreasing in line with increasing tranche seniority. In other
words, the synthetic equity tranche T[0%,22%) exhibits the highest ρ5t , while
tranche T[12%,22%) with highest seniority exposes the lowest tranche spread
sT[12%,22%) (compare Figure 4.3). In contrast, the equity tranche T[0%,3%) with
lowest seniority exhibits the lowest base correlation ρ1t as well as the highest
tranche spread sT[0%,3%) across all other securitized tranches. The plotted base
correlations correspond also to findings related to Figure 4.3: as the base
correlations ρit move moderately sideways in Sample 1 the correlation levels
increase simultaneously at the beginning of the GFC. During the GFC the
tranche-specific base correlations are on average about 1.8 times higher than
in Sample 1, while the average standard deviation of base correlations across
all tranches is about 2.8 times higher than in Sample 1.
Our dynamic regression correlation models – Equations (4.11) and (4.17) –
are tested for accuracy in pricing STCDOs against a benchmark measure using
historical asset correlations. In order to validate all our proposed models, we
examine their accuracy in matching quoted market spreads. Eventually, we test
which correlation measure prices STCDOs more accurately by comparing root
mean square forecast errors (RMSFE) of our model-based spread forecasts. In
this respect, we compare the following three correlation models:
• the dynamic mixed-effects regression correlation model (MERM) which
accounts for both random time-specific effects and fixed tranche effects,
• the dynamic fixed-effects regression correlation model (FERM) which
accounts for fixed tranche effects, and
• the dynamic asset correlation model (ACM).
In the following, the regression and forecast methodology is briefly ex-
plained: regression windows (or calibration windows) that are fixed in their size
(40-, 50- and 60-days) dynamically roll through Sample 1, 2 and 3 incremental
day by day.
Based on each regression window, we calibrate both of our prediction models
MERM and FERM to forecast base correlations ρit one day ahead. Referring to
the next day t (forecasting day), we aim not only to achieve point predictions
for ρit, but also probability distributions of base correlations. In this respect, we
use Monte Carlo simulations to compute daily samples of 1,000 observations
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for the time-specific effects vt and the residual uit. Then, we compute 1,000 one
day ahead forecasts for base correlations ρit. Before the estimation window is
shifted forward one day, this set of out-of-sample correlation forecasts is used in
Equation (4.5) to compute a mean spread for each tranche T[A,D) denoting the
respective spread forecast. This indirect spread forecasting technique allows
us to derive useful descriptive statistics from the simulated spread distribu-
tion. Figure 4.5 displays such a spread distribution for a single forecast day
in comparison to the real market upfront payment (UP). The x-axis denotes
various spread classes and the y-axis denotes the respective frequency.
Figure 4.5: Distribution of Spread Forecasts for Tranche T[0%,3%) on December
2nd, 2005
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Notes: The figure shows a histogram of 1,000 simulated model upfront payments (UPs) for tranche T[0%,3%)
on December 2nd, 2005 (MERM). The mean of the simulated model UPs is denoted by the dashed line and
the real observed market UP by the black line. For forecast purposes, the mean of the model UPs is taken
into consideration.
The mean spread of these 1,000 spread realizations constitutes our UP forecast
for the equity tranche T[0%,3%) (dashed line). The observed market UP is
denoted by the black line. In this example, the difference between the market
UP (2,590 bps) and the mean model spread (2,599 bps) is 9 bps which is less
than 0.4 percent of the market UP. This result indicates the accuracy of our
model forecasts.
Analogously, we predict spreads sT[A,D) one day ahead for all tranches. As
we receive new spread information every day, we focus methodically only on
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one day ahead forecasts. Forecasted tranche spreads sT[A,D) are then compared
to those forecasted with the historical asset correlation parameter. Results of
all three forecast models are compared to market spreads. Since all our spread
forecasts refer to the first day after each calibration window, our forecasts are
out of sample forecasts or out of window forecasts. After the regression window
is incrementally rolled forward one day, we recalibrate our prediction models,
forecast base correlations and finally derive model-specific spread forecasts.
This estimation and forecast exercise is repeated until all regression windows
reach the end of each sample. For comparability, the forecast periods related
to each window size (40-, 50- and 60-days) should correspond to each other.
Therefore, they are identically defined across all window sizes within our sam-
ples. Table 4.2 summarizes the three forecast periods depending on the defined
rolling regression windows.
Table 4.2: Sample-specific Forecast Periods of the Empirical Analysis
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Forecast Begin: 2nd of Dec 05 12th of Oct 07 2nd of Dec 05
period End: 18th of Jun 07 19th of Sep 08 19th of Sep 08
Spread forecasts 370 (1,850) 258 (1,290) 688 (3,440)
Notes: The table shows an overview of three different forecast periods which are identically defined across
all regression windows. Values in brackets describe the total amount of tranche spread forecasts related to
all of the five index tranches.
Depending on our forecast period, we estimate between 258 and 688 re-
gressions of Equations (4.11) and (4.17) to get the same number of predicted
base correlations ρit for each synthetic equity tranche T[0%,Di), which we also
use to derive corresponding spread forecasts. Eventually, we forecast 1,850
model-specific tranche spreads in terms of Sample 1, 1,290 spreads in terms of
Sample 2 and 3,440 spreads in terms of Sample 3.
An example: the first forecast day in Sample 1 is December 2nd, 2005. In
case of a 40-days regression window, we estimate our models on daily data
observed from October 5th, 2005 to December 1st, 2005 (40 observation days).
We analogously proceed for the remaining two regression windows. As a re-
sult, Sample 1 contains three different starting dates for the rolling windows
depending on the window size (40-, 50- or 60-days), but the first forecast day
is jointly December 2nd, 2005. For re-estimating the dynamic correlation mod-
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els the fix-sized regression windows are incrementally rolled forward one day
ahead. Thus, the second forecast day is jointly December 3rd, 2005 and so on.
Our rolling regression analysis is applied to backtest all prediction models
on historical data. In order to evaluate the model-specific forecast accuracy, we
implement a root mean square forecast errors (RMSFE) metric referring to the
difference between market spreads and model spreads. Finally, our RMSFE
metric is i) window-specific, ii) model-specific and iii) sample-specific.
To ensure the comparability of our results, we calculate the RMSFEs ac-
cording to
RMSFEp =
√√√√√ T∑
t=1
(
1− sˆt,p
st,p
)2
T . (4.18)
Thereby, p ∈ {1, 2, 3} indicates the related sample, sˆt,p denotes the predicted
tranche spread on day t, st,p describes the corresponding market spread and
T denotes the amount of sample-specific daily forecasts.
The descriptive statistics provided in Section 4.3.1 underline decisive differ-
ences in the behavior of tranche spreads within the entire observation period
(Sample 3 ). By splitting off this entire period in subsamples, we test the fore-
casting accuracy of our models in i) times of market turbulences (Sample 2 )
and ii) under moderate market conditions (Sample 1 ). In this way, we control
for various calibration periods, market conditions as well as different prediction
models to increase the robustness of our findings.
4.3.3 Results
Firstly, we estimate our dynamic mixed-effects regression correlation model
(MERM) as well as our dynamic fixed-effects regression correlation model
(FERM) for the three samples (Sample 1, 2 and 3 ).122
Figure 4.6 illustrates the parameter estimates for our dynamic regression
model MERM in Equation (4.11) based on 40-days estimation windows. The
various boxplots refer to estimation results of 688 regressions within Sample
3. While the upper four boxplots describe the parameter estimates, the lower
122The parameters of the regression models in Equations (4.11) and (4.17), several variance
components and the random time effects were estimated using the Maximum Likelihood
method or rather the Restricted Maximum Likelihood method. This so-called mixed
procedure is implemented in SAS.
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boxplots summarize the corresponding p-values indicating the statistical sig-
nificances of the estimates.
Figure 4.6: MERM Estimation Results
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
α1 α2 α3 α4
V a
l u
e
Fixed−effects
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
α1 α2 α3 α4
V a
l u
e
P−value
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
β50
V a
l u
e
Intercept
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
β50
V a
l u
e
P−value
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
β1 (ρt−1)
V a
l u
e
Lagged Base
0
2
4
6
8
10
x 10−17
β1 (ρt−1)
V a
l u
e
P−value
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10−3
vt
V a
l u
e
Time−effect
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10−5
vt
V a
l u
e
P−value
Notes: The figure shows various boxplots for Sample 3 which summarize the estimation results of 688
regressions based on our MERM (40-days). The upper four boxplots refer to the distribution of tranche-
specific fixed effects αi, the intercept (β¯0
5) considering the reference group α5, the coefficient β1 of the
lagged base correlation ρt−1 and the random time effect vt. The four lower boxplots show the distribution
of the respective p-values.
Based on the reference intercept β¯0
5 composed of the ‘mean’ intercept β¯0
and α5 (the fixed effect related to the senior tranche), the mean of tranche-
specific fixed effects αi is monotonically decreasing with decreasing tranche
seniority. The fixed-effect estimates are on average statistically significant at
the 9%-level. Thus, considering tranche-specific fixed effects should generally
amend the spread forecast performance.
According to the upper boxplots, lagged base correlations ρt−1 are highly
influencing the endogenous variables which is also underlined by corresponding
p-values (boxplot below): each coefficient β1 (min: 0.37, max: 1.14) exhibits a
p-value < 0.0001 throughout Sample 3 indicating a high statistical significance
of these estimates. Similar to lagged base correlations, random time-specific
effects vt significantly impact the endogenous variable with p-values below the
0.0035% quantile.
Secondly, we provide tranche spreads sT[A,D) for each index tranche in accor-
dance to our forecasted base correlations ρit. Figure 4.7 shows the time series
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of market upfront payments (black line) in comparison to forecasted UPs of
tranche T[0%,3%). The red area refers to the 5% and 95% quantiles of the sim-
ulated model spreads under the applied MERM for Sample 3 (x-axis). The
y-axis denotes the UP in bps.
Figure 4.7: Forecast Performance with Base Correlations for Tranche T[0%,3%)
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Notes: This figure shows the market upfront payment (UP) for tranche T[0%,3%), the red area describes
the forecast interval related to the 5% to 95% quantile of forecasted UPs. All forecasts are calculated with
estimated base correlations (MERM, 40-days window). The red area surrounds the market upfront payment
throughout the forecast horizon, which is from December 2nd, 2005 to September 19th, 2008.
According to the plotted quantiles the predicted UPs of tranche T[0%,3%)
continuously surround observed market UPs, even during the GFC.
In Figure 4.8, we also provide corresponding UPs (y-axis) using the dynamic
historical asset correlation model (ACM) for Sample 3 (x-axis). The dashed
line shows the performance of UP forecasts related to the equity tranche.
In comparison to Figure 4.7, UP forecasts underestimate market spreads
(black line) throughout Sample 1. Reasonable results are reached at the be-
ginning of the GFC, but during the last months of Sample 3 the ACM forecasts
are clearly overestimating quoted market spreads. This leads to higher RMS-
FEs in Sample 3 (see Table 4.3).
Referring to both the equity tranche and most senior tranche of the 5Y
iTraxx Europe, we provide model-specific scatter plots in Figure 4.9. The
scatter plots indicate the forecast accuracy of our dynamic regression corre-
lations models in comparison to our ACM benchmark model in terms of the
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Figure 4.8: Forecast Performance with Dynamic Asset Correlations for Tranche
T[0%,3%)
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Notes: This figure shows upfront payment forecasts calculated with dynamic historical asset corre-
lations versus real market upfront payments of tranche T[0%,3%). The forecasting horizon is December 2nd,
2005 to September 19th, 2008.
coefficient of determination (R2). More comprehensive results - also related
to other tranches - as well as applied test statistics are provided in Appendix
B. In each chart, the observed market spreads (x-axes) are plotted against
the respective model spreads (y-axes). The three charts on the left hand side
of Figure 4.9 refer to the UPs of the equity tranche. The three charts on the
right hand side provide results related to the senior tranche. Both upper charts
focus on the ACM benchmark model, both charts in the middle refer to our
FERM. The results of the two lower charts refer to the MERM.
All charts indicate that the spread forecasts scatter more during the GFC
(Sample 2 ) since the spread deviations are higher at high spread levels. During
Sample 1, where the spreads across all tranches are at the lowest level, the
forecast error of each model is also lowest. Concerning the three left charts,
the ACM provides the worst UP forecasts in terms of R2 (R2ACM = 91.28%).
Therefore, both dynamic regression correlation models outperform our ACM:
the R2 of FERM is almost 98.12% and the one of MERM is 98.14%.
In comparison to UP forecasts, we obtain a higher accuracy in forecasting
senior tranche spreads with each of the three models (three charts on the
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Figure 4.9: Market Spreads versus Model Spread Forecasts
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Notes: This figure shows several scatter plots which may indicate the forecast performance of our dynamic
regression correlation models MERM (lower charts) and FERM (middle charts) in comparison to our
benchmark model ACM (upper charts). In each chart, the real market spread is plotted against the
model-specific spread forecast. The three charts on the left hand side show the forecast results referring
to the market upfront payments, the charts on the right hand side analogously show the results related
to spreads of the senior tranche. The forecasting horizon is December 2nd, 2005 to September 19th, 2008
(Sample 3 ).
right). Again, the forecast errors are highest in case of the benchmark model
(R2ACM = 94.14%). The lowest errors are provided by the MERM (R2MERM =
98.64%), closely followed by those of the FERM (R2FERM = 98.6%).
Over all, the R2 metric shows that we reach the highest explanatory power
for all tranches of the 5Y iTraxx Europe by considering both random time-
effects and fixed tranche effects (MERM).
In order to obtain more detailed insights into the spread forecast accuracy,
we compare all mentioned correlation models - FERM, MERM and ACM - by
calculating the introduced RMSFE metric, compare Equation (4.18). Table
4.3 shows an overview of the RMSFEs related to the three correlation models
for Sample 1, 2 and 3 depending on the various regression windows.
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Table 4.3: Root Mean Square Forecast Errors by Sample
Sample 1
Window Tranche
Model (days) 0% - 3% 3% - 6% 6% - 9% 9% - 12% 12% - 22%
40 0.0441 0.0390 0.0544 0.0696 0.0661
MERM 50 0.0440 0.0388 0.0537 0.0714 0.0669
60 0.0441 0.0387 0.0531 0.0697 0.0673
40 0.0442 0.0395 0.0552 0.0723 0.0676
FERM 50 0.0441 0.0391 0.0551 0.0719 0.0696
60 0.0443 0.0385 0.0554 0.0735 0.0675
ACM 0.3399 1.4351 1.9897 1.7799 0.7334
Sample 2
Window Tranche
Model (days) 0% - 3% 3% - 6% 6% - 9% 9% - 12% 12% - 22%
40 0.0510 0.0641 0.0705 0.0804 0.0810
MERM 50 0.0504 0.0642 0.0706 0.0804 0.0810
60 0.0508 0.0645 0.0711 0.0802 0.0811
40 0.0512 0.0647 0.0725 0.0826 0.0822
FERM 50 0.0512 0.0652 0.0727 0.0824 0.0820
60 0.0513 0.0656 0.0717 0.0850 0.0815
ACM 0.230 1.043 0.948 0.717 0.436
Sample 3
Window Tranche
Model (days) 0% - 3% 3% - 6% 6% - 9% 9% - 12% 12% - 22%
40 0.0534 0.0636 0.0783 0.0922 0.0927
MERM 50 0.0531 0.0636 0.0781 0.0931 0.0932
60 0.0533 0.0637 0.0781 0.0924 0.0934
40 0.0536 0.0638 0.0794 0.0946 0.0943
FERM 50 0.0534 0.0639 0.0792 0.0953 0.0949
60 0.0535 0.0637 0.0801 0.0959 0.0940
ACM 0.292 1.285 1.614 1.402 0.605
Notes: This table shows RMSFEs of tranche spread forecasts for each correlation model. MERM denotes the
dynamic mixed-effects regression correlation model for the base correlation estimation. This model accounts
for random time-specific effects and for fixed tranche-specific effects as well. The second base correlation
model is the dynamic fixed-effects regression correlation model (FERM) accounting only for fixed tranche
effects. ACM denotes the dynamic historical asset correlation model which is independent of different
regression windows. Spread forecasts are made on the base of all three correlation models. Depending on
i) the window size, ii) the respective tranche and iii) the specific sample the RMSFEs vary. The lowest
RMSFEs are highlighted in bold.
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In Sample 1, the dynamic ACM performs the worst across all tranches and
regression windows. Additionally, the results confirm some theoretical findings
related to our benchmark model: even though the ACM may provide valuable
results for both the equity tranche and the senior tranche, its applicability
seems to be strongly limited regarding the remaining tranches. Thus, our
dynamic regression correlation models outperform the ACM clearly since we
simultaneously obtain more valuable results for all securitized tranches. The
results reveal further that the dynamic MERM provides overall the highest
performance accuracy across all tranches and all regression windows related to
Sample 1 in terms of our RMSFE metric.
During the GFC, the performance of our dynamic correlation models is
slightly worse, but still dominates our benchmark model. In contrast to Sample
1, we observe a decrease of forecast accuracy for both models MERM and
FERM: across all tranches and regression windows the RMSFE are on average
21% higher. Furthermore, the results show that the forecasted ACM spreads
lead to lower RMSFEs during the GFC. Thus, the forecast accuracy of the
ACM strongly increases under these volatile market conditions. Averaging the
improvements across all tranches, we observe a RMSFE decrease of almost
80% in Sample 2 related to the ACM. Nevertheless, the dynamic MERM still
outperforms all other model approaches.
Referring to both dynamic correlation models, we find further that in con-
trast to rather moderate economic climates (Sample 1 ) the RMSFEs are mono-
tonically as well as disproportionately strongly increasing with the tranche se-
niority during the GFC. Thus, particularly in times of financial distress the
spread forecast performance seems to decrease with increasing tranche senior-
ity. We suggest that this may be due to the specific risk characteristics of
high-seniority tranches related to systematic risk.
Our empirical study shows similar results for the remaining sample. Even in
the entire time interval (Sample 3 ), the overall results show that the forecast
performance of both dynamic regression correlation models is better than the
respective forecasts with historical asset correlations. Across all tranches, base
correlation estimates provide lower RMSFEs of spread forecasts. This under-
lines the superiority of our proposed dynamic regression correlation models,
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especially if we account for random time-specific and fixed tranche effects.123
We conclude that the dynamic ACM is inferior to both of the dynamic
regression correlation models in terms of RMSFEs. Thus, the inclusion of
correlation parameters gained from corresponding log-returns leads to spread
forecasts which may widely differ from quoted market spreads. We confirm
that the consideration of dependency structures reflected by historical asset
returns is not sufficient for pricing STCDOs. Consequently, we assume that
historical asset correlations incompletely reflect relevant market information
for pricing and forecasting structured financial instruments. As we show, base
correlations are much more suitable for relatively accurate tranche spread fore-
casts than historical asset correlations. In consequence, we assume that base
correlations contain more relevant market information for a reliable STCDO
pricing. However, our dynamic regression correlation models also indicate an
underestimation of systematic risk which is i) especially affecting securitized
tranches (see Coval et al. 2009b) and ii) potentially causing the disproportion-
ate strong increase of RMSFEs related to high-seniority tranches during the
GFC.
All our empirical findings show that the dynamic MERM is superior to
all other models considered in this paper in terms of one-day-ahead forecast
accuracy using a RMSFE metric. Our FERM outperforms the dynamic ACM
as well and underlines the general superiority of dynamic regression correlation
models, even during the GFC.
Based on the suggested RMSFE metric, we conclude that the inferiority
of the FERM to the MERM reveals the existence of important unobservable
time-specific effects. In order to improve the forecast accuracy indicated by
decreasing RMSFEs, spread forecast models should account for both random
time-specific effects and fixed tranche-specific effects.
Based on the intra-class correlation which exists across all tranches, we
assume the presence of a systematic risk factor simultaneously affecting all
tranches. Figure 4.10 shows both the variance components and the intra-class
correlation curve for Sample 3 (x-axis). The primary y-axis on the left hand
side refers to the variances, the secondary y-axis on the right hand side denotes
123Since Sample 3 refers to the entire period, it accounts also for 60 unconsidered days
between Sample 1 and 2 which are the calibration days of Sample 2 with respect to the
60-days regression window. During these 60 days, we observe extremely high RMSFEs.
Thus, Sample 3 reveals relative worse RMSFEs compared to Sample 2 (methodically
caused).
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the intra-class correlation values.
Figure 4.10: Variance Effects and Intra-class Correlation
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Notes: This figure shows the time series (x-axis) of derived intra-class correlations (y-axis on the right) for
Sample 3 and both parts of the estimated variance (y-axis on the left): (1) The time-specific component vt
and (2) the disturbance uit. The results refer to the dynamic panel regression correlation model accounting
for mixed-effects (MERM) and a regression window of 40-days.
The intra-class correlation is extremely high throughout the entire sample
and varies between 74% and 97%. This indicates that the variance of the
time-specific effect explains a high ratio to the total variance of base correla-
tion forecasts. This is also underlined by the remaining two functions in Figure
4.10: while the dashed line denotes the unobservable time-specific component
σt of the total variance, the dotted line denotes the residual disturbance ut of
that variance (compare Section 4.2.3). We conclude that the time-specific com-
ponent represents a main part of the total variance throughout Sample 3. This
time effect simultaneously affects all tranches of the 5Y iTraxx Europe index,
especially during the GFC, and also reaches statistical significance. Eventu-
ally, the time-specific effect is particularly striking in times of financial distress
and can not be considered by our FERM. Based on the intra-class correlation
which exists across all tranches, we suspect the presence of a systematic risk
factor simultaneously affecting all tranches.
Overall, these results suggest the existence of systematic factors which are
indicated by our MERM but not considered explicitly. In consequence, the
intra-class correlation may be interpreted as an indicator of unconsidered
systematic risk factors varying over time and simultaneously influencing all
tranches.
Finally, we conclude that the dynamic FERM is superior to the dynamic
ACM but not appropriately reducing RMSFEs of tranche spread forecasts. The
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decrease of RMSFEs related to the MERM suggests that the spread forecast
performance may be improved by accounting for both random time effects
and fixed tranche effects. In addition, further systematic risk factors may be
identified through our dynamic MERM.
4.4 Summary
The empirical analysis underlines the importance of correlations in pricing
models of structured finance instruments. We point out that ‘true’ correlation
parameters are not observable, but constitute the main factors determining ex-
pected losses of single-tranche collateralized debt obligation swaps (STCDO).
In turn, these expected tranche losses decisively determine respective tranche
spreads. Consequently, spreads of STCDOs are highly sensitive to correlation
changes. This constitutes the importance of appropriate correlation models for
valuing and hedging STCDOs. The most common correlation approaches are
introduced and evaluated. Inherent limitations of the compound correlation
approach, especially the non-uniqueness of solutions, reduce its applicability.
Base correlations are provided to overcome shortcomings of compound correla-
tions. In terms of pricing and hedging STCDOs, the base correlation approach
produces more reasonable solutions. Additionally, this simple measure also
provides market participants with a practicable valuation framework for non-
standardized CDOs.
Considering the benefits of base correlations, we develop two dynamic re-
gression correlation models in order to forecast various base correlations. Our
proposed dynamic fixed-effects regression correlation model (FERM) accounts
only for fixed tranche-specific effects, whereas our proposed dynamic mixed-
effects regression correlation model (MERM) additionally assumes that the
time effect is varying stochastically. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we
estimate daily STCDO spreads. Within the three samples, we measure the
forecast accuracy of our models by calculating root mean square forecast er-
rors (RMSFE) of forecasted STCDO spreads. Analogously, we forecast daily
STCDO spreads with a dynamic asset correlation model (ACM). A compari-
son of the forecast accuracy suggests the superiority of our proposed dynamic
regression correlation models in terms of the suggested RMSFE metric. Ap-
plying the MERM, we can account for both cross-sectional and time-series
information in quoted market spreads related to the securitized tranches. The
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consideration of both existing effects is important for more accurate correla-
tion forecasts, even during the Global Financial Crisis. The increased accuracy
leads to an improvement of the overall spread forecast performance with sev-
eral implications for financial institutions and regulatory authorities dealing
with structured finance instruments.
The intra-class correlation reveals the existence of unconsidered systematic
risk factors varying in time. Furthermore, it underlines the importance of
applying our proposed dynamic MERM in order to account for such systematic
time effects. By expanding the MERM to other relevant systematic risk factors,
useful information can be derived in order to develop appropriate stress-tests
for structured finance products. It also helps to quantify risk contributions of
STCDOs to portfolio inherent credit risks, which is highly relevant for investors
in securitized tranches.
Our findings are essential for pricing standardized and non-standardized
structured finance instruments. Additionally, our results provide reasonable
implications for hedging both STCDOs and other credit derivatives. Further
research in other relevant explanatory variables is suggested to expand our
proposed dynamic regression approach. In this way, forecast performance could
be increased, especially in times of market turbulence.
The Global Financial Crisis has revealed that current credit risk and pric-
ing models exhibit a low degree of transparency. Addressing the importance of
appropriate approaches for modeling and forecasting correlations is one step
that could be taken in order to improve the understanding of structured instru-
ments and to return more transparency as well as confidence in credit related
financial markets, institutions and instruments.
104
Chapter 5
An Analytical Approach for
Systematic Risk Sensitivity of
Structured Finance Products
The content of this chapter refers to the working paper ‘An Analytical Ap-
proach for Systematic Risk Sensitivity of Structured Finance Products’ by
Löhr, S., Claußen, A., and Rösch, D., 2012.
5.1 Introduction
In 2007, the global market volume of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
reached its historical maximum with over $1.3 trillion USD and the global
CDO market issuance denoted at $481 billion USD (compare SIFMA 2012b).
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the global CDO issuance decreased
rapidly and denoted at $4 billion USD in 2009. Since 2010, the issuance
volume is slightly increasing (see SIFMA 2012b). Contemporaneously, the
5-year cumulative impairment rates for ‘A’-rated CDOs increased from 5%
in 2005 to 57% in 2009, while respective impairment rates of ‘A’-rated bonds
increased only from 0.56% in 2005 to 0.81% in 2009 (compare Moody’s 2006a,b,
2010b,c).124
In terms of impairment risk, there are obvious differences between risk char-
acteristics of ‘A’-bonds and ‘A’-CDOs. Hence, several authors address the
124The 5-year cumulative impairment rates for CDOs and bonds are provided by the credit-
rating agency (CRA) Moody’s and they differ in a similar fashion for other rating classes.
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higher systematic risk exposures in CDO structures due to the securitization
of debt assets (see Krahnen & Wilde 2008, Coval et al. 2009a, Eckner 2009,
Hamerle & Plank 2009, Rösch & Scheule 2010). With respect to systematic
risk influences, some authors conclude that investors should demand far larger
risk premia for holding structured claims than holding comparably rated cor-
porate bonds (Coval et al. 2009b). Indeed, in the recent literature appears a
lack of detailed systematic risk analysis elaborating the specific risk profile of
structured finance products. Our main contribution is a comprehensive anal-
ysis of product-specific sensitivities to systematic risk based on both a simple
analytical approach and several simulation studies considering more realistic
product structures by implementing inter-sectoral diversification effects.
Based on the single-factor Gaussian copula model – firstly applied to port-
folio credit risk by Vasicek (1987) – a simple model is applied to quantify risk
characteristics of both securitized tranches and comparably rated corporate
bonds. In particular, we account for product-specific exposures to systematic
risk determining default risks and related losses. Within the expanded model
framework, the single risk factor is split off into a i) super-systematic compo-
nent and ii) a sector-specific factor (compare Gordy & Howells 2006, Pykthin &
Dev 2002).125 In this model setup, our approach provides an analytical method
to measure product-specific sensitivities to the super-systematic risk factor.
By developing conditional risk clusters (CRCs) related to historical default
rates, we additionally account for cluster migration risk due to changes of the
super-systematic factor. Thus, we capture downside risks of both tranches and
straight bonds related to systematic risk. Our results show that all tranches
of an asset securitization contain a higher exposure to systematic risk than
comparably rated straight bonds due to pooling and tranching.
The contributions of the paper are as follows: firstly, we implement an
analytical approach for modeling and measuring systematic risk of tranches
created from pools of default risky securities. Secondly, we use the model to
compare straight bonds with securitized tranches in terms of systematic risk
exposures. Thirdly, we analytically derive product-specific risk sensitivities to
changes in the global economy in terms of both default risk and losses from
default. Fourthly, we demonstrate that the cluster migration risk is more se-
125Pykthin & Dev (2002) address generally credit risk in asset securitizations. Their results
provide the foundation for the current Ratings Based Approach in Basel II referring to
regulatory capital requirements for structured finance products.
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vere for securitizations than for straight bonds. In comparison to straight
bonds, the downside risk of tranches is much higher, especially during eco-
nomic downturns. Our results suggest that risk-adjusted ratings are strongly
recommended for securitizations in order to reflect the inherent behavior due
to systematic risks, even if securitized debt claims are sectorally diversified.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 5.2, we
introduce a theoretical framework to develop default probabilities based on
the single-factor Gaussian copula model. In Section 5.3, we develop a model
extension to measure systematic risk sensitivities of both straight bonds and
securitized tranches. The analytical results are presented in Section 5.4. The
outcome of our inter-sectoral simulation studies consecutively underlines these
results. Finally, we examine systematic impacts on the product-specific cluster
migration risk within our CRC approach. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Risk Measures in the Single-factor Model
5.2.1 The Single-factor Model
In the financial industry, the single-factor Gaussian copula model is market
standard for quoting synthetic CDOs (Hull & White 2006).The model was
introduced by Vasicek (1987) with the intention to aggregate the credit risk
of credit portfolios and was further analyzed by Gordy (2000, 2003). It also
constitutes the core of the regulatory capital formula under the Basel II Capital
Accord. In order to describe losses of bonds as well as the loss distribution of a
credit portfolio, a structural approach developed by Merton (1974) is applied.
According to Merton’s basic model, a corporate borrower B defaults on his
debt, which is assumed to consist of a single zero bond, when his asset return
ZBt falls below a critical threshold cBt (e.g., a function of the nominal amount
of debt) at time t.126 The default probability piBt of borrower B at time t is
defined with
piBt = P(ZBt < cBt ). (5.1)
126In the remainder a corporate borrower B is also represented by bond B.
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The default event is indicated by a default variable DBt :
DBt =
 1 if borrower B defaults at time t ,0 otherwise. (5.2)
In this context, the asset return ZBt is modeled considering two different factors:
i) a systematic – or common – risk factor Yt jointly affecting all borrowers of
the credit portfolio at time t, and ii) an independent idiosyncratic risk factor
εBt which is borrower-specific at time t. Both factors Yt and εBt are assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with Yt, εBt ∼ N (0, 1).
Thus,
ZBt =
√
ρ · Yt +
√
1− ρ · εBt (5.3)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] represents the correlation of the borrowers’ asset returns. De-
spite that ρ may generally vary across borrowers and even across time it is
identical for all borrowers due to our aforementioned assumptions.127 Further,
the so-called asset correlation ρ determines the weighting of the systematic
factor simultaneously affecting all borrowers. Since Yt and εBt are i.i.d. nor-
mal with Yt, εBt ∼ N (0, 1), the random variable ZBt is also standard normal
distributed with ZBt ∼ N (0, 1).128 In the following, we focus our study on a
single period and skip time index t.
5.2.2 Default Probability of a Tranche
A collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a structured finance instrument that
securitizes a portfolio of credit risky assets (collateral). The inherent credit
risk of debt assets is transferred to external investors by repacking the original
risk profile and selling risk-adjusted tranches of different seniority to investors.
Offered tranches are backed by the collateral. The seniority reflects the order
in which losses within the collateral affect different tranches and thus tranche
investors. Each tranche is defined by the percentage of losses in the collateral
that it carries.
For example: An investor of tranche T[3%;6%) gets a premium payment (pre-
127Compare Equation (3.40) in Section 3.3.1.
128Conditional on a realization of the common risk factor Yt, the asset returns of borrowers
are i.i.d. random variables due to the independence of idiosyncratic risk factors.
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mium leg) by the protection buyer – the originator of securitization – for cover-
ing all losses in the underlying portfolio that occur within the tranche-specific
boundaries. Here, these boundaries are determined by the attachment point
A = 3% and the detachment point D = 6%. Premium payments are generally
paid out quarterly and they refer to respective outstanding notional amounts.
In turn, the protection payments of investors (protection leg) are paid out
to the protection buyer in cases of default events causing losses within the
credit portfolio related to the tranche boundaries. Exceeding portfolio losses
are carried by tranches of higher seniority.129
More generally spoken, tranche investors suffer losses if the total portfolio
loss L in percent of its notional exceeds the attachment point A of tranche
T[A,D). Occurring tranche losses LT[A,D) are restricted to the difference between
detachment point D and lower attachment point A of the tranche. In terms
of total portfolio loss L, tranche-specific losses follow from:
LT[A,D) = min (max (0, L− A) , D − A) . (5.4)
The tranche T[A,D) experiences a loss (and, therefore, an impairment or default)
if the default rate in the portfolio exceeds the attachment point A.
For modeling tranche losses, we employ some simplifying assumptions. The
credit portfolio is assumed to be infinitely granular and all borrowers or bonds,
respectively, are homogeneous. This leads to a large homogeneous credit port-
folio (LHP) in which idiosyncratic risks are fully diversified, see Gordy (2000,
2003). Furthermore, the default rate of the LHP follows the so-called ’Vasicek-
distribution’ with density
v(x) =
√
1− ρ
ρ
· exp
(
−
(√
1− ρ · Φ−1(x)− Φ−1(pi))2
2 · ρ +
(Φ−1(x))2
2
)
(5.5)
and distribution function
V (x) = Φ
(√
1− ρ · Φ−1(x)− Φ−1(pi)√
ρ
)
. (5.6)
Equation (5.6) denotes the cumulative probability that the percentage loss L
of the LHP does not exceed x ∈ [0, 1], see Vasicek (1991). pi describes the
default probability of included bonds and thus the expected default rate of the
129For more detailed information compare Bluhm et al. (2003).
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LHP. Φ−1 denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution function Φ.
Then, the default probability piT[A,D) of tranche T[A,D) is given by
piT[A,D) = 1− V (A) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√1− ρ · Φ−1(A)√
ρ
)
. (5.7)
5.2.3 Product-specific Expected Losses
The expected loss E
(
LB
)
of bond B is the product of its i) default probability
piB, ii) exposure at default EADB which is fixed at unity for tractability and
iii) loss given default LGDB =
(
1−RB) with recovery rate RB:
E
(
LB
)
= piB · EADB · (1−RB)
=
(
1−RB) · piB. (5.8)
The expected loss E
(
LT[A,D)
)
of tranche T[A,D) depends on the cumulative
losses in the underlying LHP . Related to the cumulative loss distribution, we
calculate expected tranche losses by
E
(
LT[A,D)
)
=
1−R
D − A
[
Φ2 (κ(A), c; %)− Φ2 (κ(D), c; %)
]
(5.9)
with
c = Φ−1(pi), % = −
√
1− ρ and κ(χ) = −Φ−1
(
χ
1−R
)
for χ < 1 − R and χ ∈ {A,D}, see Appendix D.130 Φ2 denotes the bivariate
Gaussian cumulative distribution function. R is the recovery rate of the LHP
which equals the recovery rate of homogeneous bonds in the portfolio.
130According to Appendix D, the expected loss equals 0 for χ ≥ 1−R.
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5.3 Measuring Systematic Risk Sensitivity: The
Extended Model
5.3.1 Introduction of a Super-systematic Factor
In the following, we introduce an extended model to quantify impacts on both
straight bonds B and securitized tranches related to super-systematic changes.
We divide borrowers into sectors so that firms in the same sector share a
common risk factor (compare Gordy & Howells 2006). If borrower B is in
sector j with j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}, his asset return ZBj is given by
ZBj =
√
ρ · Y j +
√
1− ρ · εBj . (5.10)
The idiosyncratic risk component of borrower B in sector j is described by εBj
i.i.d. standard normal, while ρ ∈ [0, 1] is jointly assumed for all borrowers B.
We decompose the sectoral risk factor Y j of Equation (5.10) into both a
super-systematic factor Y ∗ and a sectoral risk component U j according to
Y j =
√
δ · Y ∗ +√1− δ · U j (5.11)
where Y ∗ and U j are i.i.d. standard normal. Y ∗ is a univariate factor repre-
senting the overall macroeconomy, U j is a sector specific factor and δ ∈ [0, 1]
determines the strength of dependence across sectors. δ is assumed to be con-
stant across all sectors j for simplicity. Since all regarded random variables
are i.i.d. with Y ∗, U j, εBj ∼ N (0, 1), the random variable ZBj is also standard
normal distributed with ZBj ∼ N (0, 1).
For further analytical analyses, we examine just a single sector, thus, we
skip index j which leads to
ZB =
√
ρ · δ · Y ∗ +
√
ρ− ρ · δ · U +
√
1− ρ · εB. (5.12)
In this way, the conditional default probability of bond B is linked to realiza-
tions of a super-systematic factor Y ∗ which is essential for further examina-
tions.
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5.3.2 Conditional Risk Measures of a Bond
We obtain the conditional default probability piB(y∗) of bond B depending on
realizations of the super-systematic factor Y ∗ = y∗ with
piB(y∗) = P(DB = 1|Y ∗ = y∗) = Φ
(
Φ−1(piB)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
1− ρ · δ
)
. (5.13)
It follows from Equation (5.8) that the conditional expected loss E
(
LB|Y ∗ = y∗)
of bond B in dependence on Y ∗ is given by
E
(
LB|Y ∗ = y∗) = (1−RB) · Φ(Φ−1(piB)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
1− ρ · δ
)
. (5.14)
5.3.3 Conditional Risk Measures of a Tranche
Referring to the cumulative loss distribution of the LHP with recovery rate
R ∈ [0, 1), we provide the conditional default probability piT[A,D)(y∗) of tranche
T[A,D) related to Y ∗, which is given by
piT[A,D)(y∗) = P
(
DT[A,D) = 1|Y ∗ = y∗)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√1− ρ · Φ−1 ( A
1−R
)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
ρ− ρ · δ
)
, (5.15)
see Appendix C.131 Along this, we analytically quantify expected losses of
tranche T[A,D) under consideration of Y ∗, which is in line with the theoretical
framework of the single-factor Gaussian copula model (see Appendix D):
E
(
LT[A,D) |Y ∗ = y∗) = 1−R
D − A
[
Φ2 (κ(A), c˜; %˜)− Φ2 (κ(D), c˜; %˜)
]
(5.16)
with
c˜ =
Φ−1 (pi)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
1− ρ · δ as well as %˜ =
−√1− ρ√
1− ρ · δ
and
κ(χ) = −Φ−1
(
χ
1−R
)
for χ < 1−R , χ ∈ {A,D}.
131For A < 1−R, otherwise piT[A,D)(y∗) = 0.
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Consider that the expected tranche loss E
(
LT[A,D)
)
follows in accordance to
the law of iterated expectations from expectations E(·) of E (LT[A,D)|Y ∗ = y∗):
E
(
E
(
LT[A,D) |Y ∗ = y∗)) = E (LT[A,D)) . (5.17)
5.3.4 Risk-adjusted Attachment and Detachment Points
Next, we aim to compare the behavior of a specific bond B∗ with that of a
CDO tranche related to variations of Y ∗. To ensure an appropriate comparison
of both products, the risk profile of tranche T[A∗,D∗) should correspond with
the risk profile of bond B∗. For this purpose, we focus on the following risk
characteristics:
1. Corresponding probabilities of default (PDs)
piB
∗
= piT[A∗,D∗) . (5.18)
2. Corresponding expected losses (ELs)
E
(
LB
∗)
= E
(
LT[A∗,D∗)
)
. (5.19)
With respect to a LHP recovery rate R ∈ [0, 1), we analytically obtain attach-
ment point A∗ from Equations (5.7) and (5.18):
A∗ = (1−R) · Φ
(
Φ−1 (pi)−√ρ · Φ−1 (piB∗)√
1− ρ
)
. (5.20)
By inserting this result into Equation (5.15), we obtain the conditional default
probability (CPD) of tranche T[A∗,D∗) depending on realizations of Y ∗:
piT[A∗,D∗)(y∗) = Φ
(
Φ−1(piB
∗
)−√δ · y∗√
1− δ
)
. (5.21)
Equation (5.21) shows that under the aforementioned assumptions the CPD
of tranche T[A∗,D∗) does not depend on the detachment point D∗ ∈ (A∗, 1].
After inserting (5.20) into Equation (5.19) and solving numerically, we ob-
tain detachment point D∗. Eventually, the risk-adjusted tranche T[A∗,D∗) and
bond B∗ share the same risk characteristics in terms of PDs and ELs.
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In order to calculate conditional expected tranche losses (CELs) depending
on Y ∗, we insert the tranche-specific attachment point A∗ and detachment
point D∗ into Equation (5.16).
In terms of CPD changes, our analytical study relies on a comparison of
results from Equations (5.13) and (5.21). Based on the calibration of A∗ and
D∗, the comparison of results related to Equations (5.14) and (5.16) shows the
product-specific risk characteristics with respect to the CELs.
5.3.5 Product-specific Sensitivity to Systematic Risk
Concerning the sensitivities of both straight bonds and securitized tranches to
systematic influences, we derive the partial derivatives of the product-specific
i) conditional default probabilities and ii) conditional expected losses with
respect to changes of Y ∗. Firstly, we define the partial derivatives of a straight
bond B∗ with respect to Y ∗:
1. Conditional default probability piB∗(y∗) of bond B∗
ξB
∗
CPD =
∂
∂y∗
(
piB
∗
(y∗)
)
=
−√ρ · δ√
1− ρ · δ · ϕ
(
Φ−1(piB
∗
)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
1− ρ · δ
)
. (5.22)
2. Conditional expected loss E
(
LB
∗
(y∗)
)
of bond B∗
ξB
∗
CEL =
∂
∂y∗
(
E(LB∗(y∗))
)
=
−(1−RB∗) · √ρ · δ√
1− ρ · δ · ϕ
(
Φ−1(piB
∗
)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
1− ρ · δ
)
. (5.23)
Secondly, we provide the sensitivities of tranche T[A∗,D∗) with respect to Y ∗:
1. Conditional default probability piT[A∗,D∗)(y∗) of tranche T[A∗,D∗)
ξ
T[A∗,D∗)
CPD (y
∗) =
∂
∂y∗
(
piT[A∗,D∗)(y∗)
)
=
−√δ√
1− δ · ϕ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√δ · y∗√
1− δ
)
. (5.24)
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2. Conditional expected loss E
(
LT[A∗,D∗)(y∗)
)
of tranche T[A∗,D∗)
ξ
T[A∗,D∗)
CEL (y
∗) =
∂
∂y∗
(
E
(
LT[A∗,D∗)(y∗)
))
=
1−R
D∗ − A∗ · a · ϕ(a · y
∗ + b) · [Φ˜(A∗)− Φ˜(D∗)] (5.25)
with
Φ˜(χ) = Φ
(
κ(χ), ρ˜ · (a · y∗ + b),
√
1− ρ˜2
)
, κ(χ) = −Φ−1
(
χ
1−R
)
and
a =
−√ρ · δ√
1− ρ · δ , b =
Φ−1(pi)√
1− ρ · δ , ρ˜ =
−√1− ρ√
1− ρ · δ and χ ∈ {A
∗, D∗}.
The results of Equation (5.25) refer to linearity of the differential operator
and the partial derivative of the bivariate Gaussian cumulative distribution
function (see Appendix E).
5.4 Analysis of Systematic Risk Sensitivity
5.4.1 Product-specific Sensitivity of CPDs
In this section, we apply our extended model to examine CPD sensitivities of
both securitized tranches T[A∗,D∗) and specific bonds B∗ to a super-systematic
risk factor Y ∗. Before calculating sensitivities, we calibrate the attachment
and detachment points of our tranche T[A∗,D∗) along the risk characteristics of
a selected bond B∗ (compare Section 5.3.4). Exemplarily, we set the default
probability piB∗ of bond B∗ to 0.324%. Additionally, we assume the default
rate pi of the LHP with 1.180%.
The default probabilities in Table 5.1 refer to the Moody’s rating scale, see
Moody’s (2010b). Thus, our regarded bond B∗ is linked to an ‘Aa3’ rating,
whereas the LHP exhibits a default rate corresponding with a ‘Baa1’ rating.
Further, the recovery rate of the LHP as well as the recovery rate of bond B∗
are fixed at R = RB∗ = 50%.132 Correlation parameters ρ and δ are assumed
132While the recovery rate of the LHP as well as the recovery rate of the reference bond
B∗ are set to 50% (deterministic), the tranche recovery rates remain stochastic due to
general characteristics of securitizations.
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Table 5.1: 5-year Cumulative Default Rates
Rating Default rate (%)
Aaa 0.086
Aa1 0.141
Aa2 0.195
Aa3 0.324
A1 0.854
A2 0.746
A3 0.830
Baa1 1.180
Baa2 2.024
Baa3 3.081
Notes: The table shows average 5-year cumulative default rates for Moody’s rated corporate bonds (annual
cohorts from 1983 to 2009) in percent, by initial alphanumeric rating.
with ρ = 0.25 and δ = 0.25, respectively. Inserting these values into Equation
(5.20) leads to the risk-adjusted attachment point A∗ = 7.44%. Numerically
solving Equation (5.19) we obtain the tranche-specific detachment point with
D∗ = 11.10%.
In consequence, both the selected bond B∗ and the tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) of
the LHP are comparable in their risk characteristics:
1. The shared probability of default is 0.324%:
piB
∗
= piT[7.44%,11.10%) = 0.324%.
2. Both financial instruments face identical expected losses of 0.162%:
E
(
LB
∗)
= E
(
LT[7.44%,11.10%)
)
= 0.162%.
We proceed in a similar way for other default probabilities derived from the
rating grades.
Figure 5.1 shows the impacts on product-specific conditional default proba-
bilities caused by changes of the super-systematic risk factor Y ∗ (x-axes) with
Y ∗ ∈ [−3, 3]. The left chart of Figure 5.1 denotes the PDs (x-axis) depending
on Y ∗. The right chart describes the respective sensitivities of CPDs (x-axis).
Intuitively, the CPDs of both products are higher in economic downturns than
in economic upturns. As we can see, the negative realization of Y ∗ = −3 rep-
resenting the worse economic downturn is linked to the highest CPDs, while
positive realizations referring to several degrees of economic upturns lead to
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lower CPDs. Thus, our model reflects economic intuition.
Figure 5.1: Sensitivities of CPDs to the Super-systematic Factor
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Notes: The figure compares product-specific effects on conditional default probabilities (CPDs) related to
Y ∗. Results are based on a default probability piB
∗
= 0.324% of bond B∗, a default rate pi = 1.180% of the
LHP, a recovery rate RB
∗
= 50% of bond B∗ , a LHP recovery rate R = 50%. Correlation parameters are
set to ρ = 0.25 and δ = 0.25. The tranche seniority is determined with A∗ = 7.44% and D∗ = 11.10%.
In general, CPDs of both products increase with decreasing realizations of
Y ∗. For further analyses, we exemplarily regard realizations of Y ∗ ∈ {−5,−3}
as proxies for extremely bad states of the global economy. By contrast, we
assume a realization of Y ∗ = 1 as an (moderate) economic upturn. While the
plotted functions in Figure 5.1 refer to financial products, which jointly exhibit
a default probability of 0.324% (‘Aa3’), the results presented in Table 5.2
provide more detailed insights into the relations between PDs and the product-
specific CPDs related to both several rating grades and negative realizations
of Y ∗.
In relation to the underlying PD, the product-specific CPDs are impressively
increasing with decreasing values of Y ∗. While the CPD of bond B∗ is 20 times
higher in an economic downturn than its initial PD, the respective CPD of a
comparable tranche is more than 123 times higher. In case of initially ‘Aaa’-
rated products, the respective CPD/PD ratio is 29.99 for bond B∗ and 269.57
for tranche T[10.54%,14.52%), respectively. Therefore, CPDs of both financial
instruments are increasing in economic downturns, but tranche-specific CPDs
increase much more rapidly.
Despite both products being characterized by the same initial PD, their
sensitivities to negative realizations of Y ∗ are quite different. According to
Table 5.2, the CPD of an ‘Aaa’-rated tranche T[10.54%,14.52%) is up to 9 times
higher in comparison to the CPD of a comparably rated bond.
Particularly, in an extremely bad economic environment the growth rate
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Table 5.2: Impacts of Economic Downturns on Probabilities of Default
Y ∗ = -5
Rating PD (%) CPD (%) CPD Sensitivity (%)
CPD Bond
PD
CPD Tranche
PD
CPD Tranche
CPD BondBond Tranche Bond Tranche
Aaa 0.086 2.579 23.183 -1.545 -17.571 29.993 269.566 8.988
Aa1 0.141 3.643 28.703 -2.057 -19.635 25.839 203.570 7.878
Aa2 0.195 4.553 32.789 -2.465 -20.828 23.350 168.150 7.201
Aa3 0.324 6.416 39.864 -3.235 -22.269 19.803 123.038 6.213
A2 0.746 11.064 53.026 -4.867 -22.972 14.830 71.080 4.793
Baa1 1.180 14.759 60.752 -5.947 -22.209 12.508 51.485 4.116
Baa2 2.024 20.468 69.880 -7.322 -20.140 10.113 34.526 3.414
Baa3 3.081 26.131 76.691 -8.390 -17.699 8.481 24.892 2.935
Y ∗ = -3
Rating PD (%) CPD (%) CPD Sensitivity (%)
CPD Bond
PD
CPD Tranche
PD
CPD Tranche
CPD BondBond Tranche Bond Tranche
Aaa 0.086 0.689 2.954 -0.495 -3.858 8.011 34.353 4.288
Aa1 0.141 1.044 4.301 -0.713 -5.250 7.406 30.504 4.119
Aa2 0.195 1.369 5.475 -0.901 -6.370 7.018 28.077 4.001
Aa3 0.324 2.082 7.904 -1.290 -8.471 6.425 24.395 3.797
A2 0.746 4.097 14.034 -2.264 -12.832 5.492 18.813 3.426
Baa1 1.180 5.900 18.893 -3.029 -15.573 5.000 16.011 3.202
Baa2 2.024 8.989 26.313 -4.182 -18.808 4.441 13.000 2.927
Baa3 3.081 12.390 33.506 -5.274 -21.009 4.021 10.875 2.704
Notes: The table provides a comparison of several risk measures referring to bonds B∗ and tranches T[A∗,D∗),
respectively, conditional on different realizations of Y ∗ ∈ {−5,−3}. Selected values of Y ∗ reflect different
degrees of economic downturns.
of tranche-specific CPDs is up to 11 times higher (in case of an initial ‘Aaa’
rating) than sensitivities of corresponding bonds B∗. Thus, these financial
instruments highly differ from each other not only in their absolute CPDs, but
also in their sensitivities to Y ∗.
Table 5.3 shows the impacts of economic upturns on the regarded risk mea-
sures. As we can see, the tranche-specific CPDs are much lower than the
Table 5.3: Impacts of Economic Upturns on Probabilities of Default
Y ∗ = 1
Rating PD (%) CPD (%) CPD Sensitivity (%)
CPD Bond
PD
CPD Tranche
PD
PD Tranche
CPD BondBond Tranche Bond Tranche
Aaa 0.086 0.024 0.001 -0.023 -0.003 0.275 0.016 0.057
Aa1 0.141 0.041 0.003 -0.038 -0.007 0.294 0.020 0.068
Aa2 0.195 0.060 0.005 -0.054 -0.011 0.308 0.024 0.077
Aa3 0.324 0.107 0.010 -0.092 -0.022 0.330 0.031 0.093
A2 0.746 0.278 0.035 -0.220 -0.073 0.373 0.047 0.126
Baa1 1.180 0.472 0.071 -0.353 -0.140 0.400 0.060 0.150
Baa2 2.024 0.879 0.162 -0.613 -0.300 0.434 0.080 0.185
Baa3 3.081 1.432 0.312 -0.937 -0.542 0.465 0.101 0.218
Notes: The table provides exemplarily a comparison of several risk measures referring to bonds B∗ and
tranches T[A∗,D∗), respectively, conditional on a positive realization of Y ∗ = 1 which reflects an economic
upturn.
respective bond CPDs. The result is in line with our expectations since the
product’s PD is the expected CPD over all possible realizations of Y ∗. This
means that the tranche-specific CPD must fall below both the bond’s CPD
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and the PD at some point (compare Figure 5.1). In other words, the CPD of
tranche T[A∗,D∗) is decreasing more rapidly in comparison to the bonds CPD
with respect to increasing values of Y ∗. This may be a reason why the market
volume of securitization increased strongly in times of a moderate economic
environment (compare BBA 2006).
Following the principles of securitization, we theoretically link the intro-
duced PDs to tranche seniorities in accordance to Table 5.3: on the one hand,
we regard a tranche with PD of 0.086% as a tranche of highest seniority which
is assessed with an ‘Aaa’ rating. On the other hand, we specify a tranche
with a PD of 3.081% as equity tranche assessed with a ‘Baa3’ rating (lowest
seniority).
From Table 5.2 we conclude that the exposures to systematic risk vary
not only between bonds and tranches, but also across the different securitized
tranches of the LHP. The ratio between CPD and PD reveals that tranche-
specific exposures to systematic risk increase with raising tranche seniority.
This result is underlined in Figure 5.2 indicating the product-specific expo-
sures to systematic risk. The left chart shows the CPD ratios (x-axis) depend-
ing on the super-systematic factor Y ∗ (x-axes) with Y ∗ ∈ [−7, 7] for several
rating grades (‘Aaa’ to ‘Baa3’). In the right chart, corresponding sensitivities
(y-axis) of the CPD ratios are provided. The plotted functions in the left
Figure 5.2: Indication of Product-based Exposures to Systematic Risk (CPD)
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Notes: The figure points out systematic risk exposures of securitized tranches T[A,D) related to Y ∗. The
CPD ratio describes the relation between the product-based CPDs (CPDT[A∗,D∗)/CPDB
∗
). The dashed
line represents the tranche with the highest seniority (‘Aaa’ rating). In turn, the dotted line describes the
tranche with the modest rating (‘Baa3’) and thus it can be regarded as the tranche of lowest seniority (equity
tranche).
chart indicate that the tranche CPDs are more strongly affected by variations
of Y ∗ than the CPDs of bonds. Further, this effect is highly correlated with
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the tranche seniority: the higher the seniority of a tranche, the stronger is the
effect and vice versa. Finally, we observe this effect as long as the tranche-
specific CPD is above the linked PD. After crossing the this PD threshold, we
obtain a contrary effect.
Additionally, we conclude that the CPD ratio of ‘Aaa’-rated products re-
veals not only the highest absolute values, but it also reacts most sensitively
to negative realizations of Y ∗, as indicated in the right chart. In comparison
to ‘Baa3’-rated bonds, ‘Baa3’-rated tranches are more affected by negative
economic developments. This effect is strengthened and accelerated with in-
creasing seniority.
All these analytical findings underline that particularly securitized tranches
of high credit quality exhibit a high degree of systematic risk in comparison
to straight bonds of identical credit quality. Therefore, our model confirms
not only the results of the aforementioned studies of systematic risk influences
on structured financial products, it also completes theoretical findings with a
simple analytical solution.
5.4.2 Product-specific Sensitivity of CELs
As defined in Equation (5.8), expected losses of straight bonds are determined
by the bond’s PD, EAD and LGD. Concerning expected tranche losses, the
portfolio correlation parameters (ρ and δ) as well as the tranche-specific senior-
ity are decisively important. Within our ongoing analysis, we regard impacts
on product-specific expected losses with respect to realizations of Y ∗. All other
parameters remain deterministic and unchanged (ceteris paribus).
Figure 5.3 shows the sensitivities of product-specific expected losses to re-
alizations of Y ∗ (x-axes) with Y ∗ ∈ [−3, 3]. In the left chart, impacts on the
products’ expected losses (y-axis) conditional on Y ∗ are denoted. The right
chart shows the corresponding sensitivities (y-axis) to Y ∗. In comparison to
Section 5.4.1, we obtain similar product-specific results for the sensitivities of
expected losses related to Y ∗:
Conditional expected losses of both financial products increase in economic
downturns. Analogous to the developments of CPDs, the sensitivity of the
expected tranche loss CELT[7.44%,11.10%) is much higher than the sensitivity of
CELB∗ (bond). Related to the introduced rating grades, Table 5.4 provides
some insights into the relation between EL and the product-specific CEL de-
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivities of CELs to Systematic Risk
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Notes: The figure compares effects on conditional expected losses (CELs) of a bond B∗ and a tranche
T[7.44%,11.10%), respectively, related to a super-systematic risk factor Y ∗. The results are based on an
expected loss ELB
∗
= 0.162% = ELT[7.44%,11.10%) , a default probability pi = 1.180% of the LHP, a recovery
rate RB
∗
= 50% of bond B∗ , a LHP recovery rate R = 50%. Correlation parameters are set to ρ = 0.25
and δ = 0.25.
pending on several states of economic downturns.
Table 5.4: Impacts of Economic Downturns on Expected Losses
Y ∗ = -5
Rating EL (%)
CEL (%) CEL Sensitivity (%) CEL Bond
EL
CEL Tranche
EL
CEL Tranche
CEL BondBond Tranche Bond Tranche
Aaa 0.043 1.290 16.321 -0.773 -14.043 29.993 379.565 12.655
Aa1 0.071 1.822 20.573 -1.029 -16.218 25.839 291.810 11.293
Aa2 0.098 2.277 23.787 -1.233 -17.617 23.350 243.971 10.448
Aa3 0.162 3.208 29.528 -1.617 -19.649 19.803 182.273 9.204
A2 0.373 5.532 40.785 -2.434 -22.078 14.830 109.343 7.373
Baa1 0.590 7.380 47.819 -2.974 -22.635 12.508 81.050 6.480
Baa2 1.012 10.234 56.622 -3.661 -22.330 10.113 55.951 5.533
Baa3 1.541 13.065 63.661 -4.195 -21.277 8.481 41.325 4.872
Y ∗ = -3
Rating EL (%)
CEL (%) CEL Sensitivity (%) CEL Bond
EL
CEL Tranche
EL
CEL Tranche
CEL BondBond Tranche Bond Tranche
Aaa 0.043 0.344 1.683 -0.247 -2.374 8.011 39.143 4.886
Aa1 0.071 0.522 2.481 -0.356 -3.297 7.406 35.187 4.751
Aa2 0.097 0.684 3.184 -0.450 -4.057 7.018 32.652 4.653
Aa3 0.162 1.041 4.665 -0.645 -5.536 6.425 28.795 4.482
A2 0.373 2.048 8.517 -1.132 -8,833 5.492 22.833 4.158
Baa1 0.590 2.950 11.678 -1.515 -11.114 5.000 19.793 3.958
Baa2 1.012 4.495 16.661 -2.091 -14.129 4.441 16.463 3.707
Baa3 1.541 6.195 21.681 -2.637 -16.585 4.021 14.074 3.500
Notes: The table provides a comparison of several risk measures referring to bonds B∗ and tranches T[A∗,D∗),
respectively, conditional on different realizations of the super-systematic risk factor Y ∗ ∈ {−5,−3}. Selected
values of Y ∗ reflect different degrees of economic downturns.
With regard to tranche T[7.44%,11.10%), the CEL is 182 times higher in eco-
nomic downturns than the EL, while the CEL of bond B∗ is about 20 times
as high as the EL. For this reason the CEL of tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) is more
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than 9 times higher in comparison to the bond’s CEL. The highest relative
CEL impact follows for ‘Aaa’-rated tranches. Related to a very bad state of
the global economy, the tranche CEL is 12.66 times higher as the bond’s CEL.
Finally, all tranche-specific CEL ratios expand the corresponding CPD ratios
across all rating classes and thus tranche seniorities. Even for a ’Baa3’-rated
tranche the product’s CEL ratio (CELT[A∗,D∗)/CELB∗) is 1.66 times higher
than the respective CPD ratio (CPDT[A∗,D∗)/CPDB∗). These results confirm
that the product-specific sensitivities of CELs to systematic changes are gen-
erally higher than the impacts on the CPDs. The effect increases in line with
tranche seniority. Particularly, tranches of highest seniority reveal the highest
sensitivity.
While Table 5.4 is dealing with economic downturns, Table 5.5 shows anal-
ogous impacts on CEL in an economic upturn.
Table 5.5: Impacts of Economic Upturns on Expected Losses
Y ∗ = 1
Rating EL (%)
CEL (%) CEL Sensitivity (%) CEL Bond
EL
CEL Tranche
EL
CEL Tranche
CEL BondBond Tranche Bond Tranche
Aaa 0.043 0.012 0.001 -0.011 -0.001 0.275 0.012 0.04
Aa1 0.071 0.021 0.001 -0.019 -0.003 0.294 0.015 0.052
Aa2 0.097 0.030 0.002 -0.027 -0.004 0.308 0.018 0.058
Aa3 0.162 0.054 0.004 -0.046 -0.009 0.330 0.023 0.070
A2 0.373 0.139 0.013 -0.110 -0.029 0.373 0.035 0.095
Baa1 0.590 0.236 0.026 -0.177 -0.055 0.400 0.045 0.112
Baa2 1.012 0.440 0.060 -0.307 -0.119 0.434 0.060 0.137
Baa3 1.541 0.716 0.115 -0.468 -0.215 0.465 0.075 0.161
Notes: The table provides exemplarily a comparison of several risk measures referring to bonds B∗ and
tranches T[A∗,D∗), respectively, conditional on a positive realization of the super-systematic risk factor
Y ∗ = 1 which reflects an economic upturn.
Similar to the aforementioned findings, an economic upturn leads to reduced
tranche-specific CEL as intuitively expected. In comparison to our CPD re-
sults, the CELs across all tranches (from a ‘Baa3’ rating up to an ‘Aaa’ rating)
are decreasing more rapidly: the CPD ratio between a tranche with an ‘Aaa’
rating and a comparably rated bond B∗ is about 0.06, while the respective
CEL ratio is just 0.04 in value. ‘Baa3’-rated instruments exhibit a product-
specific CPD ratio of 0.22, while the CEL ratio is about 0.16. Thus, we suggest
that the CPDs of both products decrease in economic upturns which leads to a
disproportionately high reduction of CELs. We assume this effect particularly
in highly rated tranches.
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Figure 5.4 indicates the product-specific exposures to systematic risk. The
left chart reflects the product-based CEL ratios (y-axis) depending on the
super-systematic factor Y ∗ (x-axis) for several rating grades. The right chart
shows the corresponding sensitivities of the CEL ratios (y-axis) to Y ∗ (x-axis).
Figure 5.4: Indication of Product-based Exposures to Systematic Risk (CEL)
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Notes: The figure points out systematic risk exposures of securitized tranches T[A,D) related to Y ∗. The
CEL ratio describes the relation between product-based CELs (CELT[A∗,D∗)/CELB
∗
). The dashed line
represents the tranche with the highest seniority (‘Aaa’ rating). In turn, the dotted line describes the tranche
with a modest rating (‘Baa3’) and thus it can be regarded as the tranche of lowest seniority (equity tranche).
Similar to our findings presented in Figure 5.2, we conclude from Figure
5.4 that the higher the seniority of a tranche, the higher is the ratio between
tranche-specific CELs and bond-specific CELs. Comparing the right charts
of Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4, the sensitivity of CEL ratios is even higher in
economic downturns than the respective sensitivity of CPD ratios. This effect
is again strengthened and accelerated with increasing seniority.
The default probability of the LHP affects the tranche-specific impairment
risk and the expected tranche losses, which vary over the business cycle.133
In particular, default probabilities are lower in economic upturns than in eco-
nomic downturns. However, credit rating agencies assess the credit quality of
corporate bond issues and issuers ‘through-the-cycle’ and focus primarily on id-
iosyncratic risk characteristics (compare Löﬄer 2004, Heitfield 2005). Crucial
macroeconomic (‘point-in-time’) information are explicitly not included, even
though they may decisively affect the borrower’s ability to fulfill his contrac-
tual payment obligations. By focusing on the risk characteristics probability
of default or the expected loss, solely the first moment of the loss distribu-
133For this reason all these parameters can generally be modeled as random variables.
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tion is considered (Fender et al. 2008). Other relevant risk characteristics are
omitted. Especially, securitized tranches are affected decisively by systematic
influences which can be traced back to the specific structure of securitization.
Since idiosyncratic risks are mostly diversified within the underlying portfolio,
pooling and tranching leads to a concentration of systematic risk exposures
in securitized tranches. This effect may be boosted in tranches of high se-
niority. We conclude that the effects of securitization come along with an
increased premium (spread) payment for senior tranches due to their higher
exposure to systematic risk which is indicated by an increased sensitivity to
systematic influences. Underestimated systematic risk exposures may lead to
a dramatic mismatch between impairment expectations and occurred losses,
which we could observe during the GFC.
5.4.3 Product-specific Downside Risk
In the following, we introduce conditional risk clusters (CRC) as a new scale to
account for possible risk migrations. Similarly to the methodology of CRA rat-
ings, the CRCs are linked to historical PDs provided by Moody’s for corporate
bonds. In contrast to CRA ratings, our CRCs provide rating-grade outlooks
referring to expected realizations of Y ∗. Similar to classical ratings, the CRCs
are graded. Thus, our CRC scale allows us to quantify the product-specific
downside risk with respect to Y ∗.
Table 5.6 shows the complete CRC scale from CRC 1 (lowest PD) to CRC 8
(highest PD). In terms of PD, the latter CRC corresponds with the investment
grade rating of the Moody’s rating scale (‘Baa3’).
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Table 5.6: Conditional Risk Clusters and Corresponding Default Rates
Conditional Risk Cluster (CRC) Moodys Rating
Cluster Default Rate Interval (%) Default Rate (%) Rating
CRC 1 ≤ 0.086 0.086 Aaa
CRC 2 0.086 - 0.141 0.141 Aa1
CRC 3 0.141 - 0.195 0.195 Aa2
CRC 4 0.195 - 0.324 0.324 Aa3
CRC 5 0.324 - 0.746 0.746 A2
CRC 6 0.746 - 1.180 1.180 Baa1
CRC 7 1.180 - 2.024 2.024 Baa2
CRC 8 2.024 - 3.081 3.081 Baa3
Notes: The table defines conditional risk clusters (CRCs) related to historical average 5-year cumulative
default rates from 1983 to 2009 provided by Moody’s (2010). Default rate intervals describe the cluster-
specific boundaries. Default rates above 3.081% refer to rating grades below the investment grade. Non-
investment grade ratings are not considered.
Figure 5.5 provides product-specific cluster outlooks related to Y ∗ (x-axes).
While the left chart refers to bond B∗, the right chart refers to tranche
T[7.44%,11.10%). Respective cluster outlooks are linked to historical default rates
in accordance to Table 5.6. The CRCs are indicated by vertical lines within
both charts of Figure 5.5. The vertical cluster lines cross product-specific CPD
functions at corresponding PDs (y-axes).
Figure 5.5: Impacts of Systematic Risk on Cluster Migrations
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Notes: The figure provides product-specific cluster outlooks related to realizations of Y ∗. Cluster outlooks
are linked to historical default rates in accordance to Table 5.6. The results are presented with respect to i)
a corporate bond B∗ and ii) a tranche T[7.44%,11.10%). Both financial instruments exhibit the same default
probability 0.324% which is linked to CRC 4. The default rate of the LHP is pi = 1.180%; the recovery rate
of bond B∗ is RB
∗
= 50%; the recovery rate of the LHP is R = 50%. Correlation parameters are set to
ρ = 0.25 and δ = 0.25.
Both tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) and straight bond B∗ exhibit identical risk char-
acteristics. This leads to a joint rating of ‘Aa3’ corresponding with our CRC 4
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in terms of PD. Nevertheless, their inherent migration risk differs widely from
each other with respect to economy changes. Particularly, the downside risk
of tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) is much more sensitive to negative realizations of Y ∗
in comparison to the downside risk of straight bond B∗. Obviously, tranche
T[7.44%,11.10%) reaches the denoted thresholds for cluster downward movements
more rapidly than bond B∗. In other words, the global economy must be at
worse states to cause a downward movement of bond B∗ below the investment
grade cluster (CRC 8). This indicates that a bond cluster is much more con-
stant over time and exhibits a greater buffer to economy changes in terms of
migration risk.
Table 5.7 gives an overview of migrations probabilities related to the con-
ditional risk clusters (CRC).
Table 5.7: Migration Probabilities with respect to Systematic Risk
Conditional Risk Cluster (CRC) Bond (%) Tranche (%)
CRC 1 10.383 50.399
CRC 2 14.442 10.243
CRC 3 13.766 6.361
CRC 4 24.716 9.421
CRC 5 29.478 12.453
CRC 6 5.514 4.698
CRC 7 1.541 3.488
CRC 8 0.024 1.548
≤ CRC 8 0.135 1.390
Notes: The table provides a migration measure due to realizations of Y ∗. Product-specific percentages
describe the probability to remain in the respective conditional risk cluster (CRC). The results are presented
with respect to i) a corporate bond B∗ and ii) the tranche T[7.44%,11.10%). Both financial instruments
exhibit the same default probability of 0.324%. The default rate of the LHP is pi = 1.180%; the recovery
rate of bond B∗ is RB
∗
= 50%; the recovery rate of the LHP is R = 50%. Correlation parameters are set
to ρ = 0.25 and δ = 0.25.
With a probability of 1.39% the tranche’s cluster falls below the investment
grade cluster, while the corresponding probability of a straight bond B∗ is just
0.14%, which is more than 10 times lower. The probability to hold the initial
cluster (CRC 4) is about 25% for bond B∗ and only about 9% for tranche
T[7.44%,11.10%). Further, the probability of bond B∗ to prevent a downward
movement of more than one cluster is almost 2.5 times higher (54.19%) than
the respective probability of tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) (21.87%). This means that
bond B∗ reaches a CRC 4 or CRC 5 rating with a probability of 54.19%,
while the respective tranche probability is at 21.87%. On the other hand, the
probability of tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) is clearly higher for obtaining a cluster
upgrade conditional on Y ∗ than for bond B∗ (67.00% vs. 38.59%). Despite
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this result the downside risk remains striking and should be seriously taken
into consideration by investors with respect to their investment decisions.
Generally, the presented analytical results are dependent on specific param-
eter assumptions. However, parameter variations lead to qualitatively similar
results. Under consideration of several δ variations, Figure 5.6 exemplarily
shows alternative CPD functions (y-axes) depending on Y ∗ (x-axes).
Figure 5.6: Systematic Risk Impacts depending on Variations of δ
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Notes: The figure compares effects on product-specific probabilities of default (y-axes) related to several
weightings δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.5} of Y ∗ (x-axes). The results refer to identical default probabilities of bond
B∗ and tranche T[7.44%,11.10%) (piB
∗
= 0.324% = piT[7.44%,11.10%) ), a default rate pi = 1.180% of the LHP,
a recovery rate RB
∗
= 50% of bond B∗, and a recovery rate R = 50% of the LHP. While the correlation
parameter δ varies, the correlation parameter ρ is set to ρ = 0.25.
We find that the reported impacts of economy changes hold for all δ values,
δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.5}. Thus, product-specific PDs increase with rising values
for δ and vice versa.
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5.4.4 Systematic Risk Sensitivity due to Inter-sectoral
Diversification
In the following, our analytical findings will be further amended by an addi-
tional multi-sector simulation study. While the analytical framework focuses
solely on borrowers located in a single sector, the multi-sector approach ac-
counts exemplarily for structured claims which refer to borrowers from different
economic sectors such as the financial industry, consumer goods and industri-
als. This multi-sectoral perspective may provide more realistic insights into
the behavior of structured finance instruments related to economy changes. In
this way, we simultaneously check the robustness of our analytical findings.
Analogous to Section 5.3, we firstly quantify portfolio losses (case-wise)
depending on the borrowers’ sector-specific asset returns ZBi,jm through Monte
Carlo (MC) simulations. Index m indicates the multi-sector approach. Bi,j
refers to a borrower i located in sector j. ZBi,jm is evaluated depending on i)
a super-systematic risk factor Y ∗, ii) a sectoral risk component U j and iii) an
idiosyncratic risk term εBi,j .134 This leads to
ZBi,jm =
√
ρj · δj · Y ∗ +
√
ρj − ρj · δj · U j +
√
1− ρj · εBi,j . (5.26)
Since all random variables are i.i.d. with Y ∗, U j, εBi,j ∼ N (0, 1), ZBi,jm is
also standard normal distributed with ZBi,jm ∼ N (0, 1). While ρj describes
the borrowers’ asset correlation in sector j with ρj ∈ [0, 1], δj indicates the
dependency of sector j on Y ∗, compare Equation (5.11).
In order to examine the behavior of CDO tranches related to systematic
risk influences under consideration of inter-sectoral diversification effects, we
focus on the following two case studies:
In Case 1, we examine a portfolio containing debt claims related to 2000
homogeneous borrowers who are equally divided over four sectors denoted by
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The asset correlation ρj among borrowers Bi,j of sector j
(intra-sectoral asset correlation) is the same in each sector j with ρj = 0.25.
Each sector j contains 500 homogeneous borrowers and is identically affected
by the super-systematic risk factor Y ∗, which is indicated by δj = 0.25 being
constant across sectors.
The setting in Case 2 corresponds to Case 1, except the sectoral influence
134Recall that Y ∗ is simultaneously affecting all borrowers across all sectors, U j only affects
all borrowers in sector j and εBi,j affects solely a single borrower i in sector j.
128
5.4. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMATIC RISK SENSITIVITY
of the systematic risk factor Y ∗ and the intra-sectoral asset correlation ρj. In
contrast to Case 1, the dependency on Y ∗ varies across sectors, which leads to
sector-specific weights δj ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7}. The intra-sectoral asset correla-
tion ρj is homogeneous for all borrowers in a specific sector, but inhomogeneous
across sectors with ρj ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
Using the parameter settings of our analytical study further simulation re-
sults are computed referring to a pool of 500 homogeneous borrowers located
in a single sector. Thus, we test our analytical findings. This case is denoted
as Simulation Study m0.
Table 5.8 summarizes the different case settings.
Table 5.8: Case Settings within the Multi-sector Approach
Analytical Simulation Case 1 Case 2
Study (s) Study (m0) (m1) (m2)
Amount of Sectors 1 1 4 4
Bonds per Sector LHP 500 500 500
Recovery Rate of Bonds 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
ρ1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5
ρ2 - - 0.25 0.4
ρ3 - - 0.25 0.3
ρ4 - - 0.25 0.2
δ1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.4
δ2 - - 0.25 0.5
δ3 - - 0.25 0.6
δ4 - - 0.25 0.7
Notes: The table provides an overview of case settings within the multi-sector (m) approach in contrast to the
setting in the analytical single-sector approach (s). The borrowers’ asset correlation ρj with j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
is homogeneous across sectors j in Case 1 and inhomogeneous in Case 2. The sectoral dependency on
systematic risk influences is expressed by δj with j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} which is also homogeneous in Case 1 and
inhomogeneous in Case 2. The simulation study (m0) exhibits the same parameter settings as our analytical
study except the amount of bonds in the underlying pool.
Both settings - those in Case 1 and in Case 2 - may overcome some short-
comings of a single-sector approach, e.g., the underestimation of sectoral di-
versification effects. However, Case 2 overcomes additionally various simplifi-
cations of Case 1 given by constant correlation assumptions for both ρj and
δj. Thus, our asset-securitization model gets closer to observable real-world
CDOs. With inhomogeneous sectors and homogeneous borrowers in each sec-
tor more valuable insights into risk characteristics of structured products may
be provided.135 While results labeled with s refer to our single-sector approach
135Our findings hold even if we implement inhomogeneous borrowers located in inhomoge-
neous sectors. For tractability we focus solely on the introduced case settings.
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(analytical), results of the multi-sector simulations are generally indicated by
mc with c ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In addition to our simulation study m0 which tests our
analytical findings, we introduce m1 and m2 to distinguish between Case 1
and Case 2, respectively.
Next, we calibrate the risk profile of tranches T[A∗mc ,D∗mc ) on the specific
risk characteristics of reference bond B∗ in order to ensure an appropriate
comparison of both products with regard to their product-specific behavior
related to variations of Y ∗.
Based on case-wise simulated portfolio loss distributions, we assign the risk-
adjusted attachment points A∗mc and detachment points D
∗
mc of tranches mc
(compare Section 5.3.4). Eventually, tranche T[A∗mc ,D∗mc ) and bond B
∗ again
exhibit the same risk profile in terms of PDs and ELs.
In comparison to the single-sector approach, our multi-sector simulations
clearly show the inter-sectoral diversification effects related to the main char-
acteristics of structured products: inter-sectoral pooling and tranching lead to
a default-risk reduction of structured claims. For this reason, the attachment
point decreases from A∗s = 7.44% to A∗m1 = 4.07%, while the detachment point
D∗s = 11.10% decreases to D∗m1 = 5.28% in order to match the risk profile of
the reference bond B∗, which is determined by a PD of 0.324% and an EL of
0.162%.
Regarding Equation (5.26), we may observe sectoral diversification effects
for δj < 1. Apart from idiosyncratic risk, the borrowers’ asset returns are solely
influenced by sectoral changes if δj = 0. The borrowers’ idiosyncratic risk
contributions can be diversified in case of ρj < 1 and are perfectly diversified
in case of the LHP (compare Gordy 2000, 2003). Finally, we evaluate the
following pool-specific dependency measures from Equation (5.26):
• The intra-sectoral asset correlation (pairwise asset correlation among
borrowers within a single sector)
corr(ZBi,jm , Z
Bk,j
m ) = ρ
j for i 6= k. (5.27)
• The inter-sectoral asset correlation (pairwise asset correlation of borrow-
ers located in different sectors)
corr(ZBi,jm , Z
Bk,l
m ) =
√
ρi · δj · ρk · δl for j 6= l. (5.28)
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• The cross-sector correlation (pairwise sector correlation)
corr(U j, U l) =
√
δj · δl for j 6= l. (5.29)
Intra-sectoral correlations referring to Equation (5.27) are presented in Ta-
ble 5.8. According to Equation (5.28), the average inter-sectoral asset correla-
tion is 10.93% (22.15%) in Case 1 (Case 2 ). Under consideration of Equation
(5.29), we calculate an average cross-sector correlation of 25% (54.23%) in
Case 1 (Case 2 ). Thus, each setting leads to both sectoral and idiosyncratic
risk diversification.
Referring to Case 1, the two upper charts in Figure 5.7 show the product-
specific PD sensitivities (y-axes) to realizations of Y ∗ (x-axes) with Y ∗ ∈
[−3, 3]. Analogously, both lower charts in Figure 5.7 show the product-specific
sensitivities of expected losses (y-axes) to Y ∗ (x-axes).
Comparing Figure 5.7 with our analytical findings – plotted in Figures
5.1 and 5.3 – we conclude that the already stated effects due to systematic
influences are not only confirmed but also intensified by simulating multi-
sector securitizations.136 Despite corresponding risk profiles, tranche m1 with
T[4.07%,5.28%) seems to be much more affected by systematic risk – in terms
of PDs and ELs – than both the reference bond B∗ and tranche m0 with
T[7.86%,10.95%). In contrast to our single-sector approach (tranche m0), the func-
tion of tranche m1 gets steeper with decreasing realizations of Y ∗. Thus, we
derive throughout higher sensitivities to Y ∗ for tranche m1 than for tranche
m0 in economic downturns, as shown in the upper and lower chart on the right
of Figure 5.7. Finally, we suggest that the sensitivity of structured products
to systematic risk increases with the degree of sectoral diversification within
CDO structures.
Table 5.9 shows the impacts of a massive economic downturn on both
product-specific PDs and ELs for Case 1. With regard to various rated
tranches T[A∗m1 ,D∗m1 ), respective risk measures are provided, e.g., the ratio be-
tween CPD and PD, for Y ∗ = −5 in order to underline the effect size in such
a downturn scenario.
A direct comparison with findings shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.4 indicates that
impacts of such economy downturns are consistently higher on multi-sectoral
pooled debt claims than on single-sectoral pooled ones. In line with Figure
136Fore more details see Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.
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Figure 5.7: Systematic Risk Sensitivity in a Multi-sector Approach (Case 1)
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Notes: The figure for Case 1 compares effects on both conditional probabilities of default (CPDs) (I+II)
and conditional expected losses (CELs) (III+IV) related to several realizations of the super-systematic
risk factor Y ∗ in a multi-sector approach. The tranche seniority is determined with A∗m1 = 4.07% and
D∗m1 = 5.28%. It refers to a simulated pool containing debt claims from four homogenous sectors (compare
Table 5.8). The results refer to identical default probabilities of bond B∗, tranche m0 and tranche m1
(piB
∗
= 0.324% = pi
T[4.07%,5.28%)
m1 = pi
T[7.86%,10.95%)
m0 ), a default rate pi = 1.180% of the simulated pool (SP),
a recovery rate RB
∗
= 50% of bond B∗ and a recovery rate R = 50% of the SP. The correlation parameters
δj and ρj are set to δj = ρj = 0.25.
5.7, we conclude from Table 5.9 that the sensitivity of multi-sectoral pooled
products to systematic risk is much higher in terms of both PDs and ELs.
Furthermore, the systematic risk exposure increases in line with the seniority
of tranche m1. For example, under very bad economic conditions, which are
again indicated by y∗ = −5, the CPD of tranche T[4.07%,5.28%) (‘Aa3-rated’) is
at least 2.4 times higher than the respective tranche CPD referring to single-
sector debt claims (m0) and nearly 14 times higher than the respective CPD
of bond B∗.137 In case of an ‘AAA’-rated tranche m1, its CPD is 29 times
higher than the respective bond CPD and at least 3.2 times higher than the
respective CPD of tranche m0. The results of Simulation Study m0 confirm
our analytical findings (compare column Tranche s with column Tranche m0).
137Regarding already presented CRC migrations, we achieve similar results.
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Table 5.9: Case 1: Economic Impacts on PDs and ELs in a Multi-sector
Approach
Y ∗ = -5
Rating PD (%) CPD (%)
CPD Tranche m1
PD
CPD Tranche m1
CPD BondBond Tranche s Tranche m0 Tranche m1
Aaa 0.086 2.579 23.183 23.266 74.729 868.940 28.976
Aa1 0.141 3.643 28.703 27.778 81.642 579.024 22.411
Aa2 0.195 4.553 32.789 31.956 85.891 440.468 18.865
Aa3 0.324 6.416 39.864 36.946 90.062 277.968 14.037
A2 0.746 11.064 53.026 52.292 95.312 127.764 8.615
Baa1 1.180 14.759 60.752 60.124 97.247 82.413 6.589
Baa2 2.024 20.468 69.880 68.953 98.730 48.779 4.824
Baa3 3.081 26.131 76.691 75.936 99.422 32.269 3.805
Rating EL (%) CEL (%)
CEL Tranche m1
EL
CEL Tranche m1
CEL BondBond Tranche s Tranche m0 Tranche m1
Aaa 0.043 1.290 16.321 14.869 64.799 1506.949 50.232
Aa1 0.071 1.822 20.573 20.735 72.210 1024.258 39.632
Aa2 0.098 2.277 23.787 22.140 77.182 791.607 33.896
Aa3 0.162 3.208 29.528 28.652 83.532 515.631 26.039
A2 0.373 5.532 40.785 38.928 90.040 241.394 16.276
Baa1 0.590 7.380 47.819 46.666 93.765 158.924 12.705
Baa2 1.012 10.234 56.622 55.154 95.940 94.802 9.375
Baa3 1.541 13.065 63.661 62.779 97.585 63.346 7.469
Notes: The table provides a comparison of several risk measures referring to tranches T[A∗m1 ,D
∗
m1
) with
various ratings in a multi-sector (m) approach. The realization of Y ∗ = −5 reflects a strong economic
downturn. The analytical results in column Tranche s correspond approximately to those of our multi-
sector approach considering just one homogeneous sector (compare column Tranche m0). Values in column
Tranche m1 describe the results of our m-approach based on four homogeneous sectors.
Even in Case 2, we observe the risk characteristics of multi-sectoral CDOs.
Figure 5.8 contrasts risk characteristics of tranchem2 with those of tranchem1,
tranche m0, and reference bond B∗.138 The upper chart on the left-hand side
of Figure 5.8 refers to product-specific PDs (y-axis), while the lower-left chart
denotes the products’ ELs (y-axis) related to variations of Y ∗ ∈ [−3, 3] (x-
axes). The two charts on the right-hand side show the respective sensitivities
(y-axes) to Y ∗ (x-axes).
Similarly to the plotted CPD functions in Figure 5.8, the CEL functions
of tranche m1 and tranche m2, respectively, underline that they are much
more affected by variations of Y ∗ than corresponding functions of tranche m0.
But in relation to tranche m1, the sensitivity to systematic risk of tranche
m2 increases more rapidly, the worse the economic downturn is (compare the
two charts on the right). However, in bad states of the global economy the
sensitivity to systematic risk is clearly higher for all securitizations than the
sensitivity of the reference bond B∗.
138The behavior of reference bond B∗ related to changes of Y ∗ is independent from presented
case settings since the reference bond B∗ is not affected by pooling and tranching activities
(securitizations).
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Figure 5.8: Systematic Risk Sensitivity in a Multi-sector Approach (Case 2)
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Notes: The figure for Case 2 compares effects on both conditional probabilities of default (CPDs) (I+II) and
conditional expected losses (CELs) (III+IV) related to several realizations of the super-systematic risk factor
Y ∗ in a multi-sector approach. The tranche seniority is determined with A∗m2 = 7.36% and D
∗
m2
= 10.95%.
It refers to a pool containing debt claims from four inhomogeneous sectors (compare Table 5.8). The results
refer to identical default probabilities of i) bond B∗, ii) tranche m0, iii) tranche m1 and iiii) tranche m2.
Thus, piB
∗
= 0.324% = pi
T[7.36%,10.95%)
m2 = pi
T[4.07%,5.28%)
m1 = pi
T[7.86%,10.95%)
m0 . The default rate of the pool is
pi = 1.180%; the recovery rate of the pool is R = 50%; the recovery rate of bond B∗ is RB
∗
= 50%.
For Y ∗ ≥ 0, the CPD functions of all products are below the PD function,
which is jointly shared. This indicates that the default probabilities conditional
on Y ∗ are lower than the unconditional PD of 0.324% for all good states of
the global economy. Since the unconditional PD equals conditional default
expectations over all possible realizations of Y ∗, all CPD functions must cross
the PD function at negative realizations of Y ∗ (Y ∗ < 0). We conclude that the
intersections – where the CPD functions cross the PD threshold from below
– are determined by the products’ overall dependency on i) systematic risk,
ii) sector risk and iii) idiosyncratic risk. Since ii) and iii) can be diversified
in securitizations, tranche m2 and tranche m1 may reveal the highest degree
of risk diversification. In comparison to both multi-sector CDO tranches, the
tranche m0 exhibits a lower degree of sectoral diversification. Bond B∗ is
simultaneously exposed to systematic, sectoral and idiosyncratic risk without
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any diversification effects. Diversifying sectoral risk as well as idiosyncratic risk
(diversification effect) requires an adjustment of tranche seniority in order to
maintain the unconditional default risk of 0.324%. Both diversification effects
lead additionally to an increase of systematic risk exposure in securitizations
(concentration effect). This concentration effect is the higher, the more senior
a CDO tranche is. Along decreasing values of Y ∗, we expect therefore that
the products’ CPDs cross the PD threshold in the following order: first, the
CPD function of bond B∗, second the one of tranche m0 and last the ones
of the multi-sector CDO tranches m1 and m2, respectively. We confirm these
theoretical findings in the two charts on the left-hand side of Figure 5.8. Due
to different settings (see Table 5.8), tranchem1 and tranchem2 are not directly
comparable in terms of risk diversification and concentration as well. However,
what we observe is a higher systematic risk exposure in tranche m2 than in
tranchem2 since the CPD function of tranchem2 is much steeper after crossing
the PD function than that of tranche m1 (compare the two charts on the right-
hand side).139 As already indicated by Figure 5.7, the sensitivity of securitized
tranches to systematic risk is heavily increasing through multi-sectoral pooling
and tranching, even if inhomogeneous sectors are considered.
Table 5.10 addresses the impacts of an economic downturn (Y ∗ = −3) on
the products’ PDs and ELs in a multi-sector approach with inhomogeneous
sectors. Of special interest are several risk measures related to various rated
tranches m2.
For example, the ‘Aa3’-rated tranche m2 with attachment point A∗m2 =
7.36% and detachment point D∗m2 = 10.95% is at least 5.2 times stronger
affected by the economic downturn than tranche m0 (see also Figure 5.8). The
CPD of an ‘AAA’-rated tranche m2 is at least 1.8 times higher in Case 2 than
in Case1.140 In such an economic downturn, the CPD of an ‘Aa1’-rated tranche
m2 is already 151 times higher than the products’ PD and at least 20 times
higher than the CPD of an ‘Aa1’-rated bond. We obtain similar results with
regard to CELs, which are also denoted in Table 5.10. Overall, the impacts on
CPDs and CELs are even worse in very bad states of the global economy.
We conclude that the differences between case-specific CPDs and CELs are
due to multi-sectoral pooling and tranching across sectors with inhomogeneous
sensitivities to systematic risk. Expanding our analytical results, we find that
139All these results correspondingly hold for conditional expected losses.
140In Case 1, the CPD of an ‘AAA’-rated tranche m1 is 7.010% for Y ∗ = −3.
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Table 5.10: Case 2: Economic Impacts on PDs and ELs in a Multi-sector
Approach
Y ∗ = -3
Rating PD (%) CPD (%)
CPD Tranche m2
PD
CPD Tranche m2
CPD BondBond Tranche s Tranche m0 Tranche m2
Aaa 0.086 0.689 2.954 3.006 13.148 152.884 19.083
Aa1 0.141 1.044 4.301 4.269 21.342 151.365 20.443
Aa2 0.195 1.369 5.475 5.293 26.672 136.779 19.483
Aa3 0.324 2.082 7.904 7.079 37.179 114.751 17.857
A2 0.746 4.097 14.034 13.847 63.506 85.128 15.501
Baa1 1.18 5.9 18.893 18.663 75.198 63.727 12.745
Baa2 2.024 8.989 26.313 26.043 88.860 43.903 9.885
Baa3 3.081 12.39 33.506 33.326 94.740 30.750 7.646
Rating EL (%) CEL (%)
CEL Tranche m2
EL
CEL Tranche m2
CEL BondBond Tranche s Tranche m0 Tranche m2
Aaa 0.043 0.344 1.683 1.487 5.821 135.374 16.922
Aa1 0.0705 0.522 2.481 2.634 11.091 157.324 21.248
Aa2 0.0975 0.684 3.184 2.872 13.829 141.832 20.217
Aa3 0.162 1.041 4.665 4.474 20.638 127.394 19.825
A2 0.373 2.048 8.517 7.904 40.856 109.533 19.949
Baa1 0.59 2.95 11.678 11.285 51.056 86.536 17.307
Baa2 1.012 4.495 16.661 16.198 66.456 65.668 14.784
Baa3 1.5405 6.195 21.681 21.530 80.123 52.011 12.933
Notes: The table provides a comparison of several risk measures referring to tranches T[A∗m2 ,D
∗
m2
) related to
various ratings in a multi-sector (m) approach. The realization of Y ∗ = −3 reflects an economic downturn.
The analytical results in column Tranche s correspond approximately to those of our multi-sector approach
considering just one homogenous sector (compare column Tranche m0). Values in column Tranche m2
describe the results of our m-approach based on four inhomogeneous sectors.
the effect size is positively correlated with the degree of sectoral diversification
across structured debt claims. Thus, the higher the degree of sectoral diver-
sification within structured financial products, the higher is the sensitivity of
the products’ CPD and CEL to changes in the global economy.
In accordance to recent theoretical findings, we conclude further that sec-
toral diversification leads to decreasing default risk of structured finance prod-
ucts (diversification effect), but we also see an increase of their systematic risk
exposure (concentration effect). Thereby, the concentration effect within a
given CDO structure is positively correlated with tranche seniority.
Our findings hint at shortcomings of credit ratings which focus solely on
product-specific PDs and ELs. We conclude that particularly structured fi-
nance instruments, e.g., CDOs or STCDOs, are much more affected by sys-
tematic risk than corporate bonds. Additionally, we show that systematic risk
characteristics of securitized tranches differ in seniority. Especially, tranches
of high seniority are tremendously affected by systematic influences which is
pointed out by our sensitivity analysis. This higher degree of systematic risk
within securitized tranches, particularly in the most senior tranches, is not
reflected appropriately by standardized ratings provided by CRAs (Rösch &
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Scheule 2009). Especially, ratings of securitized tranches should account for
their specific systematic risk characteristics in order to quantify their inherent
risk in a proper manner. Concerning systematic risk exposures, our results
underline that market participants should avoid applying historically devel-
oped interpretations of corporate bond ratings directly to structured financial
instruments, even if these structured instruments exhibit a high degree of inter-
sectoral diversification.
5.5 Summary
The Global Financial Crisis has shown that both default probabilities (PDs)
and expected losses (ELs) of structured financial instruments are much more
affected by systematic influences than PDs and ELs of comparably rated bonds.
While rating agencies primarily consider unconditional risk measures - PDs
and ELs - they omit product-specific sensitivities to systematic risk. Since
these unconditional risk measures are averaging out extreme scenarios of the
global economy, we explicitly model this kind of scenario within our analytical
study to examine impacts on (1) impairment risks and (2) expected losses
related to tranches and bonds with corresponding unconditional risk profiles.
Monte Carlo simulations considering multi-sectoral securitizations improve the
robustness of our analytical findings.
The simple analytical model expands theoretical findings of the recent litera-
ture and provides a general framework for quantifying conditional probabilities
of default (CPDs) and conditional expected losses (CELs). We demonstrate
that in economic downturns the impairment risk of securitization is many
times higher than the respective default risk of straight bonds, even though
their unconditional PDs are identical. Analogously, product-specific expected
losses related to systematic influences differ widely as well. Overall, tranche
CPDs and CELs react much more sensitively to systematic influences than
bond CPDs and CELs, which is indicated by several risk ratios. In fact, the
revealed systematic risk sensitivities vary not only between financial instru-
ments, but also within securitizations depending on tranche seniorities. Thus,
high-seniority tranches may exhibit the highest degree of systematic expo-
sures. Furthermore, the systematic risk exposures seem to be even higher
in sectorally well-diversified CDO structures than in less diversified securiti-
zations. Our Monte Carlo simulation study shows that the systematic risk
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exposure of securitized tranches is depending on inter-sectoral diversification
effects caused by multi-sectoral pooling and tranching. Once again, the sys-
tematic risk exposures increase in line with tranche seniorities.
By introducing conditional risk clusters (CRCs), we account for cluster mi-
grations related to systematic risk in the sense of a ‘point-in-time’ perspective.
We show that the downside risk of tranches conditional on systematic influ-
ences is many times higher in contrast to straight bonds. This crucial effect
also seems to be positive correlated with subordination in securitization.
In general, rating agencies provide ratings which do not sufficiently reflect
the degree of systematic risk exposures inherent in both financial instruments.
Particularly, ratings of tranches should account for revealed systematic risk
characteristics in order to quantify their overall risk in a proper way. We sug-
gest that our CRC approach provides an reasonable starting point for further
research in risk measures anticipating product-based systematic risk.
Finally, our approach provides market participants with essential informa-
tion for risk-adjusted investment decisions since the downside risk of securi-
tization due to changes in the global economy is obviously striking. Further,
risk managers may benefit in terms of hedging credit portfolio risks, in partic-
ular with respect to risk contributions of structured instruments. Risk traders
may gain reasonable insights into product-specific risk profiles for pricing and
hedging single-tranche CDO swaps or bespoke CDOs. On the other hand, our
findings may be useful for regulatory authorities to provide risk-adjusted capi-
tal rules in order to ensure stability of financial markets since many banks are
highly involved in dealing with structured finance instruments.
For tractability our analytical analyses are based on a Gaussian copula
approach. Even within this simple model framework, effects of systematic
risks are striking. Comprehensive Monte Carlo simulations show that reported
results are boosted under consideration of a student-t distribution for Y ∗, even
for lower degrees of freedom.
However, especially for structured products research is suggested in exam-
ining dependency structures within credit risky portfolios, e.g., default corre-
lations or counterparty risk (compare Brigo & Chourdakis 2009). Not only
with respect to borrower-specific dependencies, but also with regard to unob-
servable systematic risk factors influencing simultaneously all parties. Thus
far, we have focussed our study only on impacts of controlled systematic risk
changes. In this context, it also might be valuable to address related issues like
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parameter uncertainty or model risk (see Coval et al. 2009b, Heitfield 2009).
Addressing the importance of systematic influences for modeling credit risk
is one step to improve the understanding of structured finance instruments.
Finally, market participants, e.g., banks, investors and regulatory authorities,
should be provided with all relevant information reflecting product-specific
risk characteristics to return more confidence and transparency in structured
instruments, credit markets, and credit ratings as well.
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Chapter 6
Valuation of Systematic Risk in
the Cross-section of Credit Default
Swap Spreads
The content of this chapter refers to the working paper ‘Valuation of Systematic
Risk in the Cross-section of Credit Default Swap Spreads’ by Löhr, S., Claußen,
A., Rösch, D., and Scheule, H., 2012.
6.1 Introduction
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the spreads of Credit Default Swaps
(CDS) heavily increased across most CDS dealings on corporate debt claims,
which was triggered by high numbers of corporate defaults on bonds and
loans.141 While 31 Moody’s-rated corporate issuers defaulted in 2006 on a
total of 10,388 USD billion of loans and bonds, the number of defaulted is-
suers increased to 261 in 2009 on a total of 328,864 USD billion (Moody’s
2010b). In fact, the CDS spreads on high-rated debt claims, e.g., ‘AAA’-rated
bonds, increased much more rapidly than those on lower-rated credit assets,
which may indicate a mismatch between credit ratings and the related default
141Similar to insurance contracts, CDS – as credit derivatives – are linked to credit-risky
assets such as corporate bonds, loans etc. In their role as protection seller, CDS investors
periodically receive premium payments for covering losses in the underlying credit as-
sets. These losses may be due to default events such as interest shortfalls or principal
impairments, see Gandhi et al. (2012). Thus, in the absence of arbitrage, the fair CDS
spread (risk premium) theoretically compensates for the default risk of the underlying
credit asset.
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risk.
On the corporate debt market this phenomenon takes part in the so-called
credit spread puzzle which is already addressed by several authors (Amato
& Remolona 2003, Hui 2010). Apart from addressing corporate default risk
(Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer & Strebulaev 2011), several empirical studies
recently looked beyond theoretical contingent claims and accounted for other
pricing factors such as liquidity (De Jong & Driessen 2006, Bongaerts et al.
2011, Friewald et al. 2012). As suspected by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001),
Hui (2010) and Iannotta & Pennacchi (2011) for corporate debt, other authors
also identified systematic risk factors driving CDS spreads (e.g., Amato 2005,
Blanco et al. 2005, Gala et al. 2010, Gandhi et al. 2012). However, numerous
theoretical as well as empirical studies find that common risk factors are es-
pecially affecting the default risk of credit derivatives, e.g., single-name CDS
or baskets of CDS, and thus may also be important in pricing related dealings
such as synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (see, e.g, Coval et al. 2009a).
Most of the recent studies analyze time-series properties of credit spreads
or credit spread changes by focusing on time-series regressions. An exception
are Friewald et al. (2012) who use Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions to
show that liquidity is priced in bond markets after controlling for other factors
such as credit ratings. Summarizing, the current literature on both bond and
CDS markets focuses on the identification of credit spread drivers and aims to
answer the question how these determinants are priced.
Our paper contributes to credit spread determinants in several aspects.
Firstly, we explicitly address systematic risk exposures of CDS contracts and
identify at least three systematic risk factors beyond Merton’s (1974) structural
theory as important drivers for CDS spread changes. Thus, we suggest the
Credit Market Climate, theMarket Volatility and the Cross-market Correlation
as common determinants of CDS spread changes. The latter common spread
determinant is provided to indicate the effects of a global contagion across
credit and stock markets.
Secondly, based on our CDS database from 2004 to 2010 containing weekly
spread data of 339 U.S. firms we show that credit ratings are not sufficiently
covering the overall credit risk priced in CDS spreads. We find that systematic
risk is generally priced beyond the ratings of U.S. firms located in numerous
economic sectors, e.g., financials, industrials and consumer goods.
Thirdly, we extend the current literature by applying a two-pass regression
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approach to CDS markets (compare Fama & MacBeth 1973) and thus we show
that systematic risk exposures are cross-sectionally priced in swap markets.142
In the first pass, we identify common determinants of credit spread changes and
provide contract-specific sensitivities (betas) to common risk factors by time-
series regressions. In the second pass, we examine by cross-section regressions
how these betas are cross-sectionally priced in CDS spreads after controlling
for i) several individual factors such as credit ratings, contract liquidity and
firm leverage and ii) sectoral influences. Thus, we calculate premiums for these
systematic risk betas, similar to the CAPM’s beta premium.143 We find that
these determinants of CDS spread changes are priced across several economic
sectors, particularly in times of financial distress. Especially, common risks
related to the Credit Market Climate, the Market Volatility and the Cross-
market Correlation are rewarded in the cross-section of CDS spreads, even
after controlling for other important pricing elements such as credit ratings
and liquidity. The results of the cross-section regressions show that our set
of variables – composed of systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures – al-
lows us to explain about 80% of the observed CDS spreads in normal market
environments. Even in times of financial turmoil, our model setup achieves
an explanatory power of about 90%. Furthermore, the OLS regression results
are robust with respect to the inclusion of the Fama-French factors and other
firm-specific factors such as the firm’s leverage ratio and market capitalization.
Our findings suggest that systematic risk is a decisive pricing factor, even if
we control for individual risk factors and sectoral influences.
Our empirical findings are important for at least three fields. Firstly, the
contributions are relevant for asset pricing as they identify variables which
determine spreads of swap contracts referring to credit risky assets. While
previous literature analyzes price impacts of credit ratings (e.g., Ederington &
Goh 1993, 1998), we explicitly address price impacts of systematic risk in CDS
spreads beyond ratings. Extending the current literature related to CDS and
corporate debt, our findings are not only relevant for the valuation of CDS,
but may also provide further insight into the pricing of corporate bonds, as
bonds are also exposed to systematic risk, see Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)
142The two-pass regression approach was first proposed by Fama & MacBeth (1973) to
evaluate the cross-section of stock returns.
143According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), market participants can fully
diversify firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risks, but not market (systematic) risk which is
therefore compensated by a risk (beta) premium (compare Sharpe 1964).
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and Hui (2010).
Secondly, the results are important for the regulation of financial markets.
As pointed out by Iannotta & Pennacchi (2011), there is a mismatch between
regulatory capital for banks derived from credit ratings and credit spreads,
as the latter might account for systematic risk, while credit ratings do not
appropriately reflect systematic risk. Current regulatory capital requirements
for banks primarily focus on credit ratings, and therefore banks – or financial
investors in general – are subject to misaligned incentives if systematic risk
is priced: within a specific rating grade, banks may choose those investments
with highest systematic risk exposures due to the higher risk premiums linked
to these products. This might be a threat for financial institutions, or even
the whole financial system. By providing empirical evidence for the pricing of
systematic risk on CDS markets beyond ratings, our paper also contributes to
this discussion.
Thirdly, our findings might be important for pricing structured finance se-
curities such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Since, for example,
synthetic CDOs take on credit exposures through including CDS contracts,
this work may also provide first insight into the valuation of such structured
products, which are particularly exposed to systematic risk (see Coval et al.
2009a, Rösch & Scheule 2010).144
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we
provide the theoretical framework for our empirical analysis by introducing
systematic and idiosyncratic spread determinants. Further, we describe the
database and briefly discuss the proxies used. In Section 6.3, we firstly intro-
duce the regression models within the two-pass approach and secondly provide
the methodology to test whether corporate ratings are appropriately reflecting
systematic risk. Thirdly, we provide our results and check the robustness of
our findings by expanding our model framework to i) the Fama-French factors,
ii) further firm-specific factors and iii) a principal component analysis. Section
6.4 concludes.
144Popular synthetic CDOs are credit indices such as the North American CDX and iTraxx
Europe credit index families.
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6.2 Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spreads
6.2.1 Theoretical Framework
Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) introduced an intuitive option-
pricing framework for valuing corporate equity and debt. This structural
framework by Merton (1974) provides an attractive approach to credit risk.
In structural models, the default event is usually triggered when the firm’s as-
sets fall below a critical threshold.145 The value of firm assets follows a simple
random walk (firm value process) and the default threshold is a function of
the amount of debt outstanding.
The values of debt claims are determined under the risk-neutral measure
by computing the present value of their expected future cash flows discounted
at the risk-free rate. Since a credit default swap extracts and transfers the
default risk of corporate debt, CDS investors – in their role as protection seller
– periodically receive a premium payment (premium leg) for covering losses
in underlying debt claims (protection leg). In the absence of arbitrage and in
the presence of risk-neutral valuation, the present value (PV) of the premium
leg equals the PV of the protection leg. Hence, depending on the underlying
debt claim future expected cash flows – namely the protection and premium
payments – of the related CDS are analogously discounted to determine the
fair CDS spread.146
Motivated by the structural framework, we uniquely define the CDS spread
Sϑ,t of contract ϑ at time t through 1) the price of underlying debt claims, 2)
its related contractual cash flows, 3) the time-specific risk-free rate rt, 4) com-
mon state variables Yt, which are affecting cross-sectionally all credit spreads
simultaneously and 5) idiosyncratic state variables Vϑ,t, which are firm-specific.
Thus, we define credit spreads similarly to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) ex-
tended by the common state variables Yt. This leads to
Sϑ,t := Sϑ,t (Cϑ,t(Fϑ,t), rt,Yt,Vϑ,t) (6.1)
with contractual payments Cϑ,t depending on the firm value Fϑ,t.147 Based
145Structural models were further investigated - among others - by Black & Cox (1976),
Leland (1994), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Briys & de Varenne (1997), Gordy (2000),
Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) and Gordy (2003).
146For more detailed information compare Amato (2005).
147See Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for more detailed information.
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on this theoretical framework, credit spread changes are determined given the
current values of the time-specific variables Yt and Vϑ,t, respectively. Referring
to the structural framework, we may predict i) determinants of CDS spread
changes, and ii) whether changes in these variables should be positively or
negatively correlated with changes in the CDS spreads.
Similar to other authors, we propose some common state variables reflecting
systematic risk:148
1. Changes in the Spot Rate. In theory, the static effect of a higher spot rate
is to increase the risk-neutral drift of the firm value process (Longstaff &
Schwartz 1995, Duffee 1998). The higher drift reduces the firm’s proba-
bility of default and thus the price of related derivatives offering protec-
tion against default losses. We therefore expect that CDS spreads are
negatively correlated with the risk-less interest rate.
2. Changes in the Slope of the Yield Curve. Independent from the struc-
tural framework, some authors argue that the interest term-structure is
upon other factors mainly driven by i) the interest level and ii) the slope
characteristics (Blanco et al. 2005).
Often, the slope of the yield curve is seen as an indicator of economic
wealth: while a positive slope indicates a prosperous economy, a nega-
tive one reflects expectations of an economic downturn. Hence, the CDS
spread may decrease if an increasing slope of the interest curve indicates
higher expected short rates, as also argued by Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001) for credit spreads.149 By contrast, a decreasing term-structure
may indicate an economic downturn leading to higher losses given default
since recoveries are assumed to be positively correlated to the macroe-
conomy (Frye 2000, Altman 2008, Bade et al. 2011). In this way, the
liquidation risk for corporate debt may be higher leading to widening
CDS spreads.
3. Changes in the Market Volatility. Since debt claims exhibit character-
istics similar to a short position in a put, it follows from the option-
pricing framework that option prices increase with increasing volatility.
148Since systematic risk affects all market participants simultaneously, we aim to approxi-
mate this kind of risk by common risk variables. Note that state variables are generally
not necessary in Merton’s structural approach.
149Note that rising future short-term rates may lead to lower default probabilities and thus
to lower CDS spreads.
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Intuitively, with an increase of volatility the firm’s default probability
increases and thus the related CDS spread increases due to the higher
default risk.
4. Changes in the Credit Market Climate. The Credit Market Climate may
reflect the market view of the overall credit risk. If the global economy
is turning down in line with decreasing recoveries, the weakening market
conditions should increase the firms’ default risk as well as related losses.
Thus, the increased credit risk on credit markets may lead to an increase
of the overall credit spread level. The Credit Market Climate can be seen
as a common market factor similar to the market index in the CAPM. It
should strongly be affected by economic conditions. Therefore, we expect
a cross-sectional increase of default risk due to weakening economic con-
ditions leading to increased CDS spread levels. Hence, the CDS spreads
should be positively correlated with the Credit Market Climate.
5. Changes in the Cross-market Correlation. Foresi & Wu (2005) argue
for equity markets that downside movements in any index are likely to
be highly correlated with those in other markets as a result of global
contagion. Expanding this argument to credit markets, we expect higher
CDS spreads if cross-market correlations increase, because the prospects
for risk diversification on global markets decrease. In turn, we expect
lower CDS spreads if the dependencies across various markets – such as
credit, equity, and exchange markets – decrease.
Lastly, firm-specific or idiosyncratic spread determinants are proposed and
discussed individually.
1. Physical Default Probability. Within the structural framework, the dif-
ference between the physical probability of default (PD) and the risk-
neutral PD indicates the risk aversion of market participants. Under the
risk-neutral measure, the drift parameter µ of the asset value process is
changed to the risk-less rate r from which it follows that the risk-neutral
PD is composed of the physical PD plus a correction term accounting
for the risk aversion. By controlling for the physical PD, we quantify
the premium for pure default risk apart from other major determinants.
In line with intuition and ceteris paribus, the higher (lower) the firm’s
physical PD, the higher (lower) the CDS spread should be.
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2. Swap Liquidity. Analogous to other authors who show that liquidity is
priced in credit spreads of corporate bonds, we assume that CDS in-
vestors also claim a premium compensating for liquidity risk. Trans-
ferring these empirical findings to CDS markets, the contract’s liquid-
ity is expected to determine the CDS spread. Intuitively, CDS spreads
should rise if the contracts’ liquidity, for example, measured by its trad-
ing volume, decreases and vice versa. Eventually, we expect a negative
relationship between Swap Liquidity and swap spread.
6.2.2 Empirical Data
Our empirical study refers to a comprehensive data set of single-name CDS
spreads provided by Markit. Overall, we analyze dollar-denoted CDS spreads
of 339 U.S. American entities from January 6th, 2004 to December 27th, 2010.150
By splitting the entire period into two different subsamples, we account for
different market conditions before the GFC and in times of market turbulences
during the GFC. Firstly, we define the period from January 6th, 2004 to June
18th, 2007 as time prior to the GFC (Pre-GFC). Secondly, we define the period
from June 19th, 2007 to December 27th, 2010 as times of financial distress
during the GFC.151
Table 6.1 summarizes the sample periods for the time-series regressions
(TSR) and for the cross-sectional regressions (CSR).152 The amount of related
CDS spread observations and the number of considered entities are also de-
noted.
Overall, we investigate 124,413 weekly CDS spreads from 339 different is-
suers in the entire period, in which the number of CDS spreads per entity is
367. The Pre-GFC sample contains 180 weekly spreads per entity, which leads
to 61,020 weekly observations in total. In the GFC sample, we examine 63,393
weekly CDS spreads with 187 observation per entity.
150The contracts’ document clause is MR. The seniority is SNRFOR (senior unsecured debt).
For more information compare Markit (2008). Thereby, we select only contracts which
have at least 47 weekly spread notations in each year.
151On June 18th, 2007 it is reported for the first time that Merrill Lynch seizes collateral
from a Bear Stearns hedge fund invested heavily in subprime loans, which may have
caused strong spread increases on credit markets over the following days.
152The corresponding regression models are introduced in the next section.
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Table 6.1: Sample Periods of Multiple Time-series and Cross-section Regres-
sions
Multiple Time-series and Cross-section Regressions
Sample Entire period Pre-GFC GFC
Maturity From: 6th of Jan 04 6th of Jan 04 19th of Jun 07
Until: 27th of Dec 10 18th of Jun 07 27th of Dec 10
Amount: 339 339 339
Entities Obs. per entity: 367 180 187
Sum of obs.: 124,413 61,020 63,393
Notes: The table summarizes the sample maturities as well as the amount of CDS spread observations (obs.)
covered by each sample. The period of the Pre-GFC reflects the time interval prior to the financial crisis and
the GFC describes the time period during the crisis. Based on each sample, multiple time-series regressions
as well as cross-sectional regressions are conducted.
The U.S. companies are divided over ten economic sectors, e.g., financials
(16.81%), industrials (14.16%) and consumer goods (13.57%). Table 6.2 sum-
marizes the amount of firms located in each sector and provides the sector-
specific average spreads by sample.
Table 6.2: Investigated Economic Sectors
Mean Spread
U.S. Sector Count Count in % Entire Pre-GFC GFC
Basic Materials 22 6.49 0.0184 0.0113 0.0253
Consumer Goods 46 13.57 0.0216 0.0113 0.0316
Consumer Services 58 17.11 0.0320 0.0162 0.0471
Financials 57 16.81 0.0220 0.0042 0.0389
Health Care 16 4.72 0.0137 0.0074 0.0198
Industrials 48 14.16 0.0123 0.0077 0.0168
Oil & Gas 29 8.55 0.0128 0.0082 0.0174
Technology 14 4.13 0.0156 0.0109 0.0202
Telecommunications 12 3.54 0.0291 0.0230 0.0349
Utilities 37 10.91 0.0119 0.0073 0.0163
Overall 339 100 0.0189 0.0107 0.0268
Notes: The table reports the amount of U.S. entities located in ten economic sectors and denotes the
sector-specific mean CDS spreads by sample (Entire, Pre-GFC and GFC).
Since we investigate a wide range of U.S. American firms, we may obtain
a broad insight into the cross-sectional determinants of CDS spreads. The
sector-specific average spreads clearly vary by sample and even across sectors.
In order to account for sector-specific influences, we implement sector dummies
in our CSR model.
Furthermore, all underlying contracts of the CDS are rated on a rating
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scale from ’AAA’ to ’CCC’.153 In Figure 6.1, we plot the time series of average
CDS spreads per rating grade from January 6th, 2004 to December 27th, 2010
(x-axis). The y-axis denotes the average CDS spreads.
Figure 6.1: Average Spreads by Rating
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Notes: This figure shows time series of average CDS spreads for various rating grades, e.g., ‘AAA’, ‘AA’,
‘A’, from January 6th, 2004 to December 27th 2010. The spread function of ‘AAA’-rated contracts (black
line) is below all other spread functions since highest creditworthiness is linked to the lowest risk premium.
In turn, the ‘CCC’-based CDS spread function (dashed line) is located above all others. The entire sample
is divided into the period prior to the financial crisis (Pre-GFC) and the GFC by the dashed vertical line.
The average spread level generally varies depending on the rating grades:
the average CDS spread of ‘AAA’-rated underlyings (black line) is throughout
below all other grade-specific average spreads, as theoretically assumed above.
By contrast, ‘CCC’-rated contracts (dashed line) exhibit the highest average
CDS spreads since they reflect the highest default risk. All grade-specific
functions show that average spreads are rapidly increasing across all rating
grades during the turmoil of the GFC.
Next, we choose the following proxies for the identified systematic state
variables.
1. Spot Rate. The spot rate (SR) is approximated by changes in govern-
ment bonds, as also suggested by other authors in the recent literature
153The rating scale contains average ratings referring to Moody’s and S&P ratings. For more
details compare www.markit.com.
149
6.2. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP SPREADS
(compare Blanco et al. 2005, Avramov et al. 2007).154 We use 5-year
Treasury bill rates provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.155
2. Slope of the Yield Curve. Analogous to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001),
among others, we define the slope of the term structure (STS) as the
difference between the long-term and the short-term Treasury bill rate.
To capture slope effects, we use changes in spread differences on U.S.
Treasury bills with 2-year and 10-year maturity. The slope may be inter-
preted as an indicator of the economic health and expectations of future
short rates. Respective Treasury bill rates are also provided by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury.
3. Market Volatility. As benchmark for the Market Volatility, we assume
the VIX index provided by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. The
VIX measures market expectation of near-term volatility conveyed by
stock index option prices.156 By using a wider range of strike prices
rather than just at-the-money series, the VIX index is additionally in-
corporating information from the volatility ‘skew’. Thus, the VIX may
not only reflect investors’ consensus view of future expected stock mar-
ket volatility: since out-of-the money put options as well as in-the-money
call options are considered for short maturities, the index may also be
seen as an indicator for negative jumps in the S&P 500 index causing
investors’ fear. According to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), an increas-
ing probability and magnitude of large negative jumps in the firm value
should rise credit spreads, and thus CDS spreads (Blanco et al. 2005).
4. Climate of Credit Markets. As S&P 500 index returns are suggested
to approximate the overall state of the economy (see Collin-Dufresne
et al. 2001, Blanco et al. 2005), we analogously assume the index spread
changes of the 5-year (5Y) CDX NA IG credit index (CDX) as proxy
154However, due to several reasons, e.g., taxation treatment, scarcity premiums and bench-
mark status issues, it is often criticized that government bonds are no ideal proxy for the
unobservable risk-free rate. In this concern, 5-year swap rates for dollars and euros are
often proposed as a better proxy. For an insightful discussion see Blanco et al. (2005).
We also incorporate corresponding swap rates for robustness.
155Other maturities such as 1 year, 2 years and 10 years are also investigated, but not
reported since they lead to similar results.
156The VIX uses a weighted average of options with a constant maturity of 30 days to
expiration. The options refer to the S&P 500 index.
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for the credit market conditions. The CDX is one of the most popu-
lar CDS indices covering a cross-sectoral basket of the 125 most liquid
North American (NA) investment grade (IG) single-name CDS.157 Index
spreads of the CDX are provided by Markit.
5. Cross-market Correlation. We consider the average of quarterly cross-
correlations referring to returns on numerous i) exchange, ii) equity and
iii) credit markets. In this context, we suggest some indices to calculate
the applied Cross-market Correlation (CMC), e.g., S&P 500, DAX 30,
5Y CDX NA IG, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nikkei 225.
Figure 6.2 shows the times series of the systematic state variables from
January 6th, 2004 to December 27th, 2010 (x-axes). The y-axes denote the
states of the respective proxies. The dashed vertical lines divide the entire
sample period into the samples Pre-GFC and GFC.
Time series of the Cross-market Correlation (upper-left chart) fluctuated
within the entire period in a moderate range between 0.13 (min) and 0.63
(max) with mean 0.36 and standard deviation (STD) 0.09.
As intuitively expected, the index spread of the CDX (upper-right chart)
was moving sideways with relatively low volatility before the GFC. Indeed,
during the GFC the volatility of the CDX strongly increased as well as its
spread level. While its mean was denoted at almost 47 basis points (bp), its
STD was at 9.8 bp prior to the crisis. In contrast to the Pre-GFC, the mean
of the CDX was three times higher (136 bp) during the GFC, while its STD
was six times higher (59 bp). The maximum spread was observed at the end
of 2008 denoting at 280 bp, the minimum spread of 29 bp in January 2007, a
few months before the GFC began.
The VIX index (mid-left chart) moved sideways from January 2004 until
June 2007 with moderate volatility (index mean 13.6 and STD 2.2), increased
clearly in the beginning of the GFC and reached its historical peak at around
80.9 in December 2008. Similarly to the other systematic risk factors, the mean
of the VIX was clearly higher in times of the crises (2.3 times higher) than in
moderate economic conditions and also its related STD (6.1 times higher). In
the beginning of 2009, the VIX index turned clearly back on the index level
reached in January 2008.
157The composition of the basket is fixed until maturity and included CDS contracts are
equally weighted. For a detailed description of the numerous CDX indices refer to
www.markit.com.
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Figure 6.2: Time Series of Systematic State Variables
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Notes: This figure shows time series of systematic state variables from January 6th, 2004 to December
27th, 2010. The following proxies for the state variables are plotted: the Cross-Market Correlation refers to
the average cross-correlation across several market indices (upper-left). The time series of the 5Y CDX IG
index spread represents the Credit Market Climate (upper-right). The Market Volatility is indicated by the
time series of the VIX index (mid-left). The Spot Rate is approximated by the 5Y T-bill rate (mid-right).
For the Slope of The Term Structure, we present time series of the difference between the 10Y and the
2Y T-bill rate (lower-left). The dashed vertical lines divide the entire sample into the two sub-samples
(Pre-GFC and GFC).
The Spot Rate in terms of the 5-year Treasury bill rate (mid-right chart) was
about 3% in January 2004, moved around 5% in June 2007 and then decreased
rapidly to 1.5% in 2009 due to the market turbulences on the credit markets.
A decreasing Slope of the Term-structure (lower-left chart), which we ob-
served before the GFC began in June 2007, indicates expectations of an eco-
nomic downward movement (compare BIS 2009a). Increasing slope values as
observed during the turmoil on financial markets, in turn, may have predicted
an economic up-turn in the aftermath.
Eventually, the time series show that each systematic risk factor moves
clearly different before the GFC than during the financial turmoil, as it is indi-
cated by the factors’ period-specific means and standard deviations. Basically
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motivated by the chronology of the GFC, the determination of our subsamples
is also confirmed by both CDS spread descriptives and time-series analysis of
the systematic state variables.
The correlation matrix in Table 6.3 refers to changes (∆) in the systematic
state variables identified above and reflects the linear dependency structure
across these changes. The upper triangle of the matrix refers to correlations
in the Pre-GFC and the lower triangle shows cross-correlations in the crisis.
Table 6.3: Sample-specific Correlation Matrix of Common Risk Factors
Pre-GFC
∆CMC ∆CDX ∆VIX ∆SR ∆STS
GFC
∆CMC 0.0571 0.264 -0.0254 0.0726
∆CDX 0.0441 0.4116 -0.1067 -0.0734
∆VIX 0.0673 0.6382 -0.1656 0.0219
∆SR -0.0534 -0.4530 -0.3158 0.1949
∆STS -0.1589 0.0522 0.1152 0.1021
Notes: The table shows the cross-correlations related to changes (∆) in five systematic risk variables, namely
the Cross-market Correlation (CMC), the CDX index, the VIX index, the Spot Rate (SR), and the Slope
of the Term Structure (STS). While the upper triangle of the matrix refers to the cross-correlations of the
Pre-GFC, the lower triangle shows the correlations of the GFC.
According to Table 6.3, the proxy for the Cross-market Correlation and the
proxies for the interest risk – Slope of the Term Structure and Spot Rate –
exhibit the lowest overall ∆-dependencies on the other systematic risk factors
in both samples. Table 6.3 also shows that the dependencies generally increase
during the GFC. Nevertheless, most cross-correlations denote at low levels
(about 0.10). We observe the highest correlation between the VIX and the
CDX with 0.41 before the GFC and 0.64 during the financial crisis.158
In the following, proxies for idiosyncratic or individual risk are provided.
1. Physical Probability of Default. Since a credit rating generally reflects
an opinion of the obligor’s creditworthiness, the highest-rated obligors
(‘AAA’-rated) are assumed to exhibit the lowest probability of default
(PD), while lowest rated ones (‘C’-rated) exhibit the highest PD. Credit-
rating agencies (CRA), for example, link their classical rating grades
(ordinal scaled) to historical default rates of corporate bonds (Moody’s
2010b).159 Hence, we use average ratings provided by Markit as proxy
158Even if the correlations are solely moderate, the presence of multi-collinearity in system-
atic state variables may generally distort the interpretations of regression results.
159Referring to the three major rating agencies – Moody’s, S&P and Fitch – the rating grades
are monotonically increasing with the obligor’s creditworthiness (compare Moody’s 2012).
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for the firm’s physical default risk, similarly to Friewald et al. (2012).160
As already examined by Abid & Naifar (2006), we assume that the ab-
solute CDS spread level is determined by the related obligor rating. The
worse the rating of the obligor the higher is the CDS spread level and vice
versa, all else equal. For simplicity, we apply a shortened rating scale
which summarizes the available rating metrics. In our cross-sectional re-
gressions, we account for five different rating classes RC1 to RC5, where
the latter indicates lowest creditworthiness and RC1 highest.161
CRAs such as Moody’s and S&P’s provide ratings that are rather stable
through business cycles (through-the-cycle ratings), see Moody’s (1999)
and S&P’s (2008). Thus, macroeconomic point-in-time information is
rather neglected in such a through-the-cycle approach (Moody’s 1999).162
Since CRAs mainly address firm-specific risks in their rating metrics
rather than states of the global economy (common risk) (S&P’s 2008),
we consider credit ratings primarily as proxy for idiosyncratic risk.
2. Swap Liquidity. As proposed by Gala et al. (2010) and Gandhi et al.
(2012), we incorporate the contract’s amount of trades (trading depth)
to proxy its liquidity. The data were provided by Markit and denoted as
Swap Liquidity (LIQ).
Overall, each single-risk proxy i) reveals for itself significant explanatory
power in respective univariate regressions, ii) significantly contributes to the
explanation of the endogenous variable in our CSR and iii) has the power
to innovate. Especially the latter condition is important in terms of multi-
collinearity: all of our systematic risk factors provide for themselves addi-
tional explanatory power, even if considered lastly in a normalized regression
160Recall that Markit’s average ratings are based on available Moody’s and S&P ratings, see
www.markit.com
161Due to the number of available ratings, RC1 includes rating grades ‘AAA’, ‘AA’ and
‘A’ , RC2 reflects ‘BBB’ ratings, RC3 accounts for rating grade ‘BB’, RC4 refers to ‘B’
ratings and RC5 to ‘CCC’ ratings. The data set contains only one ‘AAA’-rated and six
‘AA’-rated entities. Even if we exclude these entities from our regression approach and
thus solely group ‘A’-rated firms in RC1, we obtain similar regression results.
162More detailed information to CRAs and their rating systems can be found in Krahnen &
Weber (2001) or in Löﬄer (2004, 2012).
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framework.163 In other words, the explanatory power of each proxy is i) not
completely covered by the ensemble of other regressors, independent of the in-
troduction order, and ii) its explanatory power is not the product of the entire
ensemble.
6.3 Empirical Evidence for Pricing Systematic
Risk in CDS Spreads
6.3.1 Models in the Two-pass Regression Approach
In the first step of our two-pass regression procedure (compare Fama & Mac-
Beth 1973), we estimate the CDS spread sensitivities (betas) to the proposed
systematic state variables by multiple time-series regressions (TSR). For each
CDS referring to entity ϑ ∈ {1, ..., 339} with CDS spread Sϑ,t at time t we es-
timate the following time-series regression model, which was methodologically
proposed by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for credit spreads and also applied
by Ericsson et al. (2009) and by Friewald et al. (2012).
∆Sϑ,t = αϑ + β
CMC
ϑ ·∆CMCt + βCDXϑ ·∆CDXt + βV IXϑ ·∆V IXt
+ βSRϑ ·∆SRt + βSTSϑ ·∆STSt + εϑ,t. (6.2)
∆Sϑ,t denotes the spread change of the contract related to firm ϑ at time t.
αϑ describes the intercept, β
(·)
ϑ denotes the coefficients of included regressors,
∆ refers generally to changes in the state variables and εϑ,t is the residual.164
In the second step, we examine the cross-section of CDS spreads by cross-
section regressions, similarly to Friewald et al. (2012) who apply this type of
regression to corporate bond spreads. Thus, our TSR beta estimates are used
as regressors in the cross-sectional regression (CSR), along with additional
163The order of regressors does not matter in basic OLS regressions, but within OLS regres-
sions based on normalized regressors which were additionally conducted for robustness.
Within a normalized framework, the regressors are corrected for observable co-variances.
In the end, the regressors’ covariance matrix is a diagonal matrix with variances equal to
one. The regressors’ means are also standardized and equal null. The results accounting
for multi-collinearity are not separately reported since they solely confirm the presented
findings.
164Linkage of shortened declarations according to Section 6.2.2: Cross-market Correlation
(CMC), Credit Market Climate (CDX), Market Volatility (VIX), Spot Rate (SR) and
Slope of the Term Structure (STS).
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variables such as the proposed individual risk factors. In the basic model
setup, we consider the firm’s ratings and the contract’s liquidity. Additionally,
we account for firm-specific sectoral influences by sector dummies. In Section
6.3.4, we add further idiosyncratic risk factors, e.g., the firm’s Leverage Ratio
and Market Capitalization, as well as further systematic risk betas related to
the Fama-French factors in order to check the robustness of our findings.
After calculating the entities’ average CDS spreads Sϑ by sample, we esti-
mate the following cross-section regression model for each sample
Sϑ = α + γ
CMC · βˆCMCϑ + γCDX · βˆCDXϑ + γV IX · βˆV IXϑ + γSR · βˆSRϑ
+ γSTS · βˆSTSϑ + γLIQ · LIQϑ + γRC ·RCϑ + γSI · SIϑ + εCSϑ , (6.3)
where εCSϑ denotes the cross-sectional residual. βˆ
(·)
ϑ denotes the parameter esti-
mates of TSR regressors. LIQ denotes the swap’s average liquidity, RC and SI
represent the firm-specific Rating Classes and Sector Indicators, respectively,
which are included as dummy variables.165 α denotes the intercept and γ(·)
are the cross-sectional slope parameters. γRC and γSI represent vectors of
estimators referring to the sector-specific and rating-specific dummy variables.
Table 6.4 gives a brief regressor overview and shows the predicted signs
of coefficients related to the TSR and the CSR in line with the theoretical
expectations presented in Section 6.2.1.
Table 6.4: Overview of Common Risk Factors and Predicted Signs
Predicted Sign
Variable Description β (TSR) γ (CSR)
Systematic Risk Factors in Time-series Regressions
∆CMC Change in the Cross-market Correlation + +
∆CDX Change in CDX index spread + +
∆V IX Change in implied volatility of S&P 500 + +
∆SR Change in yield on 5-year Treasury yield - -
∆STS Change in 10-year minus 2-year Treasury yield - -
Idiosyncratic Risk Factors in the Cross-section Regression
LIQϑ Liquidity of CDS Contract -
RCϑ Rating Dummy for Class 1 to 5 +
SIϑ Sector Indicator for Sector 1 to 10
Notes: The table shows included regressors of both the multiple time-series regressions (TSR) and the cross-
section regressions (CSR). The predicted signs for the respective regression coefficients of the TSR (β) and
CSR (γ) are also denoted.
165RC1 (SI1) represents the reference rating class (sector) included in the intercept.
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For example, the estimates of the TSR which refer to changes in the CDX
credit index should be positive since in theory an increase of the CDX index
spread should commonly widen the CDS spreads. Alternatively, for the LIQ
we expect a negative relationship to the CDS spread. Hence, an increase of the
swaps’s liquidity should lead to a decrease of the CDS spread and vice versa.
6.3.2 Systematic Risk Beyond Ratings
Firstly, we examine whether the firms’ ratings have cross-sectional explanatory
power with respect to the CDS spreads of 339 entities. Table 6.5 reports the
regression results of rating-based CSRs.
Table 6.5: Cross-section Regressions by Rating Dummies
Entire Period Pre-GFC GFC
Intercept 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0025∗ 0.0103∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0028)
BBB-rated 0.0039∗ 0.0027∗ 0.005−
(0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0034)
BB-rated 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0043)
B-rated 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0049)
CCC-rated 0.0741∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗∗ 0.1111∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.004) (0.0077)
R2 59.29% 45.29% 55.39%
No. Entities 339 339 339
Notes: The table summarizes the rating-based results of cross-section regressions. The parameters are
statistical significant at the 1%-level (∗∗∗), the 5%-level (∗∗) and the 10%-level (∗). R2 denotes the coefficient
of determination. The number of entities (No. Entities) reflects the amount of entities considered in the
cross-section regressions.
The intercept includes the reference rating class RC1 referring to ‘AAA’,
‘AA’ and ‘A’ ratings. Thus, the intercept represents the basic spread level of
swap contracts related to high-rated obligors. Furthermore, Table 6.5 shows
that the worse the firm’s rating the higher is the general risk premium for
that CDS contract, which is in line with our expectations. The risk premiums
seem to be higher in the financial crisis than prior to the GFC, which holds
across all rating classes. The results show that firm ratings represent relevant
information for pricing swap contracts cross-sectionally. A comparison of R2
based on a comparable number of observations (see Table 6.3) indicates that
ratings may explain more of the spread variation in times of financial distress
than in moderate economic conditions (45.29% vs. 55.39%). These results
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may also indicate that market participants, who were involved in pricing swap
contracts, relied more intensively on ratings during the GFC than prior to the
crisis. Since we observe sample-specific differences in the rating-based spread
level, which are ‘averaged’ out over the entire period, we focus our empirical
study in the following solely on the two samples Pre-GFC and GFC.
A simple preliminary test to examine whether CDS spreads are reflecting
systematic risk beyond the risks reflected by CRA ratings is to compare the
rating-based mean CDS spreads of contracts having different sensitivities to
systematic risk.166 Similarly to Iannotta & Pennacchi (2011), we conduct
univariate TSRs for each systematic regressor by rating class (RC1 − RC5).
For each sample period, the sensitivity to systematic risk is measured by the
regressor’s beta. CDS contracts exhibiting systematic risk sensitivities above
or equal to the sample median are defined as contracts with high systematic
risk exposures and thus attributed to Portfolio 1. Contracts with sensitivities
below the sample median are attributed to Portfolio 2 (low systematic risk
exposures). Afterwards, the portfolios’ mean spreads are calculated by rating
class and tested for equality (t-test).
Table 6.6 reports the median betas (β), the portfolio-specific mean spreads
and the t-test results for each systematic risk factor, rating class and sample.
The median betas are monotonically increasing with rating classes. Hence,
contracts related to the worse credit rating exhibit the highest betas to sys-
tematic risk. This may be due to the increase in the rating-specific spread
level. Thus, swap contracts of bad-rated firms may not necessarily exhibit the
highest sensitivities to systematic risk. Although the sensitivities to system-
atic risk are not comparable across rating classes, the contracts’ systematic
risk sensitivities vary widely around the median beta within each rating class.
This indicates that systematic risk exposures are underestimated in parts by
CRAs. This finding holds for all regressors and both samples.
Eventually, most of the portfolio-specific mean spreads are significantly dif-
fering from each other in each sample and across all regressors. In most cases,
we observe higher average spreads for portfolios composed of high risk con-
tracts.167 From these empirical findings we conclude that CDS with higher
166Iannotta & Pennacchi (2011) provide a similar test for credit spreads on corporate bonds.
167The order of sensitivities is descending for each rating class. Thus, we observe the highest
systematic risk concentration in Portfolio 2, if the regressor’s sensitivity to systematic risk
is expected to be negative, as it is the case in terms of the Spot Rate. Again, the higher
interest risk sensitivity leads in average to higher CDS spreads.
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Table 6.6: Systematic Risk Indication by Rating Class
Pre-GFC GFC
Mean CDS Spread Mean CDS Spread
Rating Median Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Beta Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2
Class Beta (above median) (below median) Median (above median) (below median)
CMC
1
+
<0.0001 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.0009 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0079
2 0.0001 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0044 0.0014 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0125
3 0.0002 0.014 0.0141 0.0058 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0293
4 0.0014 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0170 0.0187 0.1002∗∗∗ 0.0557
5 0.0037 0.078∗∗∗ 0.0255 0.0228 0.1315∗∗∗ 0.1112
CDX
1 0.2074 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0020 0.3926 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0055
2 0.4223 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0041 0.5809 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0102
3 11,635 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0090 11,506 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0208
4 16,865 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0168 23,389 0.0984∗∗∗ 0.0574
5 23,129 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0254 46,139 0.1571∗∗∗ 0.0856
VIX
1
+
<0.0001 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0020 0.0001 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0055
2
+
<0.0001 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0042 0.0001 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0107
3 0.0001 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0094 0.0002 0.0561∗∗∗ 0.0251
4 0.0001 0.0384∗∗∗ 0.0168 0.0005 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.0582
5 0.0002 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0426 0.0011 0.1416∗∗∗ 0.1011
SR
1 -0.0144 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0025 -0.1502 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0150
2 -0.0235 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0060 -0.2388 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0206
3 -0.0632 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0191 -0.5638 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0614
4 -0.0817 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0333 -0.9909 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.1045
5 -0.1624 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0563 -15,973 0.1209 0.1219
STS
1 -0.0076 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0023 0.0025 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0090
2 -0.0075 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0047 -0.0210 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0164
3 -0.0046 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0126 0.0177 0.0413∗ 0.0394
4 0.0501 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0231 -0.0470 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0911
5 -0.0400 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0563 -0.2102 0.1416∗∗∗ 0.1011
Notes: This table reports mean CDS spreads per rating class depending on the sensitivity of CDS spread
changes to five systematic risk factors: Cross-market Correlation (CMC), CDX index , VIX index, Spot
Rate (SR) and Slope of the Term Structure (STS). Univariate regressions are conducted on CDS contracts
in order to evaluate the median sensitivity (Median Beta) to the systematic risk proxies in each rating class.
Afterwards portfolios are established in dependence on estimated betas. Portfolio 1 contains all CDS with
betas above the median, while Portfolio 2 includes those with betas below the median. The results are
reported for both samples, the Pre-GFC and the GFC. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the statistical significance
(1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level) of the t-test for equality of mean CDS spreads for contracts with beta estimates
below and above the median.
systematic risk exposures are in general higher priced and that this systematic
risk is not sufficiently reflected by the related credit rating.
6.3.3 Results of Time-series and Cross-section Regres-
sions
Figure 6.3 shows boxplots summarizing the estimation results of multiple time-
series regressions across 339 entities by regressor and by sample. All of the
state variables in regression (6.2) have some ability to explain changes in the
CDS spreads. Further, the signs of the estimated coefficients mostly correspond
with our rationale.
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Figure 6.3: Estimation Results of Time-series Regressions
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Notes: This figure provides boxplots referring to estimates of time-series regressions for the Pre-GFC and the
GFC. Additionally, the lower-right chart shows boxplots related to the coefficients of determination (R2).
In each boxplot, the upper whisker+ refers to the 90 percentile, while the lower whisker− refers to the 10
percentile. Asterisks denote the means.
With respect to the GFC (right boxplot in each chart), the regression results
show that signs of estimates agree on average with our expectations, except
the betas of the Spot Rate proxy. These beta estimates are expected to be
negative, which is on average only fulfilled prior to the GFC.168 Hence, in the
pre-crisis the SR corresponds to expectations and thus an increase in the SP
tends on average to a decrease of CDS spreads across all firms. In times of
financial distress, the beta estimates of the Cross-market Correlation are on
average positive and thus CDS spreads tend to increase with increasing market
168While the median beta is negative, the mean beta is positive due to a few outliers.
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correlation. Coefficients of the slope proxy (SMT) are mainly negative during
the GFC. As suggested in theory, positive expectations of the economic health
leads to a decrease in CDS spreads across most of the firms. We find further
that the betas of the CDX index spread changes are positive throughout all
samples. As theoretically expected, there is a positive relationship between
CDX spread changes and CDS spread changes.
Regarding the Pre-GFC (left boxplot in each chart), the signs of betas
correspond on average to theory except in case of the VIX and the STS. In
terms of the VIX (STS), the respective beta estimates are on average negative
(positive) before the crisis and thus contrary to our rationale.169 Analogous
to the empirical findings of Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Duffee (1998) and
Blanco et al. (2005) for credit spread changes, we find that an increase in the
risk-free rate (SR) lowers the CDS spread for at least 75% of the firms prior
to the crisis.
Similarly to other empirical studies (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001, Ericsson
et al. 2009, Friewald et al. 2012), the coefficient of determination R2 ranges
in average between 14.37% and 29.08%, as shown in the lower-right chart of
Figure 6.3. We find that the explanatory power of our applied systematic
risk factors depends on the sample period. Our systematic state variables
explain CDS spread changes much better in times of market turbulences than
in moderate market conditions. This finding may justify the selection of our
proxies for systematic state variables.
By contrast, most recent studies (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001, Ericsson
et al. 2009) primarily consider idiosyncratic risk factors in their TSR, but
do not provide a cross-sectional spread examination, except Friewald et al.
(2012). In our two-pass approach such individual risk factors are methodically
omitted in the TSR (pass one), but explicitly considered in the CSR (pass
two).170 Nevertheless, we achieve comparable explanatory power in our first
pass by focusing on systematic risk factors.
In the second step, we run the cross-sectional regressions – see Equation
(6.3) – according to our two-pass regression methodology to identify significant
cross-sectional pricing factors and their specified weights or spread premiums
169Note that there are still entities whose beta estimates meet our rationale, but not on
average.
170We are explicitly targeting at the product’s sensitivity to systematic risk based on weekly
data points. To avoid distortions due to rather time-constant firm-specific risk factors
such as the firm ratings or corporate debt, we omit these factors in the first pass.
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(γ) in pricing CDS.
Table 6.7 shows the gamma estimates of the CSR for the two samples (Pre-
GFC and GFC). While the left column in each sample reports results without
Table 6.7: Table of Cross-section Estimates
Pre-GFC GFC
Intercept 0.0098∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0014/0.0016) (0.0017/0.0016) (0.0033/0.0021) (0.0036/0.002)
CMC 2.4531∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 2.5994∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.3227∗∗∗/∗∗ 0.3335∗∗∗/∗∗
(0.2492/0.8104) (0.2455/0.8938) (0.0673/0.1546) (0.0678/0.159)
CDX 0.0074∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0004/0.0015) (0.0004/0.0015) (0.0006/0.0014) (0.0006/0.0015)
VIX 41.1653∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 41.1929∗∗∗/∗∗ 33.0365∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 32.8229∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(5.7257/15.8017) (5.6241/16.4716) (3.6158/8.0606) (3.674/8.5242)
SP 0.0072∗/− 0.0077∗∗/− -0.0144∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0039/0.0104) (0.0039/0.0108) (0.0018/0.003) (0.0019/0.003)
STS -0.0002−/− 0.0002−/− -0.009∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0093∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0013/0.0061) (0.0013/0.0062) (0.0012/0.0022) (0.0012/0.0023)
LIQ -0.0008∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0001/0.0001) (0.0001/0.0001) (0.0004/0.0003) (0.0004/0.0003)
BBB-rated -0.0001−/− -0.0002−/− 0.0027−/∗∗∗ 0.0029∗/∗∗∗
(0.001/0.0003) (0.001/0.0004) (0.0017/0.0005) (0.0017/0.0005)
BB-rated 0.0017−/∗ 0.0012−/− 0.0122∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0013/0.001) (0.0013/0.0011) (0.0022/0.001) (0.0023/0.0012)
B-rated 0.0077∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0016/0.0014) (0.0016/0.0015) (0.0028/0.0023) (0.003/0.0024)
CCC-rated 0.0125∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0028/0.0032) (0.0028/0.0034) (0.0043/0.0051) (0.0045/0.0056)
Sector Dummies No Yes No Yes
R2 81.70% 83.18% 89.89% 90.18%
No. Entities 339 339
Notes: This table shows the estimation results referring to the cross-section regressions (CSR) of Equation
(6.3) under consideration of both systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors. Systematic risk factors are the
Cross-market Correlation (CMC), the CDX index, the VIX index, the Spot Rate (SR) and the Slope of
the Term Structure (STS). Idiosyncratic risk factors are represented by the Swap liquidity (LIQ) and the
firm’s rating. Sector dummies account for the sector in which the firm is operating. The results are provided
for each subsample based on weekly CDS spread data. The parameters are statistical significant at the
1%-level (∗∗∗), the 5%-level (∗∗), and the 10%-level (∗). Values in parenthesis describe the parameters’
standard deviation (STD). Shanken-corrected STDs and significances are separated by a slash. R2 denotes
the coefficient of determination. The number of entities (No. Entities) refers to the amount of entities
considered in the CSR.
sector dummies, the right column shows results under consideration of sector
dummies which account for sectoral influences. Standard deviations are re-
ported in parentheses and significance levels are marked with asterisks. In con-
trast to the additional individual variables in the CSR, which are deterministic,
the betas of our systematic state variables are statistically estimated. Thus,
they are generally stochastic and hence possibly misspecified. To account for
related parameter estimation errors, we also report corrected standard devi-
ations and corrected significances for the gamma estimates, as suggested by
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Shanken (1992).171
While the TSR estimates indicate the firm-specific sensitivity to the sys-
tematic risk factors, the CSR estimates may be interpreted as average pricing
weights for the systematic risk factors across all CDS spreads. We find that
mostly the CSR estimates are significantly differing from null. Thus, TSR
estimates are either positively (γ > 0) or negatively (γ < 0) priced. For ex-
ample: given a positive beta (β), we observe with respect to a positive gamma
(γ > 0) that the CDS spread increases if the firms sensitivity to that common
risk factor increases.
In times of financial distress (GFC), all systematic risk sensitivities (TSR-
betas) exhibit significant explanatory power to the cross-section of CDS spreads,
even if the standard deviations of gamma estimates are Shanken corrected (sep-
arated by slash). This means that the contracts’ sensitivities to the systematic
risk proxies are significantly priced in CDS contracts across all economic sec-
tors. Thereby, the signs of all gamma coefficients correspond to our economic
expectations.
In the pre-crisis, we observe a slight mismatch between theory and empir-
ical findings with respect to the interest risk proxies. Prior to the GFC, the
gamma estimates indicate that a higher sensitivity to the Spot Rate leads to
a spread increase, but the corrected t-statistic shows that these estimates are
not significantly priced. The Slope of the Term Structure also lacks statistical
significance in the pre-crisis, but becomes statistically significant in the GFC.
Therefore, we conjecture that market participants view the STS as an indica-
tor of economic wealth, which is particularly priced in economic downturns,
but less relevant in moderate economic conditions.
Particularly gammas of the CDX, the CMC and the VIX reach high sta-
tistical significance in both samples, even if we control for idiosyncratic risks,
sector dummies and Shanken-corrected t-statistics. Thus, market participants
seem to demand a positive risk premium depending on the Cross Market Cor-
relation, the Credit Market Climate and the Market Volatility, independent
from the sample period.
As found in previous literature, liquidity is also an economically and statisti-
cally significant pricing determinant, which is contract-specific. The estimates
of the Swap Liquidity are statistically significant across all samples. According
171The Shanken corrections are separated by slash. For a thorough description of the applied
correction procedures compare Shanken (1992), Shanken & Zhou (2007).
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to our rationale, market participants claim a risk premium for the market liq-
uidity of the CDS. Thus, in the cross-section an increase of the Swap Liquidity
leads to a decrease of swap spreads and vice versa.
Regarding the rating classes, our empirical results confirm our expectations
and show that the CDS spreads monotonically increase with decreasing firm
rating. Again, we observe a strong increase of basic spread levels across all
rating classes during the GFC. This general increase in CDS spreads may be
particularly due to extremely high default rates of investment grade bonds in
this period, which may have caused many rating downgrades of these financial
instruments as well. Hence, we suspect that the firms’ rating information
significantly determines the CDS spread levels across both samples, correction
methods and swap contracts. As expected, we conclude that a high-rated firm
may benefit from its higher creditworthiness by receiving a reduction in its
CDS spread (lower spread level).
Moreover, we find that our empirical results hold across all economic sectors
examined, since the inclusion of sector dummies affects our estimation results
only slightly. Thus, we conclude that the introduced risk factors have economy-
wide impacts on the pricing of swap contracts, beyond sectoral influences.
While the entire ensemble of risk factors account for almost 90.18% of the
spread variation during the GFC, the models R2 is clearly lower prior to the
crisis (83.18%). Thus, we find that the explanatory power of the regressor
ensemble is depending on the sample period and that the regressors best fit
CDS spreads in the crisis. This finding also indicates that systematic risk
betas of CDS contracts are particularly priced in economic downturns coming
along with increasing statistical significances of our systematic risk proxies in
the GFC.
In Figure 6.4, we compare predicted CDS spreads with observed market
ones by sample in order to indicate the accuracy of our CSR model. The x-
axes of the two charts denote the predicted CDS spreads and the y-axes denote
the market CDS spreads.
Referring to regression (6.3), both scatter plots visualize the quality of our
proposed CSR model. Since the spread predictions in the lower chart (R2 =
90.18%) are less scattering than in the upper one (R2 = 83.18%), we suggest
that our CSR model – which is explicitly addressing systematic risk – reaches
the highest model accuracy in times of global financial distress.
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Figure 6.4: CDS Spread Comparison (market spread vs. model spread)
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Notes: This figure shows the comparison of market CDS spreads (y-axes) and model spreads (x-axes). The
spread predictions are based on the estimation results related to the basic CSR model in Equation (6.3).
While the upper chart refers to the period prior to the GFC (Pre-GFC), the lower chart shows the results
for the GFC.
6.3.4 Robustness
In the following, we extend our basic regression approach in several ways to
show the robustness of our empirical findings. Firstly, we test whether our
results hold, even if the three Fama-French (FF) factors are included in our
basic models. Thereby, we also examine if the FF factors provide additional
explanatory power in the cross-section of swap spreads beyond the basic risk
components (compare Fama & French 1993). Secondly, we examine euro/dollar
swap rates as alternate proxies for the Spot Rate and the Slope of the Term
Structure. Thirdly, we conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) referring
to the residuals of the multiple time-series regressions. The PCA may help to
identify further potential candidates for systematic risk. Related to the PCA,
we conduct new cross-sectional regressions in which we include the eigenvector
of the first major component. By this, we test if this unknown systematic
risk factor is cross-sectionally priced in the CDS spreads. Fourthly, we add
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the firm’s Leverage Ratio and Market Capitalization as two more idiosyncratic
risk factors to the basic regression model. Lastly, we provide the regression
results of the entire model in which all model extensions are simultaneously
considered.172
Table 6.8 shows CSR results referring to the first three model extensions.
Estimation results are presented for both sample periods (Pre-GFC and GFC)
under consideration of sector and rating dummies. Respective standard devia-
tions are reported in parentheses. Additionally, corrections for the standard de-
viations and significances are provided as suggested by Shanken (1992), which
are separated by a slash.
In the first case (left column), the three Fama-French benchmark returns
are included in the TSR. Afterwards, the estimated betas are added to the
basic CSR model in Equation (6.3). The Fama-French excess Return (FFR)
describes the excess173 return on the market, Small Minus Big (SMB) repre-
sents the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks, and High Minus
Low (HML) denotes the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks
(compare Fama & French 1993). Commonly, the Fama-French factors are
used by investors seeking for portfolio benchmark returns and by academics to
explain the cross-section of stock returns.
We find that there is a negative relationship between the FFR and CDS
spreads which is also statistically significant. This empirical result also follows
economic intuition since positive excess returns may indicate a prosperous
global economy with lower default risk in general. Thus, the CDS spreads
should increase if the excess returns decrease and vice versa. In contrast to
the FFR, we observe shifts in the signs of estimators with respect to SMB
and HML across samples. These sign changes makes further interpretations
somewhat difficult, even if the estimates reach statistical significance in both
samples.
On the one hand, the R2 increases from 83.19% to 89.04% through the
consideration of the Fama-French factors in the pre-crisis. On the other hand,
the R2 remains on the same level with respect to the GFC (90.18% vs. 90.57%).
172Not reported are robustness checks related to i) various window sizes of the cross-sectional
regressions, e.g., rolling or fixed, and ii) other alternate proxies for, e.g., the Slope of the
Term Structure, Spot Rate and Cross-market Correlation. These analyses lead to similar
regression results as the already reported ones.
173The excess return is defined as the difference between the return of the market portfolio
(Rm) and the risk-less rate (r) (compare Fama & French 1993).
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Thus, we conclude that the Fama-French factors may increase the explana-
tory power of the basic model in times of moderate economic movements,
but that the additional pricing information is strongly limited in times of an
economic downturn.
In the second case (middle column), we examine the 5-year euro/dollar swap
rate as alternate proxy for the Spot Rate, since some authors in the recent
literature suggest swap rates as interest rate proxies rather than Treasury
bills.174 Furthermore, the Slope of the Term Structure is now approximated
by the difference of the 10-year swap rate and the 2-year swap rate. The
new ensemble of systematic risk factors achieves similar high R2, whereat the
gamma coefficients are roughly similar to those of the basic model. Since
the coefficients of determination vary not more than 0.1% in each sample, we
suggest that alternate interest rate proxies provide similar pricing information.
In the third case (right column), we conduct a principal component analysis
(PCA) on the residuals of the multiple TSR to identify potential candidates
for systematic risk omitted in this empirical study so far. By this, we examine
if the TSR residuals are jointly driven by unknown systematic risk factors
and we specify these principal components, similar to Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001). To test whether the specified principal components are priced by
market participants in our CDS spreads cross-sectionally, we run subsequent
second-pass regressions (CSR) in which we additionally include the eigenvector
of the first major component.
Results of the PCA are plotted in Figure 6.5. While the upper chart shows
the results of the PCA related to the Pre-GFC, the lower chart contains the
PCA results for the GFC. The primary y-axes show the eigenvalues, the sec-
ondary y-axes denote the cumulative variance of identified components that
are denoted on the x-axes.
Both charts demonstrate that the PCA leads to similar results in each sam-
ple. According to the scree-test, the residuals of the time-series regressions are
mainly driven by one major risk component that accounts for almost 17% of
the cumulated variance prior to the GFC and for almost 25% during the GFC.
The right column of Table 6.8 summarizes the estimation results of the CSR
after adding the first principal component. The results show that the influence
of the first component (PC1) is negatively estimated in both samples. More-
over, the principal component is significantly priced during the GFC, but not
174For literature remarks see Footnote 13.
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Figure 6.5: Principal Component Analysis of Time-series Residuals
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Notes: This figure shows the results of the principal component analysis (PCA) referring to the residuals
of the time-series regressions. The PCA is provided for both subsamples. The upper chart refers to the
Pre-GFC, the lower chart to the GFC. In each chart, the x-axis denotes the principal components and the
primary y-axis reports the corresponding eigenvalues. The secondary y-axes show the cumulative variance
of the principal components.
in the pre-crisis. Since the component is unknown, economic interpretations
are somewhat difficult. But the coefficient indicates that there may be a source
for systematic risk that is negatively correlated with CDS spreads. Thus, the
swap spreads increase when the component’s value decreases and vice versa.
Overall, the PCA indicates that there are some systematic drivers respon-
sible for the shared variance of TSR residuals, but these drivers are not priced
without restrictions cross-sectionally. Therefore, the use of the PCA is strongly
limited. From the small pricing impact of the PCA component in combina-
tion with the relatively high explanatory power of our basic model framework,
one may conclude that our valuation framework already considers the most
important systematic as well as idiosyncratic spread drivers and thus provides
valuable insight into the pricing of swap contracts.
Table 6.9 reports the empirical results related to the CSR based on the
last two model extensions. The estimation results refer to the Pre-GFC and
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the GFC. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The shanken-
corrected standard deviations and significances are separated by slash, see
Shanken (1992).
Table 6.9: Table of Cross-section Estimates Including Additional Risk Factors
Case Idiosyncratic Risk Factors Entire Model
Sample Pre-Crisis GFC Pre-Crisis GFC
Intercept 0.0029−/− 0.0125−/∗ 0.0026−/− 0.0184∗∗/∗∗
(0.0037/0.0024) (0.0079/0.0071) (0.0032/0.0016) (0.0071/0.0089)
CMC 2.8977∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.5783∗∗∗/∗ 1.8085∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.7574∗∗∗/∗∗
(0.2552/1.0955) (0.0775/0.3461) (0.2538/0.3952) (0.0817/0.3358)
CDX 0.0056∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0004/0.0017) (0.0007/0.0032) (0.0004/0.0012) (0.0008/0.0024)
VIX 48.5248∗∗∗/∗∗ 23.6418∗∗∗/− 50.5089∗∗∗/∗∗∗ 12.4364∗∗∗/−
(6.4512/19.9699) (4.6039/14.6251) (5.6951/15.5018) (4.6586/9.3532)
SR (T-bills) 0.0172∗∗∗/− -0.0052−/− -0.0072∗/− -0.0126∗∗∗/∗
(0.0035/0.0207) (0.0032/0.0057) (0.0042/0.0083) (0.0029/0.0069)
STS (T-bills) -0.0006−/− -0.0105∗∗∗/∗ 0.0058∗∗∗/− -0.0045∗∗∗/−
(0.0016/0.0093) (0.0015/0.0055) (0.0016/0.0058) (0.0014/0.0075)
FFR -0.1065∗∗∗/∗∗ -0.0518∗∗∗/−
(0.0142/0.0522) (0.0084/0.041)
SMB 0.0035−/− -0.0299∗∗∗/−
(0.0141/0.022) (0.0069/0.0285)
HML 0.0206∗∗/− -0.0402∗∗∗/∗∗∗
(0.0083/0.0223) (0.0037/0.0134)
LIQ -0.0008∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0007∗/−
(0.0001/0.0002) (0.0005/0.0007) (0.0001/0.0002) (0.0004/0.0006)
MC 0.0003−/− 0−/− 0.0002−/∗ -0.0002−/−
(0.0003/0.0002) (0.0006/0.0007) (0.0002/0.0001) (0.0005/0.0007)
LR 0.0055∗∗/∗∗∗ 0.0034−/− 0.0064∗∗∗/∗∗∗ -0.0013−/−
(0.0027/0.002) (0.0054/0.0048) (0.0023/0.0015) (0.0045/0.0063)
PC 1 0.0223∗/− -0.0768∗∗∗/∗
(0.013/0.0151) (0.0274/0.0419)
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Rating & Sector)
R2 91.29% 91.63% 93.87% 94.43%
No. Entities 225 225 225 225
Notes: This table shows the estimation results referring to the cross-section regressions under consideration of
two different cases: in the first case, two more idiosyncratic risk factors – the firm’sMarket Capitalization and
Leverage Ratio – are added to the basic CSR model of Equation (6.3). The Entire Model (case two) contains
the basic risk factors (Cross-market Correlation (CMC), CDX index, VIX index, Spot Rate (SR), Slope of
the Term Structure (STS) and Swap Liquidity (LIQ)), the three Fama-French factors (Fama-French excess
Return (FFR), Small Minus Big (SMB) and High Minus Low (HML), additional idiosyncratic risk factors
(Market Capitalization and Leverage Ratio) and the first component (PC 1) of the principal component
analysis as further systematic risk factor. Dummy variables are included to account for both the firm’s
rating and economic sector. The results are provided for both samples (Pre-GFC and GFC) based on
weekly CDS spread data of 225 entities. The parameters are statistical significant at the 1%-level (∗∗∗), the
5%-level (∗∗), and the 10%-level (∗). The values in parenthesis describe the parameters’ standard deviations
(STD). Shanken-corrected STDs and significances are separated by a slash. R2 denotes the coefficient of
determination.
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Results reported in the left column refer to the basic model under consider-
ation of two more idiosyncratic factors: the firm’s Market Capitalization (MC)
and Leverage Ratio (LR). Independent from Merton’s structural framework,
we suppose that the firm’s size indicates somehow the robustness of the firm
against, e.g., economic downturns (compare Blume et al. 1998, Tang & Yan
2007). We suggest that firms characterized by a large and well-diversified as-
set portfolio exhibit both a higher resistance to external shocks and a greater
power to innovate, even in market turbulences (compare Porter 1987, Hitt et al.
1996). Thus, we expect a positive risk premium for firms that are less market
capitalized. Finally, we measure the firm size by the natural logarithm of the
market value of the firm’s equity (market capitalization) (compare Blume et al.
1998) and additionally calculate the book-to-market equity ratio based on a
COMPUSTAT database.175
According to the structural theory, the default threshold is a function of
outstanding debt claims. The higher the leverage, the higher is the proba-
bility that the asset value process undergoes the critical threshold. Hence,
the default probability is increasing with increasing leverage. Therefore, we
may expect a positive relationship between the leverage ratio and the observed
CDS spread. Among others, Welch (2004) found that stock returns capture
changes in leverage appropriately. Approximated by stock returns, Avramov
et al. (2007) identified leverage as main driver for credit spread changes. We
approximate leverage by the following leverage ratio
Book Value of Debt
Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt
to proxy the firm’s health according to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). Respec-
tive data is provided by COMPUSTAT. As this analysis requires additional
data from COMPUSTAT the number of entities is reduced to 225.
According to the left column of Table 6.9, our main results also hold with
respect to the inclusion of these two firm-specific variables.176 We find that
the MC does not provide significant explanatory power – neither prior to the
GFC nor during the GFC. By contrast, the firm’s LR constitutes a significant
pricing determinant in moderate economic conditions which also corresponds
175Since the book-to-market equity ratio reaches no significance in our model framework, we
solely focus on the firm’s market capitalization.
176Slight differences may be due to the lower amount of entities in this model setup.
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to economic expectations: across all economic sectors an increase in the firm’s
leverage leads to an increase in the swap’s risk premium. Overall, the inclusion
of these idiosyncratic risk factors lead to an increase of the R2 from 83.18% to
91.29% in the Pre-GFC, but causes solely small benefits in times of the GFC,
where the R2 increases only from 90.18% in the basic model to 91.63% in the
extended model.
To check whether the effect sizes related to each model extension are com-
plementary or not, we estimate the last model case in which the basic two-pass
approach is simultaneously extended to the Fama-French factors, the Leverage
Ratio, the Market Capitalitzation and the first principal component.177 The
respective regression results are reported in the right column of Table 6.9.
With respect to the models R2, the entire ensemble of risk factors accounts
for almost 94% of the CDS spread variation in both samples, which is highest
compared to the R2 of all other regression models.178 We find that the main
results are confirmed in the Entire Model : again, the OLS regression results
show that all estimates of the systematic risk variables reach statistical sig-
nificance, independent from the sample period.179 Thus, all systematic risk
proxies are significantly priced in the cross-section of CDS spreads. Apart
from the Slope of the Term Structure, all of these variables additionally meet
economic expectations. But even though, e.g., the time-series characteristics
of systematic risk variables vary by sample in terms of both their means and
standard deviations (compare Figure 6.2), the quality of the Entire Model is
almost identical in both samples. Since the Entire Model exhibits high ex-
planatory power independent from the sample, this regression model seems to
be robust against subsampling in some extent.
Each case-specific model extension confirms for itself the results of the basic
approach. Thus, we identify the Credit Market Climate (CDX), the Cross Mar-
ket Correlations (CMC) and the Market Volatility (VIX) as most important
systematic risk factors in the cross-sectional pricing process of swap contracts.
The corresponding risk sensitivities (betas) are positively priced across all sam-
ples and model cases. This result indicates a positive correlation between these
177Here, Treasury bills constitute the reference interest rates.
178Note that the models’ R2 are not directly comparable with each other due to different
numbers of entities in the data sets.
179The Shanken-corrected t-value of the VIX is not statistically significant in this model
setup. Such distortions may generally be due to i) the lower amount of entities, ii) the
higher number of regressors or iii) effects of multi-collinearity.
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risk proxies and the cross-section of credit spreads. We find that CDS spreads
significantly rise if one of these risk factors increases and vice versa which is in
line with economic expectations. The applied model extensions may help to
increase the model’s explanatory power particularly with respect to moderate
economic conditions. Additionally, we confirm liquidity as a further decisive
determinant in pricing swap contracts. Corresponding to expectations, the
contract’s liquidity reveals a negative relationship to the CDS spread in both
samples and we observe significant negative gamma estimates across all mod-
els. Hence, the results show that the contract’s sensitivity to liquidity risk is
compensated through a respective premium widening the spread if the liquid-
ity of the contract decreases. Referring to the rating classes, the estimates are
statistically significant in most cases. The empirical results show that mar-
ket participants claim a higher risk premium for investing in low-rated swap
contracts reflecting a lower creditworthiness of the rated obligor. This risk
premium is monotonically increasing with rating classes and paid in the cross-
section of CDS spreads. All these findings hold, even if we account for the
economic sector in which the firm is operating.
Eventually, we conclude that systematic risk is generally affecting spreads
of swap contracts relying on debt assets. Even if it is hard to measure the pric-
ing impact of the systematic risk factors exactly, we demonstrate that specific
systematic risk variables such as the Credit Market Climate, the Cross-market
Correlation and the Market Volatility may play a major role in pricing credit
default swaps. We find that the systematic risk exposures of CDS contracts
vary by rating class and even within each rating class. We further show that
these systematic risk exposures are priced beyond ratings. Although the ex-
planatory power of our systematic risk determinants may generally vary by
regressor and by sample, we find that the influence of most systematic risk
factors particularly increases in economic downturns. Overall, we argue in this
empirical study from both an economic and a statistical perspective in order
to demonstrate the relevance of the provided systematic risk factors for pricing
CDS contracts, even in the presence of major idiosyncratic risk factors, other
systematic risk proxies and sectoral influences.
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6.4 Summary
The recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has shown that macroeconomic
shocks, e.g., caused by the U.S. housing crisis, may have strong impacts on
global financial markets, particularly on the credit markets. Indeed, many
credit market participants suffered from unexpected high default rates on cor-
porate bonds or related financial instruments such as credit default swaps or
collateralized debt obligations (compare Moody’s 2009a, 2011b).
Motivated by i) these market-specific impacts of systematic risk and ii) other
authors who show that corporate credit spreads are driven by both economic
risk factors as well as firm-specific factors (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001, Eom
2004, Longstaff et al. 2005, Iannotta & Pennacchi 2011), we explicitly address
the sensitivity of credit default swap spreads to systematic risk and evaluate
related pricing impacts.
Firstly, we introduce a set of systematic risk factors that reflects in theory
several systematic state variables such as the Credit Market Climate, the Mar-
ket Volatility, the Spot Rate and the Slope of the Term Structure. Additionally,
we provide the Cross-market Correlation as proxy for global contagion.
Secondly, we show that swap contracts, which are highly sensitive to sys-
tematic risk, are higher priced than contracts having a lower sensitivity. We
also demonstrate that credit ratings are not reflecting these systematic risks
appropriately and that systematic risk sensitivities may vary by rating grade
and economic environment. Especially, these findings may provide first insight
for regulatory authorities who develop risk-adjusted capital requirements for
banks based on ratings.
Thirdly, we demonstrate in a two-pass regression approach according to
Fama & MacBeth (1973) that CDS spread changes sensitively react to changes
in the proposed systematic risk variables and that these sensitivities (betas)
to systematic risk are cross-sectionally priced. In the first pass, we calculate
the factor betas by multiple time-series regressions. In the second pass, we
test whether these systematic risk sensitivities are cross-sectionally priced in
CDS spreads, even in the presence of firm-specific risk factors suggested from
numerous authors in the recent literature on both corporate debt and CDS.
While the firm’s rating as well as the swap’s liquidity is considered in the basic
approach, we account for the firm’s logarithmized Market Capitalization and
Leverage Ratio in further model extensions.
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We find that most betas of our systematic state variables are significantly
priced in each sample, even if idiosyncratic risk variables and sector dum-
mies are included. Our basic ensemble of risk factors explains about 83%
of the cross-section of CDS spreads before the crisis and about 90% during
the crisis. Thus, systematic risk seems to be priced particularly in economic
downturns. Moreover, we identify the firm’s rating, Leverage Ratio and the
contract-specific Swap Liquidity as most important individual risk factors in
pricing swap contracts. Thus, our results also correspond to findings of other
authors in the recent literature. While the firm’s rating is mostly significantly
priced and its gamma estimates correspond to economic expectations, those of
other risk factors, such as the Market Capitalization do not. Results related
to the firm’s Leverage Ratio are plausible from an economic point of view in
both samples and this proxy is also significantly priced prior to the GFC.
Related to our systematic risk factors, we find that particularly the sensi-
tivity to the Credit Market Climate – approximated by the 5-year CDX NA
IG credit index spread – is significantly influencing the cross-section of CDS
spreads. From an economic perspective, we observe a positive sensitivity of
CDS spread changes to changes in the CDX which leads to a positive risk pre-
mium in the contracts’ cross-section. If the credit climate gets worse, the CDS
spreads significantly increase and vice versa. Hence, our empirical findings
show that investors on CDS markets are monetarily compensated for this kind
of common risk.
Furthermore, we find that the suggested Cross-market Correlation also sig-
nificantly explains CDS spreads. To approximate the prospects of risk diversifi-
cation across, e.g., stock, credit and exchange markets, we calculate the average
cross-correlation related to specified markets. Both beta and gamma estimates
also satisfy economic expectations: the higher (lower) the cross-market correla-
tion the higher (lower) is the related systematic risk since market participants
are more (less) constrained in their diversification efforts. Thus, we observe
increasing CDS spreads in line with an increasing Cross-market Correlation
(positive pricing effect) due to a positive sensitivity of CDS spreads to cross-
correlation movements.
With the VIX index – indicating the Market Volatility – we identify another
important determinant for the valuation of systematic risk in CDS spreads.
Throughout positive beta as well as gamma estimates, which are also statisti-
cally significant, confirm our theoretical expectations and suggest that market
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participants are positively rewarded for the market risk expressed through the
volatility on stock markets. We find that if the volatility on stock markets is
high (low) swap investors may receive a high (low) risk premium included in
the CDS spread.
In order to check the robustness of our empirical findings, we provide fur-
ther model extensions: to account for parameter estimation risk related to our
two-pass regression approach, particularly to our cross-section regressions, we
firstly provide corrected t-statistics for the gamma estimates, as proposed by
Shanken (1992). Even if the related significances slightly differ, the primary
tendency of our main results hold. Moreover, we extend our analysis to the
Fama-French Factors (Fama & French 1993). In both samples, the model accu-
racy increases in terms of the coefficient of determination (R2), but this effect
is particularly observable in moderate economic conditions. The inclusion of
swap rates instead of Treasury bills in order to approximate the interest rate
risk in terms of the Spot Rate and the Slope of the Term Structure leads to R2,
which are similarly as high as in the basic model. Eventually, the R2 do not
differ more than 0.1% in total. Therefore, we conclude that swap rates provide
comparable pricing information to Treasury bills. Through a principal compo-
nent analysis – similarly to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) – we identify at least
one major component responsible for the shared variance of TSR residuals.
We find that this principal component is significantly priced in CDS spreads
across all entities during the GFC, but not prior to the crisis. Eventually, the
results related to each model extension show that our main empirical findings
hold, even in the presence of these additional risk factors or proxy alternatives.
Apart from our findings, further research is suggested in other systematic
risk variables such as market recovery risk, or counter-party risk since both fac-
tors may represent other relevant determinants of CDS spreads omitted in this
study (compare Brigo & Chourdakis 2009, Gandhi et al. 2012). Thereby, both
risk variables may be evaluated either referring to credit markets in general
(systematic) or explicitly as swap-specific (idiosyncratic) risk factors.
On the one hand, we are aware that there may exist other proxies that
more appropriately measure the identified systematic risk variables. On the
other hand, results may in parts generally be due to ‘failure’ in the proposed
risk proxies since they depend strongly on the measurement technique and the
quality of the data source. Even in terms of our Cross-market correlation, sev-
eral other index compilations seem to be economically plausible as well. Thus,
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6.4. SUMMARY
modifications of the measurement technique may either confirm or contradict
our findings, even in a large set of risk factors, where also multi-collinearity
may cause further distortions. Proper interpretations of our empirical findings
are even more complicated if single state variables are conversely discussed in
the recent literature. This might be the case, for example, in terms of the
economic meaning and effect size related to the Market Capitalization.
In general, our empirical study provides a valuable insight into the valua-
tion of systematic risk in CDS spreads. We suggest that at least three of our
systematic risk factors reflect decisive determinants in pricing credit default
swaps in line with economic expectations. These systematic determinants may
also play a decisive role in the valuation of synthetic CDOs since this type of
asset securitizations consists of CDS contracts.180 Thus, our empirical study
indicates not only the impacts of systematic risk on the valuation of swap con-
tracts, but also offers scope for further research in the valuation of structured
securities.
180Compare Chapter 2.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Suggested
Research Outlook
In this cumulative thesis, the main contributions are provided in the Chapters
2, 4, 5 and 6. At the end of each chapter, the main findings are summarized
in detail and in context of the addressed audience. Hence, this section primar-
ily suggests some chapter-specific research outlooks and afterwards concludes
briefly.
In Chapter 2, Asset-backed Securities are introduced and the relevance of
asset securitizations in global financial markets is highlighted. Recent devel-
opments in markets for structured products, especially for CDOs, show that
the investors’ confidence has slightly returned since 2010 leading to an in-
creased demand for such products during the last two years. But nowadays,
the collateral of securitizations is focused on more secured asset types such
as investment grade bonds. In fact, the European market for securitization
grows faster than its U.S. counterpart. With respect to current and future
valuation models, market developments will be of special interest since the
types of collateral may play an important role for model specifications and
the selection of included risk or pricing factors. Future market developments
will show whether asset securitizations have the potential to reach their former
popularity in terms of issuance and trading volumes.
In Chapter 4, basic correlation concepts – represented by latent asset cor-
relations and default correlations – are extended to implied correlations as
crucial parameters for the valuation of structured securities. Using base cor-
relations, our proposed dynamic regression correlation models – FERM and
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MERM – account for both fixed tranche-specific effects and stochastic time
effects in order to increase the forecast accuracy related to tranche spreads of
the iTraxx Europe credit index. In both correlation skew models, we consider
distributional properties of numerically inverted base correlations (means) in-
stead of point estimates to lower the related parameter estimation risk. The
results suggest that particularly our MERM offers a prosperous concept for
modeling and forecasting tranche spreads by considering tranche-specific fixed
effects and stochastic time effects simultaneously. Another beneficial aspect of
our dynamic correlation regression approach is the independence to parameter
assumptions in some extent due to the model framework.181 Thus, parameter
risk is rather less important in this model setup which may increase the models’
applicability in practice. Our empirical findings may be checked in subsequent
empirical studies on an expanded database of iTraxx tranche spreads, or even
based on a corresponding CDX database. Furthermore, it might be valuable
to extend our proposed model framework to further systematic risk factors, for
example, to those identified in Chapter 6. Then, it could be evaluated whether
common risk factors such as the Credit Market Climate, the Cross-market Cor-
relation and the Market Volatility significantly explain base correlations and
thus might increase the forecast accuracy of our proposed dynamic correlation
models. Other correlation approaches in the recent literature such as random
factor loadings, proposed by Andersen & Sidenius (2005b), aim – similarly to
our models – to reduce the limitations of a single-correlation approach. By
extending the standard Gaussian copula model, this approach targets at bet-
ter fits of tranche spreads than in the market standard model. Through the
inclusion of two or more correlation regimes depending on states of the global
economy, Andersen & Sidenius (2005b) address highly significant pricing ef-
fects such as fat tails and correlation skews in synthetic CDO tranches. In
this context, Longstaff & Rajan (2008) provide another top-down model ap-
proach which accounts for a systematic, a sectoral and an idiosyncratic risk
factor as decisive determinants of CDX tranche spreads. Eventually, each of
the three model approaches follows the same idea from a different perspective.
Thus, further research may focus, for example, on a broad model comparison
of these three approaches to evaluate the models’ applicability in practice for
181Recall that distributional assumptions must be made with respect to the stochastic time
effect, if considered. But parameter assumptions of the basic valuation model, e.g., related
to recovery rates and the risk-less rate, are compensated by the numerical inverted level
of base correlations (compare Appendix A).
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best spread fits and forecasts. The results of such a model comparison may
offer valuable insights particularly for market participants dealing and hedging
single-tranche CDO swaps.
In Chapter 5, we demonstrate the systematic risk sensitivity of structured
securities by decomposing the single-risk factor of the basic Gaussian copula
model into a sectoral and a super-systematic risk component. We show that in
securitizations pooling and tranching generally lead i) to effects of idiosyncratic
risk diversification and ii) to effects of systematic risk concentration. The re-
sults show that particularly securitized tranches exhibit high systematic risk
exposures monotonically increasing with the tranche’s seniority, while idiosyn-
cratic risks are fully diversified. These effects may be even higher in multiple
structured securitizations such as CDO squared (CDO2). By applying a Monte
Carlo approach to several CDO2 structures and accounting for heterogenous
borrowers and heterogeneous sectors, subsequent research studies may provide
additional insights into the risk characteristics of multiple structured products
related to systematic risk under consideration of rather realistic scenarios, be-
yond the simplifying assumptions of the LHP. Furthermore, our results hint
at shortcomings of current credit rating metrics provided by CRAs. Our find-
ings suggest to develop ratings which reflect more appropriately the overall
risk characteristics of financial instruments. Compared to corporate bonds,
CDO tranches are especially exposed to systematic risk and thus a new rating
metric is required which additionally indicates the products’ systematic risk
exposures and resulting sensitivities to systematic risk. Thus, further research
is suggested in risk measures which do not only focus on the first moment of
the loss distribution, but also anticipate impacts of cyclical effects such as sys-
tematic shocks in economic downturns. Moreover, our results may improve the
current understanding of the natural behavior of asset securitizations related
to systematic risk influences in order to develop pricing models appropriately
anticipating product-specific risks. Apart from the assessment of systematic
risk, aspects of model risk might be addressed within our extended model
framework by applying different copula approaches, e.g., archimedean copu-
lae, to the joint distribution of the borrowers’ asset returns or the distributions
of risk factors in the model setup.182 Similar to Tarashev (2010), aspects of
parameter risk may also be examined for several specifications of our extended
182Beyond elliptical copulae such as the Gaussian or t-copula which are already examined
in the presented Monte Carlo approach.
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model in order to quantify impacts of systematic risk on the portfolio’s (or
tranche’s) value at risk (VaR), as monetary measure of credit risk.183
In Chapter 6, we identify the Credit Market Climate, Cross-market Cor-
relation and the Market Volatility as relevant systematic risk factors driving
spread changes of CDS contracts referring to numerous U.S. firms which are
operating in a broad variety of economic sectors. Cross-sectional regression re-
sults show that the sensitivities to these common risk factors are significantly
priced in the cross-section of CDS spreads, even after controlling for individual
risk factors such as firm ratings, swap liquidity etc. and sectoral influences.
Particularly, the examination of price impacts related to other systematic risk
factors such as market recovery risk or individual counter-party risk offers
scope for further research (compare Brigo & Chourdakis 2009, Gandhi et al.
2012). As Longstaff & Rajan (2008) find that sectoral risk is a major de-
terminant in pricing CDX tranche spreads, the examination of sector-specific
risk factors in subsequent studies may also provide valuable contributions to
the pricing of CDS spreads. Moreover, it might be worthwhile combining the
panel regression approach proposed in Chapter 4 with our findings related to
systematic CDS spread determinants in order to develop a new valuation ap-
proach for structured securities such as synthetic CDOs. The application of a
dynamic panel regression approach may help to identify common determinants
of tranche spreads and thus offers scope for further research. Analogous to find-
ings in the recent literature on CDS and corporate debt, the empirical results
of our applied two-pass regression approach in Chapter 6 confirm that partic-
ularly the physical default risk represents an important individual risk factor
in pricing swap contracts. With respect to the suggested panel regressions,
the approximation of the tranches’ physical default risk might be problematic,
if tranche ratings of CRAs are not available. Thus, it is suggested to develop
a model approach for the estimation of the tranche-specific physical default
risk before applying dynamic panel regressions to the cross-section of tranche
spreads. Controlling for other relevant spread determinants – proposed, for
example, in Chapter 6 – may generally help to achieve more valid regression
results and to avoid misleading interpretations.
In conclusion, this thesis explicitly addresses several aspects of systematic
risk related to structured securities such as CDOs and CDS. The findings
contribute to the discussion about the risk properties of structured finance
183For a good introduction to the VaR concept see Hull (2007).
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products related to macroeconomic (systematic) influences and improves the
understanding of the ‘natural’ behavior of securitizations caused by movements
of the global economy. By providing the dynamic correlation regression models
– FERM and MERM – we offer a prosperous approach for pricing and fore-
casting STCDO spreads. Thus, we contribute to the discussion of correlation
modeling in the context of structured finance securities. The identified three
systematic risk factors – Credit Market Climate, Cross-market Correlation and
the Market Volatility – which are significantly priced in the cross-section of
CDS spreads, may also be highly relevant for the valuation of CDOs, since
structured securities are especially exposed to systematic risk, as found in the
recent literature in a rather general manner (see, e.g., Coval et al. 2009b).
Hence, these results may be relevant for asset pricing in general and particu-
larly for the pricing of tranches referring to the two most popular credit index
families, namely the iTraxx Europe and CDX index families. Overall, the
findings presented in this thesis may help to anticipate systematic risk sensi-
tivities of credit-linked instruments in order to return more transparency and
confidence in structured products, or even in credit-related financial markets.
The results also offer valuable insights for both market participants involved in
dealing or hedging examined financial instruments and regulatory authorities
developing risk-adjusted capital requirements for banks. Additionally, this the-
sis suggests further research in i) measurement tools for systematic risk, ii) the
development of rating metrics appropriately reflecting the products’ exposures
to systematic risk and iii) the application of appropriate valuation models for
CDS and CDOs explicitly accounting for systematic risk, as one of the most
important sources of credit risk in current financial markets.
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Appendix A
Sensitivity Analysis
In order to address the effects of parameter variations, we provide some sensi-
tivity analysis related to changes of the risk-less interest rate r. Based on
historical Treasury bills, we calculate impacts of varying interest rates on
the forecast performance of our three correlation models MERM, FERM, and
ACM.
With regard to Sample 3, the average treasury rate - in the meaning of
averaging the 1 to 5 years treasury rates - varies between 1.6% (minimum)
and 5.27% (maximum) with a mean of 4%.
In Figure A.1, the time-series of base correlations (y-axis) are plotted for the
mezzanine tranche T[0%,6%) from June 19th, 2007 to September 19th, 2008 (x-
axis) depending on three different flat term structures of the risk-less interest
rate r with r ∈ {1%, 2%, 4%}.184
As we can see, an increase of the interest rate leads to a slight decrease
of base correlations and vice versa (ceteris paribus). The dashed line (r =
1%) is above the black line (r = 2%) throughout Sample 2. In terms of
r = 4%, the base correlations (grey-dashed line) are throughout below the
black line. Referring to historical T-bills, a real term-structure can easily
be implemented, but eventually time-series of resulting base correlations will
be located somewhere between the plotted functions denoting the empirical
border of Treasury bill rates.
Concerning our analysis, implied correlations that are numerically inverted
are completely covering shifts in r due to the applied pricing methodology,
184Note that the deviations due to changes of r are quite small, even in times of financial
distress. Thus, we focus on Sample 2 only for illustration purposes.
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Figure A.1: Sensitivity of Base Correlations
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compare Equation (4.5).185 Eventually, our dynamic correlation approach is
somewhat independent from parameter assumptions and thus the risk-less in-
terest rate r as well as other parameter settings, e.g., recovery rates, are of
secondary importance.
For example: related to Equation (4.18), Table A.1 provides RMSFEs re-
ferring to our three correlation models, each regression window (40-, 50- and
60-days), each sample and each tranche under consideration of two different
flat term structures of the risk-less interest rate r with r ∈ {1%, 4%}.
The effects of varying interest rates are marginal in terms of our dynamic
correlation models MERM and FERM. Apparent differences are due to our
forecast procedure in which we simulate base correlations in order to calculate
our spread forecasts. As already indicated, we find that a ‘real’ term structure
solely influences the ACM forecasts. Thus, the RMSFEs of the ACM are
dependent on the applied term structure. Implementing a T-bill term structure
may help to reduce the RMSFEs of our ACM forecasts. However, the decrease
of the RMSFEs is on average not more than 2.43% in Sample 3. Compared to
our dynamic correlation models, the ACM still provides RMSFEs which are
on average 15 times higher. Therefore, we suggest that the resulting benefits
of a ‘real’ term structure are somewhat negligible.186
185Note that the risk-less interest rate r determines the time-specific discount factors Qtj .
186We obtain similar results by applying an interest term structure based on swap rates.
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Appendix B
Forecast Test Statistics
In this section, we examine the forecast accuracy of our three correlation mod-
els by comparing market spreads with our model-specific spread forecasts in
each sample p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We estimate the intercept θ0,p and the coefficient
θ1,p of each tranche spread forecast based on
st,p = θ0,p + θ1,p · sˆt,p + t,p (B.1)
with t,p ∼ N (0, σ2 ) i.i.d.
Applying regression model B.1, the hypothesis H0 : θq,p = 0 is tested with
q ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, a F-test is provided for H0 : θ1,p = 1.
Table B.1 summarizes the regression results referring to Equation B.1 as well
as corresponding p-values of the second test statistic. The results also refer to
the forecast period of Sample 3 and each of our three correlation models, each
regression window (40-, 50- and 60-days), and each tranche.
Referring to our dynamic regression correlation models – FERM and MERM
– we find i) that the intercepts θ0 are not significantly differing from zero and
ii) the coefficients θ1,p of spread forecasts sˆt,p are significantly different to zero.
These findings hold for all tranches and all regression windows. Since the esti-
mates θ1,p are close to 1 across all tranches and regression windows as well, we
apply a F-test for θ1,p = 1. The p-values of the secondary test statistic (F-test)
indicate that the estimated coefficients θ1,p are not significantly differing from
1 (compare the last column of Table B.1). On the other hand, the estimation
results related to the ACM show that the intercepts θ0 as well as the spread
forecast coefficients θ1,p are differing from zero with a statistical significance at
the 10%-quantile across all tranches. Further, the secondary test statistic in-
186
dicates that the coefficients θ1,p are different to 1 at the statistical significance
level of 0.01%.
Table B.1: Forecast Test Statistics
Window Tranche
Intercept θ0 Forecast Coefficient θ1 R2
Test Statistic
Estimate STD Estimate STD (p-value)
MERM
40-days
0%− 3% 0.001 0.001 0.996∗∗∗ 0.005 0.981 0.423
3%− 6% 0.000 0.000 0.997∗∗∗ 0.004 0.988 0.547
6%− 9% 0.000 0.000 0.998∗∗∗ 0.004 0.990 0.604
9%− 12% 0.000 0.000 0.995∗∗∗ 0.004 0.986 0.258
12%− 22% 0.000 0.000 0.996∗∗∗ 0.004 0.986 0.339
50-days
0%− 3% 0.001 0.001 0.997∗∗∗ 0.005 0.981 0.517
3%− 6% 0.000 0.000 0.997∗∗∗ 0.004 0.988 0.477
6%− 9% 0.000 0.000 0.996∗∗∗ 0.004 0.990 0.355
9%− 12% 0.000 0.000 0.993∗∗∗ 0.004 0.987 0.112
12%− 22% 0.000 0.000 0.994∗∗∗ 0.004 0.986 0.187
60-days
0%− 3% 0.001 0.001 0.996∗∗∗ 0.005 0.981 0.497
3%− 6% 0.000 0.000 0.997∗∗∗ 0.004 0.988 0.449
6%− 9% 0.000 0.000 0.996∗∗∗ 0.004 0.990 0.296
9%− 12% 0.000 0.000 0.992∗∗∗ 0.004 0.987 0.068
12%− 22% 0.000 0.000 0.993∗∗∗ 0.004 0.986 0.136
FERM
40-days
0%− 3% 0.001 0.001 0.997∗∗∗ 0.005 0.981 0.571
3%− 6% 0.000 0.000 0.997∗∗∗ 0.004 0.988 0.495
6%− 9% 0.000 0.000 0.996∗∗∗ 0.004 0.990 0.269
9%− 12% 0.000 0.000 0.991∗∗∗ 0.005 0.986 0.055
12%− 22% 0.000 0.000 0.992∗∗∗ 0.005 0.986 0.078
50-days
0%− 3% 0.001 0.001 0.997∗∗∗ 0.005 0.981 0.516
3%− 6% 0.000 0.000 0.997∗∗∗ 0.004 0.988 0.423
6%− 9% 0.000 0.000 0.996∗∗∗ 0.004 0.989 0.352
9%− 12% 0.000 0.000 0.991∗∗∗ 0.004 0.986 0.040
12%− 22% 0.000 0.000 0.992∗∗∗ 0.005 0.986 0.072
60-days
0%− 3% 0.001 0.001 0.996∗∗∗ 0.005 0.981 0.479
3%− 6% 0.000 0.000 0.997∗∗∗ 0.004 0.988 0.486
6%− 9% 0.000 0.000 0.996∗∗∗ 0.004 0.989 0.266
9%− 12% 0.000 0.000 0.991∗∗∗ 0.005 0.986 0.056
12%− 22% 0.000 0.000 0.992∗∗∗ 0.005 0.986 0.081
ACM
-
0%− 3% 0.085∗∗∗ 0.002 0.638∗∗∗ 0.008 0.913 0.000
3%− 6% -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.551∗∗∗ 0.004 0.971 0.000
6%− 9% -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.597∗∗∗ 0.004 0.973 0.000
9%− 12% 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.600∗∗∗ 0.005 0.954 0.000
12%− 22% 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.639∗∗∗ 0.006 0.941 0.000
Notes: The table provides test statistics related to tranche-specific spread forecasts for each correlation
model (MERM, FERM, ACM) and each window size (40-, 50-, 60-days) as well. The results refer to the
forecast period of Sample 3. While the parameter estimates are tested for H0 : θq = 0 with q ∈ {0, 1}, the
test ,statistic is testing the coefficient θ1 of spread forecasts for H0 : θ1 = 1. STD denotes the standard
deviation of parameter estimates. ∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ are indicating statistical significance at the 0.1%-, 5%- and
10%-quantile. R2 denotes the coefficient of determination.
Eventually, our test statistics confirm results of Figure 4.9 and underline
that all three correlation models provide valuable forecast performance. As re-
vealed in Figure 4.9, the ACM spread forecasts are more scattering in contrast
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to both dynamic regression correlation models which leads to lower R2 across
all tranches (compare column 7 of Table B.1). Thus, our MERM and FERM
seem to provide more reliable spread forecasts leading to their superiority in
terms of the R2 metric.
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Appendix C
Proof of Equation (5.15)
Conditional default probability piT[A,D)(y∗) of tranche T[A,D)
We derive the conditional default probability piT[A,D)(y∗) of tranche T[A,D) in
dependence of the super-systematic factor Y ∗ in three steps:
Firstly, we determine the default rate L(U, Y ∗ | U = u, Y ∗ = y∗) of the LHP
with recovery rate R = 0 in dependence on realizations of both Y ∗ = y∗ and
the sectoral component U = u:
L(U, Y ∗ | U = u, Y ∗ = y∗) = P (DB = 1|U = u, Y ∗ = y∗)
= P
(
ZB < Φ−1(piB)|U = u, Y ∗ = y∗)
= P
(
εB <
Φ−1(piB)−√ρ · δ · Y ∗√
1− ρ
−
√
ρ− ρ · δ · U√
1− ρ |U = u, Y
∗ = y∗
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(piB)−√ρ · δ · y∗ −√ρ− ρ · δ · u√
1− ρ
)
(C.1)
Secondly, we provide the cumulative loss distribution function of the LHP
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conditional on Y ∗ = y∗:
P (L(U, Y ∗ | Y ∗ = y∗) ≤ x) = P
(
Φ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√ρ · δ · y∗ −√ρ− ρ · δ · U√
1− ρ
)
≤ x
)
= P
(
U ≤ Φ
−1(x) · √1− ρ− Φ−1(pi) +√ρ · δ · y∗√
ρ− ρ · δ
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(x) · √1− ρ− Φ−1(pi) +√ρ · δ · y∗√
ρ− ρ · δ
)
(C.2)
with x ∈ [0, 1]. By inserting the tranche-specific attachment point A into
Equation (C.2) and considering the LHP recovery rate R ∈ [0, 1), we obtain
the conditional default probability piT[A,D)(y∗) of tranche T[A,D)
piT[A,D)(y∗) = P
(
DT[A,D) = 1|Y ∗ = y∗)
= P
(
L(U, Y ∗ | Y ∗ = y∗) > A
1−R
)
= 1− P
(
L(U, Y ∗ | Y ∗ = y∗) ≤ A
1−R
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√1− ρ · Φ−1 ( A
1−R
)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
ρ− ρ · δ
)
(C.3)
for A < 1−R. Since LHP losses are limited to 1−R, it follows that piT[A,D)(y∗) =
0 for A ≥ 1−R.
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Appendix D
Proof of Equations (5.9) and (5.16)
Expected losses of tranche T[A,D)
To calculate the percentage loss LT[A,D) of tranche T[A,D), we consider Equa-
tion (5.4) or as an alternative
LT[A,D) =
1
D − A
[
(L− A)+ − (L−D)+] , (D.1)
where the random variable L denotes the portfolio loss. (·)+ = max(·, 0).
Due to linearity of E(·), we solely calculate expectations of E ((L− A)+).
Generally, the LHP’s recovery rate R may vary but we can reduce our proof
on the special case of R = 0 since
E
(
(L− A)+) = (1−R) · E0((L− A
1−R
)+)
(D.2)
is valid with E0(·) describing expectations of portfolio losses exhibiting a re-
covery rate R = 0. The latter case can be calculated by
E0
(
(L− A)+) = 1∫
A
(x− A) · g(x)dx (D.3)
= 1− A−
1∫
A
P(L ≤ x)dx,
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where g(x) with x ∈ [0, 1] is the density function of losses in the LHP. P(L ≤ x)
denotes the respective cumulative loss distribution.
Equation (D.3) holds for all cumulative loss distributions P(L ≤ x). There-
fore, we insert results of both Equations (5.6) and (C.2) for P(L ≤ x) in order
to calculate expected tranche losses in the regarded special case (R = 0).
Integrating and using the following identity (compare Andersen & Sidenius
2005b)) ∫ γ
−∞
Φ(α · x+ β) · ϕ(x)dx = Φ2
(
β√
1 + α2
, γ;
−α√
1 + α2
)
(D.4)
leads to corresponding expected losses
1. in the basic single-factor model:
E0
(
(L− A)+) = Φ2 (−Φ−1(A),Φ−1(pi);√1− ρ) . (D.5)
2. in the expanded model conditional on Y ∗:
E0
(
(L− A)+|Y ∗ = y∗) = Φ2 (−Φ−1(A), c˜; %˜) (D.6)
with
c˜ =
Φ−1(pi)−√ρ · δ · y∗√
1− ρ · δ as well as %˜ =
−√1− ρ√
1− ρ · δ .
By combining these results, we obtain Equation (5.9) and Equation (5.16).
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Appendix E
Proof of Equation (5.25)
Calculating the partial derivative of the bivariate Gaussian cumulative distri-
bution function.
ϕ(x, µ, σ) denotes the Gaussian density function; ϕ2(x, y; ρ) the bivariate
Gaussian density function; Φ(x, µ, σ) the Gaussian cumulative distribution
function, and Φ2(x, y; ρ) the bivariate Gaussian cumulative distribution func-
tion. µ represents the mean, σ the standard deviation and ρ describes the
correlation between X and Y in the bivariate case.
Referring to the bivariate normal distribution, it is commonly known that
the conditional probability distribution function is normally distributed. This
leads in the bivariate case to:
ϕ2(x, y; ρ|x = x) = ϕ
(
y, ρ · x,
√
1− ρ2
)
. (E.1)
According to the law of total probability
ϕ2(x, y; ρ) = ϕ(x) · ϕ2 (x, y; ρ|x = x) , (E.2)
we rewrite the bivariate Gaussian density function
ϕ2(x, y; ρ) = ϕ(x) · ϕ
(
y, ρ · x,
√
1− ρ2
)
. (E.3)
Based on these results, the partial derivative of the bivariate Gaussian cumu-
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lative distribution function can be calculated as follows:
∂
∂x
(Φ2(a · x+ b, y; ρ)) = ∂
∂x
 a·x+b∫
−∞
y∫
−∞
ϕ2(x, y; ρ) dy dx

=
∂
∂x
 x∫
−∞
y∫
−∞
a · ϕ2(a · x+ b, y; ρ) dy dx

=
y∫
−∞
a · ϕ2(a · x+ b, y; ρ) dy
=
y∫
−∞
a · ϕ(a · x+ b) · ϕ
(
y, ρ · (a · x+ b),
√
1− ρ2
)
dy
= a · ϕ(a · x+ b) · Φ
(
y, ρ · (a · x+ b),
√
1− ρ2
)
(E.4)
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